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Abstract 
This study examines the rhetorical methods that eighteenth-century biographers use to 
produce selfhood and to educate readers in behaviors that promote sociability. The interventions 
of the New Science’s inductive epistemology in rhetoric and conceptualizations of selfhood, as 
well as the rise of print culture, offer a foundation for exploring the emergence of the modern 
biographical form in the eighteenth century. In its development, eighteenth-century biography 
utilizes various rhetorical techniques to create a rhetoric of self, which arranges documented, 
lived experience into a print selfhood that readers can observe empirically and sympathetically, 
an engagement with the print person through which they teach themselves right social practice. 
Fundamentally, the effect of these rhetorical techniques is a selfhood that can act as a substitute 
for a person, which readers can observe empirically and sympathetically. In its emergence, the 
biographical rhetoric of self teaches readers to apply a new ethics of reading in order to improve 
themselves and to engage the larger community of readers. 
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Introduction 
 
Critical Positioning 
 Since it relies so conspicuously on research and a chronological apparatus, modern 
biography can seem too formulaic or too easy, a simplistic arrangement of self-evident facts. 
Whether the modern reader takes up one of Claire Tomalin’s literary biographies or just a single 
volume of Michael Reynolds’ five volume treatment of Ernest Hemingway’s life, the familiar 
markers of the form are all there: chapter headings divide the life into years or noteworthy 
periods, citations and footnotes credential documentary evidence, and a series of plates 
reproduces portraits of the subject’s social network. Even Stephen Greenblatt acknowledges the 
significance of these biographical considerations in his Will in the World. Since he lacks the 
usual amount of documentation associated with the form, he locates the most shadowy details of 
William Shakespeare’s life in the reader’s own imagination, yet he seeks to create the same 
biographical effects in the shift from hard fact to imaginative speculation. This apparent, formal 
regularity in modern biography belies its complexity and hides the social function that can be 
traced back to the genre’s eighteenth-century origins. 
My aim is to position the emergent, eighteenth-century biographical form within the 
representational framework provided by the advent of the New Science, its epistemology and 
rhetorical mandate; the rise of print culture and its standards for documentation and credit; and 
the ongoing development of the form toward an increasingly intimate representation of the self. 
From this framework emerges a genre centered on the formulation of the rhetoric of self for the 
eighteenth-century subject. The biographical rhetoric of self comprises the variable and 
adaptable strategies biographers use to represent selfhood in the eighteenth century. I argue that 
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the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self arranges documented, lived experience into a print 
selfhood, which readers can observe empirically and sympathetically, like a living person, in 
order to teach themselves right social practice. This autodidactic quality furnishes readers with a 
private, print means for self-improvement, which has the potential to resituate and stabilize the 
destabilized situation of the self after the seventeenth century. Biography offers an alternative to 
a strictly Foucaultian subject formation through a discursive ordering. Foucault’s construction 
hinges on a formation comprised of “‘[w]ords and things’ . . . a work that modifies its own form, 
displaces its own data, and reveals . . . practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (Archeology 49). While biography does hail the reader as agent within a set of 
formative cultural practices, it establishes a model for the self who can also act rightly within a 
system of practice. The rhetoric of self moves a Foucaultian emphasis on the discursive “words 
and things” of social practice that define the subject back to the reader who can choose to act 
within these practices. Given such agency, the reader can also be taught to choose right action. 
The rhetoric of self’s didacticism gives public significance to the private reader: selfhood 
develops through engagement with the biographical form, in turn developing the individual 
reader into a community of mutual readers, a larger society, and a more stable nation.  
 While the novel emerged alongside biography, it provided imaginative engagement with 
fictitious characters, but biography promised a scientific, instructive account of a real modern 
self. My intervention into the conversation posits the biographical rhetoric of self as a didactic 
form emerging from dual contexts of the New Science and print culture. I focus on the scientific 
epistemology and rhetoric that emerged with the Royal Society, giving particular attention to 
Thomas Sprat, the early historian of the Society, and John Locke, the Society member whose 
theories of selfhood dominated eighteenth-century conceptualizations of the self. Biographically, 
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I will focus on the theory of selfhood put forward in manuscript by Roger North, a contemporary 
of Sprat and Locke, and the later rhetorics of self arranged by Samuel Johnson, whose approach 
is particularly mediated by developing print standards. His biography combined the science and 
the print standards in an early form that would make Oliver Goldsmith’s and James Boswell’s 
biographies possible. 
   
Eighteenth-Century Notions of Biography  
 With his Life of Johnson, James Boswell offers the most comprehensive example of an 
eighteenth-century print self substituted biographically for the lived self. He arranges details 
from Samuel Johnson’s everyday life—the crucial, “minute particulars” which “are frequently 
characteristic . . . when they relate to a distinguished man” (Life i.23)—into a representation that 
privileges Johnson’s personal experiences over his established persona. In Boswell’s biography, 
Johnson is as much a man as an author and social philosopher. This biographical organization 
structures Johnson’s life as a rhetorical pattern of accessible social practices with didactic 
promise. He invites readers not only to observe Johnson, but to engage his selfhood and his ideas 
in conversation. Readers of the Life of Johnson, Boswell could boldly claim, “will not only talk, 
but think Johnson,” an ambitious rhetorical effect, which Boswell claimed his biography had 
accomplished by its second edition: his Life of Johnson had “Johnsonised the land” (Life i.8). 
Boswell’s biography is an assertion that cultural values could be written on or translated through 
an experiential, embodied account of that person’s life, which readers could observe empirically 
and sympathetically. The assertion is, moreover, an exertion of a socially conservative energy 
that addresses an exigence of instability in identity and authority that the eighteenth century 
inherited from the English Civil Wars and the Restoration. Subjects had an agency that was not 
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determined by the religious and socio-economic discourses that blatantly sought to prescribe 
seventeenth-century identities. 
 Recognizing eighteenth-century biographical didacticism, however, is complicated by the 
challenge of defining the form in its moment. The OED cites the first instance of biography as 
1671, around the beginning of the Royal Society, and it cites the first instance of biographer in 
1644. In the first instance, biography is synonymous with autobiography and drafting the 
character of a literary figure; in the second, with a larger, national scope that eighteenth-century 
biographers narrow to the single self, eschewing larger national figures or nations in favor of a 
didactic selfhood. Scholars of the eighteenth-century novel are quick to note the growing 
influence of the biographical genre, but never offer more than a slim outline of the form as such, 
and only in the service of arguments about the novel. Michael McKeon argues that the paradox 
of early biography, “the tension between the individual life and overarching pattern,” 
necessitated the need for specific detail that would later come to characterize the realism of the 
eighteenth-century novel (91). J. Paul Hunter, similarly, notes that biography’s “status as a 
respectable literary and didactic species” validated the emerging novel form, since both forms, to 
some degree, employ similar structures for representing human experience (351). Like 
biography, the novel form often promises the improvement of the reader. Novels like Clarissa 
claim to be “a work which is designed to inculcate upon the human mind, under the guise of an 
amusement, the great lessons of Christianity” (Richardson 1495). Even the comic Tristram 
Shandy seeks to improve the quality of life, since the “mirth” that the novel promises can provide 
a “fence against the infirmities of ill health, and the other evils of life” because “every time a 
man smiles,—but much more so, when he laughs, . . . it adds something to this Fragment of Life” 
(Sterne xv). The similarities and borrowings between eighteenth-century biographies and novels, 
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especially their didactic import, gives novel scholars a convenient counterpoint for theorizing the 
novel, suggesting that the conventions of biography are so self-evident they require no 
articulation. They can be cited as an established, nonfiction form, which contrasts and thus 
clarifies the complexities of the novel form. But a closer critical focus on biography reveals 
generic differences that lend themselves to distinct analytical methods, most notably their 
rhetorical approaches to didacticism.  
 Like scholars of the novel, scholars of modern biographical form are challenged to tease 
a definition from its complexity. William Epstein and Paula Backscheider both allow that the 
form defies easy definition now as much it did for its eighteenth-century predecessors. Each 
looks first to the reader’s engagement with biographical writing as one of the form’s more 
definitive features. Since biography “has never really had a generally accepted terminology . . . 
[or] a poetics that could be upheld and resisted,” William Epstein proposes a focus on “generic 
frames,” whereby a modern audience organizes its understanding through the form and the form 
itself is reorganized as a means of understanding (6, 2). Epstein’s generic frames offer some 
potential for examining the characteristic didactic effect of eighteenth-century biography. After 
all, the rhetoric of self invites readers to shape their self-understanding through an understanding 
of a print self. Although his particular attention to generic recognition emphasizes the reader’s 
interaction with the biography,
1
 Epstein ultimately downplays the moralizing impetus of 
eighteenth-century biography. Backsheider, on the other hand, more productively emphasizes the 
social potential written into the form. Her description of biography foregrounds the interplay 
between the biographer, the audience, and common experience to convey an individuality 
                                                 
1
 Epstein focuses on prominent, emergent biographies, two from the eighteenth century, and organizes his chapters 
and the generic frames they seek to interrogate around like primarily Restoration and eighteenth-century biographies 
like Izaak Walton’s Life of Donne, Johnson’s Life of Savage, and Boswell’s Life of Johnson, as well as Lytton 
Strachey’s Eminent Victorians. 
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particular to the biographical subject. She characterizes this interplay as a “three-way dynamic”: 
“[j]ust as biographers bring themselves to biography and find personal meaning, so do readers, 
and what they bring and find validate truths about biography and about life,” so that, “[e]ven 
better than the novel, biography can be discussed and defined by the ‘work’ it does in society” 
(227). The “work” that the genre “does in society” ultimately becomes the most important 
marker of biography. Its social potential is its definitive feature.  
The rigors of eighteenth-century biography differed from medieval hagiography, 
reflecting different social work it did to a much smaller, much specific body of readers, medieval 
clergy. Medieval hagiography, as a form of life writing, existed in relationship to a religious 
institution sprawling across continents and, thus, requiring greater self-definition, a manuscript 
culture with limited distribution, and an audience accountable to the Christian standards 
prescribed by the medieval Catholic Church. The manuscript culture that produced lives of 
Catholic saints, a genre which Thomas Heffernan labels sacred biography rather than 
hagiography, demonstrated a rhetorical emphasis on “dramatized action over complex argument” 
within a rhetoric of selfhood dependent on “sacred stories designed to teach the faithful to 
imitate actions which the community had decided were paradigmatic” (Heffernan 5). The 
constraints of the social situation require a “presentation of what the community has 
acknowledged as normative behavior” in “dramatic moments . . . [which] are conventionalized 
and thus exist as paradigms for the community” (Heffernan 20). By dramatizing the standards for 
right social action, these sacred biographies illustrated how Christian principles might be 
practiced within the medieval culture. Simply put, these were saintly models of perfection for 
emulation by the less saintly reader, who was most likely a cleric in medieval society. The 
constraints presented by an eighteenth-century culture, on the other hand, merited a different 
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biographical rhetoric that answered the need of a more socially stratified audience than the needs 
of a religious institution stabilizing its paradigmatic standards for an international cohort of 
medieval clerics. 
Boswell’s biographical approach to writing Johnson and to “Johnsonising the land” 
indicates that the emerging form of eighteenth-century biography was three-part, an eighteenth-
century update to Aristotle’s three appeals, derived from the intervention of the new science and 
print culture. Biography depends on an appeal to logos, the verifiable, nonfictional, minute facts 
about a person’s experiences and a compelling arrangement of these facts that lends continuity to 
the life’s representation; an appeal to pathos, a reader’s didactic sympathy with the print person; 
and an appeal to ethos, the biographer’s claim to arrange an authentic rhetoric of self. In his 
Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson defines a “biographer” as a “writer of 
lives” who records “the actions of particular persons.” He does not, however, bother delineating 
how the biographer might structure the record, perhaps confident that his own biographical 
output might address formal considerations. Rather than explicitly define “biography,” Johnson 
cites a definition from Isaac Watts’ Logick (1725).2 Watt’s definition stresses the relationship 
between the materials available to the biographer and the rhetorical arrangements these materials 
make possible, noting that, 
in writing the Lives of Men, which is called Biography, some Authors follow the 
Track of their Years, and place every thing in the precise Order of Time when it 
occurr’d: Others throw the Temper and Character of the Persons, the private Life, 
                                                 
2
 Johnson’s citation is faulty, but he acknowledges the possibility of such inaccuracy in the Preface to his 
Dictionary. To keep the Dictionary accessible and as brief as possible, Johnson found it necessary to shorten the 
examples he included to demonstrate usage; as a result, “[t]he examples are often injudiciously truncated, and 
perhaps sometimes, I hope rarely, alleged in a mistaken sense; for in making this collection, I trusted more to 
memory, than, in a state of disquiet and embarrassment, memory can contain, and purposed to supply at the review 
what was left incomplete in the first transcription.” A truncated citation in the Dictionary does not compromise the 
expertise Johnson’s opinions as a biographer in the eighteenth century. 
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their public Stations, their personal Occurrences, their domestic Conduct, their 
Speeches, their Books or Writings, their Sickness and Death, into so many distinct 
Chapters. (347) 
For a culture increasingly coming to imagine itself and personal selfhood through print, 
verification of such facts would have depended on documentation. An undocumented life, a self 
that leaves no evidence of its actions, is an unlived life with no didactic potential. The 
eighteenth-century biographer’s task was to take all the information that Watts suggested for 
biography—the speeches, books, writing, experiences, public jobs, records of sickness and death 
and so on—and arrange a rhetoric of self in the rhetorical practices of the time. Wilbur Samuel 
Howell notes that these rhetorical practices would “in content . . . be fully relevant to the fact of 
the given situation and in form would be simple and easy to grasp,” written in “the middle and 
the plain style” accessible to all readers who read, view, and learn from the rhetoric of self 
(Eighteenth-Century 446). The print person of the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self could only 
be accessible, compelling, and instructive if it could be fully credentialed as accurate and true.   
In representing a rhetoric of self, emergent biographers felt a closer formal affinity to the 
historian than the poet, novelist, dramatist, medieval hagiography, or seventeenth-century 
character writer. The specifics that mark a private life, which few people see, are more 
challenging to credential than a history that a nation witnesses, yet they are of a kind. Scottish 
rhetorician Hugh Blair classes biography specifically as a distinct construction of history, subject 
to the common attributes of historical rhetoric. He notes that “History is a species of Writing 
designed for the instruction of mankind, [so] sound morality should always reign in it,” and he 
also argues that the biographical form “or the Writing of Lives, is a very useful kind of 
Composition; less formal and stately than History; but to the bulk of readers, perhaps, no less 
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instructive; as it affords them the opportunity of seeing the characters and tempers, the virtues 
and failings of eminent men fully displayed; and admits them into a more thorough and intimate 
acquaintance than History generally allows” (411). Blair’s notion of biography emphasizes the 
form’s appeal to readers. In drawing on common experience and human nature to relay the 
events of the life, the biographer leads readers to draw their own conclusions about the self and 
sociability. The emergent biographical form facilitated a crucial understanding of the multiple, 
shifting codes in social behavior that eighteenth-century readers had to navigate. The immediacy 
of personal histories presents a self for public scrutiny, and their capacity to excite audience 
sympathy indicates their didactic potential. 
 
The Situation of the Eighteenth-Century Self 
While every age has its own stake in defining the human condition, the emergence of 
biography in the eighteenth century suggests a self-awareness about representing selfhood that is 
unique to the period. What might seem foundational to modern biography—incorporating as 
many relevant, minute details as possible, however unflattering, for a fuller representation of the 
biographical subject—must have seemed like a dredging of the potentially invasive, offensive, 
and inappropriate. The form’s didactic commitment to a more thorough representation of human 
experience implies a need, if not for improvement, at least a new way for recognizing selfhood. 
Backscheider asserts that an instructive potential is implicit in the biographical form in 
particular, because it holds up a mirror up to its audience that has “the power to define how a 
person, a nation and its history will be judged, to contribute to maintaining, revising, or shaking 
its self-image” (Backscheider 227-8). Her reading conflates the distinction that Blair draws 
between the grand sweep of human experience that history depicts and the common account of 
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lived experience that a biographical subject presents in order to argue that selfhood embodies 
what is significant about “a nation and its history.”  
Eighteenth-century biography is a discourse determined by a rhetorical situation charged 
with a particular urgency that the rhetoric of self must addresses. In modeling the rhetorical 
situation, modern rhetorician Lloyd Bitzer emphasizes the interplay between rhetoric and world 
which “presents imperfections to be modified by means of discourse” (Bitzer 14): the rhetorical 
situation is the “complex of persons, objects, events and relations . . . . located in reality, [which] 
are objective and publicly observable historical facts in the world we experience, [and] are 
therefore readily available for scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them” (11). Bitzer 
argues that the function of a rhetoric or rhetorical discourse is always determined by an exigence, 
“an imperfection marked by urgency,” that is present only when a situation presents a “defect, an 
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” that can be 
changed positively and only through a rhetorical discourse that fits the specific needs of the 
observable situation (Bitzer 6-7). The sense of urgency drives and shapes the discourse to 
operate with the specific constraints of the imperfection it addresses. 
In the broad, eighteenth-century context of shifting economic mobility, reconfigurations 
of civil authority, and developments in print culture, the discursive potential for biography was 
tremendous and urgent, resituating selfhood and making possible the emergence of a new form 
that could teach readers how to reimagine themselves in the jarring wake of the seventeenth-
century civil and religious wars. Years of internecine struggle destabilized the relationship 
between social authority, political and religious, and its subjects, who took their cues for 
adopting a selfhood from the florid, vitriolic harangues in pulpits and pamphlets. As 
Backscheider argues, the roles of the nation and its history are written into selfhood. Royalists, 
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parliamentarians, Catholics, republicans, Puritans engaged in a war of identities that culminated 
in the execution of the monarch, Charles I, God’s own appointee. If the British could position 
themselves to axe the highest representative of religiously-sanctioned, social authority, then they 
must certainly assume the responsibility of defining their new roles and the authority in relation 
to their new world. Subjects faced the daunting task of reimagining themselves, a task more 
daunting when a new king took the throne and monarchy was restored to England. The old selves 
were out of joint with those times. Biography’s emergence addressed the urgency of this post-
Restoration problem, offering a rhetoric of self that would teach readers how to redefine 
selfhood. Biography simultaneously problematizes extant Civil War and Restoration identities, 
and it becomes a conservative social force in this period, smoothing out the potentially 
destabilizing energies that threatened the prevailing social order, which resulted from the 
beheading of Charles I and Bloodless Revolution that ushered James II from the throne. The 
adversarial political and religious relationship between the revolutionary, anti-monarchical 
Protestant roundhead and the Cavalier monarchist had little gripe and less place in the peaceful, 
Augustan golden age of Queen Anne’s reign.   
In the early eighteenth century, Thomas Birch puts forward a biography of Robert Boyle 
that invites readers to consider the tensions between the Anglican Church and the Royal Society, 
His Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle connects Boyle’s life, scientific endeavors, and 
religious integrity to model how the culture itself might settle the differences between science 
and faith: “Religion, as well as Philosophy, has received . . . important service from the excellent 
Writings and excessive Labours of the celebrated Mr. BOYLE,” so that the biography should 
appeal to those “who have the truest Zeal for the Promotion of Piety, and, it’s best Support, 
useful Science” (Dedication). The rhetoric of self arranged Boyle’s resolve to be a Christian and 
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a scientist into an image of how the culture might resolve itself: faith first, augmented by a 
science that proves itself to be useful.
3
 The biographical form posited a rhetoric of self to answer 
a specific exigence, the instability of selfhood at the outset of the century, by attempting to 
stabilize it, teaching readers the proper action for the public self. 
 Notions of identity destabilized by the upheaval of the civil wars and the subsequent 
Restoration were stabilized by private readers in a society defining itself through print. Earlier 
notions of self were not being replaced entirely, but rather re-envisioned and rewritten through 
biographical form’s gradual emergence. Although he does not attribute these shifts solely to the 
influence of biography, Dror Wahrman traces a pattern of selfhood that moves from a vaguer to a 
more fixed understanding of selfhood, a shift from an earlier, “ancien régime of identity” that 
was characteristically unstable, “mutable, assumable, divisible, or actively malleable,” to a later, 
modern regime that stressed a fixed selfhood with an “innate, fixed, determined core,” 
categorically identifiable “as gender, race, class, and the human/animal divide” (275). Wahrman 
argues that “[l]ike any other historically specific phenomenon, the ancien régime off identity had 
a beginning and an end. . . some aspects of the ancien régime emerged in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries,” followed by “the sea change in the last two decades of the 
eighteenth century in which this distinctive configuration lost its cultural ground and was rapidly 
superseded by another . . . new, alternative identity regime . . . defined by a fundamental 
emphasis on self” (xiii). This solidification of self-understanding, the emergence of a less 
flexible, “alternative identity regime” suggests how biographical rhetoric met the exigency of a 
                                                 
3
 Naturally, Birch’s rhetoric of self ultimately failed to resolve the disconnect between religion and science in the 
eighteenth century, but Bitzer notes that “rhetorical situations come into existence, then either mature or decay or 
mature and persist - conceivably some persist indefinitely” (12). Such is the case with regard to religion’s 
relationship to science—it continues to resonate.  
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society seeking to stabilize the mutable, ancient régime of its identity. And by the end of 
eighteenth century, Wahrman argues, the society largely had (274-8). 
 One of the crucial models for establishing a rationale to resituate selfhood and assigning a 
function to the biographical form is closely John Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood in his 
Inquiry into Human Understanding. While the boundaries of selfhood might have been set by 
external institutions or historical events, as Michel Foucault’s account of modernity suggests, the 
staggering responsibility of the millions of choices that comprise selfhood resides with 
individuals themselves.
4
 For Locke, the responsibility of selfhood and the ability define it for 
oneself are innate. He asserted that,  
since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes ever 
one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a 
rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to 
any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the 
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now 
reflects on it, that that Action was done. (2.335.21-8)  
Charles Taylor characterizes such philosophical understandings of the eighteenth-century self as 
an attempt to stabilize identity. He points to the philosophical construction of selfhood 
articulated by John Locke late in the seventeenth century that allowed people, through the 
rational thought and empirical disengagement, to engage in a “radical disengagement [that] 
opens the prospect of self-remaking,” a self that Taylor dubs the “‘punctual’ self” (171). The 
                                                 
4
 Foucault suggests that modern individuality is at odds with the commonwealth individuality, “the distillation of a 
single will—a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty—from the particular wills of a 
multiplicity of individuals” that Thomas Hobbes outlines in the Leviathan ( “Lectures” 97). Instead, the “individual 
is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, or precisely to the 
extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation” (Foucault, “Lectures” 98).  
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empirical commitments of the rhetorical situation characterized by an unstable selfhood 
demanded a more objectified and classifiable representation of the self. For Taylor, the punctual 
self was situated to “practise a kind of radical reflexivity . . . [which would] fix experience in 
order to deprive it of its power, a source of bewitchment and error” (163). It was a self that could 
self-evaluate and self-correct its imperfections. The notion of the punctual self opens the 
possibility of self perfection, through a disengaged self-consciousness: Taylor argues that “[t]he 
perfectly detachable consciousness is an illusion . . . but it is a shadow cast by the punctual self” 
(172). The biographical form circumvents readers’ fundamental inability to fully detach their 
consciousness and self-reflexively reconstruct themselves by giving them the illusion of another 
consciousness brought into full view. Dynamic readers could view a static selfhood in the 
rhetorical project of biography and instruct themselves from the perspective of the “shadow cast 
by the punctual self,” which is only possible through the self-reflexive detachment that Locke 
believed to be innate. New philosophical models for self-examination such as Locke’s were just 
as emergent, developmental, and unperfected as the biographical form. Yet for a society 
understanding and mediating itself through print more than any previous period, the autodidactic 
potential of biography within this philosophical context allowed readers to discern and adopt 
these lessons they found in the print selves that biography presented. 
 
Private Readers, Social Subjects 
 The didactic advantage of eighteenth-century biography was how it positioned the reader 
in relation to the biographical subject. Translator Henry Gally asserted that “[e]ach Man contains 
a little World within himself, and every Heart is a new World. We cannot therefore attain to a 
perfect Knowledge of human Nature, by studying others or our selves alone, but by studying 
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both” (32). In Gally’s construction, selfhood is expansive, a “world” large enough to contain a 
personal “knowledge of human nature” observation and self-reflexivity. Biography offers a 
means of studying others to understand personal selfhood better. Gally seems to prefer such 
means over social interaction. He argues that didactic studies of selfhood—for him, character 
writing—is “the most agreeable, most instructive Entertainment that can possibly be desir’d; [to] 
transport . . . [the reader] with the greatest Ease imaginable, from the solitude of his Chamber to 
places of the greatest Concourse; there to see and learn the Virtues of men; there to see and shun 
their Vices, without being corrupted by the Contagion of a real Commerce” (Gally 33). Unlike 
actual sociality, modern biography guaranteed good company; unlike the novel, it did not 
encourage readers to identify with unethical characters that were often necessary to complicate 
the plot; and unlike Puritan or evangelical autobiography, it did not seek religious conversion. A 
rhetoric of self could locate the private details of a person’s life within an established, character-
based framework for public understandings of virtue and vice, with all the advantages of 
observing a living person and none of the danger of “corruption.” 
Reading the didactic rhetoric of self becomes a social engagement, a communication 
between the person as print and the almost voyeuristic reader hungry for intimate details. But, 
together, the effect of the intimate print person on the empirical, sympathetic reader is didactic. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith describes such communication between living 
people as a “fellow feeling,” in which one person is moved to sympathize with another by 
substituting his or her own feelings to construct an imagined understanding of the other person’s 
situation and feelings (10). Sympathy, as a product of the imagination, can only be elicited by 
observing other people, empirically, to understand their situation, experiences, and feelings. The 
observer or spectator is guided by “principles” characteristic of human “nature, which interest 
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him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (Smith, Theory 9). Smith’s theory of moral 
sentiments hinges on a spectator witnessing first-hand the suffering or success of another, 
identifying with that other person’s opinions or sentiments and, in the process, coming to 
espouse them: “[t]o approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt 
them is approve of them” (Smith, Theory 17). Biography authenticates this experience as real, a 
textual version of “first-hand” that readers observe like witnessing a living person, which is 
distinct from the novel’s imagined experiences. The rhetorical arrangement of these first-hand 
facts also brings them into clearer, more comprehensive view, so that a reader might consider the 
rhetoric of self more sympathetically than a living person. 
But a good reader, situated to approve and adopt the sentiments of others, must assume 
an objective understanding of their own spectatorial self, the punctual self that enables a rational 
comparison and critique. This self-objectification allows the spectator to identify the traits for 
evaluating others: “[e]very faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like 
faculty in another” (Smith, Theory 19). It is a self-reflexive sensibility informed by set of moral 
standards—Smith gestures to the Golden Rule and Christian charity without naming them 
explicitly (Theory 25)—that ultimately places the responsibility for virtuous behavior on a 
spectator who can judge the vices and virtues of others. The spectator is trained to choose right 
social behavior by observation, imagination, and reflection on the propriety of another’s 
behavior. Evaluating the social practices of another self in a biographical format provided 
practical standards readers could use to reflect on and correct themselves. Walter Ong argues that 
every author writes for an “audience [that] is a fiction,” which requires the “author to imagine an 
audience cast in some sort of role,” and the audience must correspondingly “fictionalize itself . . . 
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to play the role in which the author has cast” it (Interfaces 60-1). The rhetorical situation of an 
eighteenth century biography required a rhetoric of self that invited the reader to cast an “I” in 
relation to representation of the biographical “I”; the fictional role in which biographers cast their 
audience was that of friend or acquaintance to the person whose life they arranged 
biographically. The biographical form made it possible for eighteenth-century readers to 
fictionalize a spectatorial relationship between themselves and biographical subjects safely, as 
Gally would assert, so that they could recognize and adopt the moral tropes embodied there.  
Engaging the didacticism of a biographical print self obligates readers to apply their 
private self-improvement to their social practices. Walter J. Ong has observed these obligations 
in all writing, arguing that print closes off human consciousness by situating readers in relation 
to text and away from other readers (Interfaces 305).
5
 Ong suggests that the effect of this 
interaction between the audience and the material object makes it an agent of change: “print 
encouraged human beings to think of their own interior conscious and unconscious resources as 
more and more thing-like . . . Print encouraged the mind to sense that its possessions were held 
in some sort of inert mental space,” and it implies a finality “suggesting [a] self-containment 
[that] encloses thought” (Orality 132). Although print has an alienating effect, it functions by 
regularizing knowledge and has, thus, a profoundly unifying effect, too (Orality 82). The 
selfhood a reader meets in a biography is a selfhood that other readers meet as well. The personal 
interaction between reader and print thus becomes a social interaction in its repeatability. Ong 
argues that print structures a “[h]uman consciousness [that] is open closure,” a consciousness 
                                                 
5
 Ong cites numerous examples from the eighteenth century to emphasize this point. As opposed to a live audience 
responsive to the rhetoric of a live rhetorician, “[t]he reader, using his eyes to assimilate a text, is essentially a 
spectator, outside the action, however interested. His reaction to one page has no effect on what appears on the next. 
Inviting readers to fill in blank pages, as in Sterne’s Tristram Shandy . . . essentially alters nothing: what the author 
has written, he has written. The live audience is not so necessarily passive” (Interfaces 222). The responsive reader 
is an active agent who can make choices within the context of cultural practices that the embodied biographical 
selfhood presents. 
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that separates readers while opening them to the ideas conveyed in print, rendering it into the “‘I’ 
[that] interfaces with everything” (Interfaces 337). Print and the biographical rhetoric of self in 
particular play a crucial role in mediating a sense of self, a self-contained “I” and a sense of that 
“I” in relation to others in a manner particularly amenable to understandings of self and 
sensibility in the eighteenth century. 
 Some theorists link the development of print culture in the eighteenth century to social 
shifts that defined eighteenth-century publics, since the larger society is comprised of individual 
readers. Benedict Anderson attributes two effects of print culture to the development of a society 
in which readers imagined themselves united as a public community. He notes that newspapers 
and novels in particular created a sense of both “temporal coincidence,” simultaneity of 
happening events (24), and a “social organism” acting within this simultaneity (26). From this 
perspective, eighteenth-century print culture and especially “print capitalism . . . made it possible 
for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, to relate themselves to others, 
in profoundly new ways” (Anderson 36). Similarly, Jürgen Habermas credited print with 
mediating a “rational-critical debate” which initiated a “public sphere” from the republic of 
letters: “by communicating with itself, [the public sphere] attained clarity about itself” (51). Like 
Anderson, Habermas gave particular attention to novels and newspapers, but Habermas linked 
the significance of print to its effect on material culture at large, citing in particular the role of 
Addison and Steele’s Spectator papers in shaping the site of public self-construction, the 
eighteenth-century coffee house (58-9). Habermas more deliberately theorizes the role of the 
individual participant within a public made possible by print culture, arguing that it “was based 
on the fictitious identity of . . . privatized individuals who came together to form a public . . . 
[which] usually combined the characteristic attributes of ownership and education” (56). These 
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private participants came to imagine themselves as a public, however fictitious the identity it 
adopted for itself.
6
 
The distinction between the imagined “I” of the reader, the fictitious identity that the 
author projected and the reader adopted, and the imagined public of a reading community does 
not necessarily lend themselves to an easy participation for all, as the religious and political rifts 
of the seventeenth century illustrated. A personal notion of self can easily be at odds with 
oppositional notions. Johnson biographically invited his readers to broach this issue in his life of 
Addison. Addison, whose Spectator papers were an attempt to answer the questions posed by the 
seventeenth century with a new social civility, acted as secretary to the newly appointed lord 
lieutenant of Ireland, a man whose attitudes and opinions Johnson describes as diametrically 
opposed to Addison’s own. In this conflict, Johnson demonstrates a place for social authority, 
however repugnant to the private person, and for individual ideas of selfhood: “[i]t is not 
necessary to refuse benefits from a bad man, when the acceptance implies no approbation of his 
crimes; nor has the subordinate officer any obligation to examine the opinions or conduct of 
those under whom he acts, except that he may not be made the instrument of wickedness” (Lives 
XXII.609). Johnson’s overt commentary argues that differences between public authority and 
private conscience are not fundamentally irreconcilable; authority that does not require 
“wickedness” or an “approbation of crimes” from the private person does not violate the private 
person’s selfhood. Addison’s life, as the rhetoric of self Johnson arranges, illustrates biography’s 
“power to define how a person, a nation and its history will be judged, to contribute to 
                                                 
6
 Likewise, Adam Smith recognizes in both the historical and biographical forms stylistic attributes with didactic 
implications. Smith makes no particular mention of biography as a form, suggesting that historical writing entirely 
encompasses it. Historical writing, for Smith, implies a sort of biographical stylistics, but ultimately, “[t]he design of 
history . . . is to state the remarkable transactions that pass in different nations, and the designs, motions, and views 
of the most remarkable men of those times, so far as they are necessary to explain the great changes and revolutions 
of states” (Lectures 59). The general didactic effect is to train an audience to act within the larger movements of the 
state, to participate responsibly in a general, social rhetorical situation. 
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maintaining, revising, or shaking its self-image” (Backscheider 227-8). The biography of 
Addison embodies the social concerns that Johnson writes on it and didactically invites readers 
to discover. 
The rhetoric of self produces meaning in the absence of a self’s lived experiences by 
substituting text for life, a principle often evident in the very titles of eighteenth-century 
biographies. Johnson rendered the experiences of a Dutch scientist into “The Life of Herman 
Boerhaave”; Goldsmith substituted a rhetoric of self for Beau Nash in The Life of Richard Nash, 
and Boswell’s biography of Johnson stands in for the man as The Life of Johnson. Text becomes 
life in eighteenth-century biography, and the biographical experience is didactic, engaging 
another selfhood personally at a reader’s private leisure. Since biographical writing substitutes 
the facts of a life for the immediacy of a lived experience, they become the embodied print 
practices of selfhood that allow for sociability that can shape personal selfhood and stabilize 
society’s larger self-fashioning.  
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 1 
This chapter focuses on Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society and John Locke’s 
Inquiry into Human Understanding to examine the role of science in situating a model for 
stabilizing selfhood. I argue that the rise of the new inductive science within the 
institutionalization of the Royal Society and Locke’s influential theory of the self is a point of 
emergence for the eighteenth-century model of selfhood and biographical representation. This 
scientific context was dominated by an inductive scientific practice that privileged cycles of 
experimentation, observation, and documentation. It was the model that Thomas Sprat and, to 
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varying degrees, the members of the newly inaugurated Royal Society endorsed. This inductive 
epistemology depended on cyclical observations to generate facts from which scientific truths 
could be induced, tested and observed, and revised. Epistemologically, when the significance of 
observation is applied to the self, a reasoning person develops through a reflexive self-
consciousness, becoming a spectating self-observer who, as a consequence of observing multiple 
details and facts, generates a distinctive selfhood, as Locke postulated. The emergent biography 
itself also put the person in view, like a print experiment in selfhood, and developed a rhetoric of 
self that would allow readers to induce selfhood from the facts the biographer presents. The 
principles are evident in Roger North’s theory of biography. Although it went unpublished until 
the nineteenth century, North’s model of life writing suggests the influence of the period’s 
scientific theories. North, Sprat, the Royal Society, and Locke are at the center of the new 
science; their models of understanding allowed the biographer to create choices for the reader, 
rhetorical effects that would come to shape selfhood and self-awareness. 
 
Chapter 2  
This chapter focuses on two biographical selfhoods, Johnson’s treatments of Richard 
Savage and Goldsmith’s biography of Richard Nash. Both biographers make particular appeals 
to logos, locating the materials for a life and arranging them in a compelling fashion, that mark 
advances in the form, which appeal to pathos, exciting readers’ sympathies in turn. I argue that 
their development in the context of eighteenth-century print culture advanced a new ethics of 
reading for the biographical form that forces readers observe the print self and make active 
choices for understanding it, like scientists, observing and drawing conclusions from the details 
they see. Eighteenth-century biographers discovered the details for the lives they wrote from 
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sources that were credited by public assent. These biographers arrange the rhetoric of self by 
locating contrasts and contrarieties that create tensions within the character, which could only be 
resolved by the reader’s sympathies. Readers could observe those rhetorics of self as living 
people and learn by reconciling what they saw with what they could conclude. The didactic 
effect of such conclusions identifies and defines right social action for the reader and the larger 
community of readers. Their role as readers was to play the acquaintance of the biographical 
selves they read.  
 
Chapter 3 
This chapter explores the role of the ethos in establishing an intimate rhetoric of self with 
specific attention to the ethos James Boswell fashions for himself in order to write the Life of 
Johnson. By developing the importance of the biographical ethos, Boswell will make a more 
compelling, sympathetic biographical appeal with greater didactic potential for readers. The 
intimate understanding of Johnson that Boswell demonstrates is singular in its scope and 
development throughout this emergent period in biography’s formation. Building a credible 
ethos to play biographer to the great Samuel Johnson was more important to Boswell than to 
earlier biographers because Boswell understood that his claim would be more contested by 
Johnson’s other friends and authors, the profusion of the Grub Street hacks and periodical 
writers, and a reading public with set expectations established through public familiarity. By 
proving himself as a biographer and journalist, Boswell could play interlocutor to Johnson and 
translate his selfhood to a wide range of readers. By establishing an ethos whose biographical 
undertaking would be apropos, Boswell situated himself to arrange Johnson’s selfhood 
rhetorically within it history and character, but most importantly, Boswell’s ethos made possible 
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his most unique contribution to the canon of eighteenth-century biography: an approach that put 
the audience directly in conversation with the rhetoric of self and established a more intimate 
relationship. Boswell’s ethos would come to arrange a rhetoric of self that would locate Johnson 
in print and experience, but it would also bend these eighteenth-century biographical patterns to 
deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic reader to view Johnson’s print life 
ethically, making a spectacle of a rhetorical selfhood that invited all readers to learn about 
sociability and values from the Life of Johnson. 
 
Chapter 4 
The rhetoric of self that James Boswell writes for Samuel Johnson builds on earlier 
strengths of eighteenth-century biographical models. Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of 
print and manuscript culture to arrange the experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood 
bound in time against specific characteristics that transcend the moments of Johnson’s life, 
connecting them all. But ultimately Boswell sought to exhibit Johnson’s lived experience and his 
character in his conversation, through which he strove to “Johnsonise the land.” As a biographer, 
Boswell meditates Johnson’s selfhood. Observing this selfhood, the reader participates in 
conversations with Johnson and his circle to engage Johnson’s selfhood actively. The larger 
consequence of this intimate biography is a larger social shift in which readers will not just talk 
Johnson, but also “think Johnson.” Conversation informs social intercourse, but shapes the 
discursive practices of the larger society. The reader who comes to talk and think Johnson by 
meeting the man in print recognizes him over the course of his life within an intimate rhetoric of 
self and understanding Johnson by discerning his character from a matrix of experiences, events, 
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and especially conversations. In the conversational locus, Johnson’s selfhood is less a thing to be 
observed than it is a presence, a person, a more intimate biographical subject than any prior.  
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Chapter 1—Situating the Self:  
The Emergence of the New Science and the Rhetorics of Self 
 
 The set of practices of selfhood which came to define biography for the eighteenth 
century developed from a conceptual foundation in the larger civil and religious anxieties of the 
seventeenth century. A king could be executed, a commonwealth instituted, and monarchy 
ultimately restored, but succeeding to what? Which Christianity would be sanctioned as a state 
church to reform and persecute aberrant dogmatics? Warring views of state authority and 
sparring sectarian factions essentially became identities in conflict—Roundheads versus 
Cavaliers, the Presbyter, the Puritan, the Papist—types that vied for primacy as normative 
models for the religious and governmental practices they would impose on other selves.
7
 The 
fights between proponents of different ideologies ranged from the Midlands battlefields to the 
streets of London, Parliament, the court, and across the printed page. A robust and often virulent 
print culture exacerbated these conflicts in polemic that shaped the clashing ideologies and their 
corresponding identities with bombast and florid, impassioned rhetoric. 
 During the mid-1640s, in the midst of these struggles, another model for selfhood 
gradually emerged from secret meetings at Oxford, in Gresham College. The men who met there 
identified themselves as natural philosophers, a community of scientists who came to imagine 
                                                 
7
 I use the term “identity” narrowly here to signify the distinctions that different groups established to distinguish 
themselves and their particular political or religious ideological perspective from other groups.  My use follows Dror 
Wahrman’s explanation of identity the Preface of The Making of the Modern Self as a “productive tension between 
two contradictory impulses” (xii). It is a balance between identity understood as the “unique individuality of a 
person” and, especially, “a common denominator that places an individual within a group (as in ‘identity politics’),” 
whereby “identity is the obverse or erasure of difference: it is what allows me to ignore particular differences as I 
recognize myself in a collective grouping” (xii). Identities like Roundhead and Cavalier, by broad strokes, gave 
continuity to groups as diverse as Catholics, moderate constitutionalists, and soldiers, in the case of royalist 
Cavaliers; the Roundhead comprised groups that challenged monarchy such as the Puritans and Republicans. As 
direct identification with the “collective groupings” in Civil Wars and Restoration, the “common” ideological 
“denominators” overrode the markers of unique selfhoods. These markers came to the fore in the emergence of 
eighteenth-century biography, which sought to push past these broad identities into a specific, intimate selfhood. 
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themselves and their practices as, not only an alternative to the anxieties of the seventeenth 
century, but as a remedy to them. These men met secretly to develop a new scientific model; 
they proposed various experiments and, by way of demonstration, related their findings to the 
scrutiny and discussion of the group. The first historian of the Royal Society, Thomas Sprat, 
records some of these varied, early scientific investigations, like Dr. Goddard’s “Experiments of 
a Stone called Oculus Mundi,” Lord Brouncker’s “Experiments of the Weight of Bodies 
increased in the FIRE: Made at the Tower,” and Sir William Petty’s “Apparatus to the History of 
the Common Practices of Dying” (228-231, 284-306). 8 Sprat proposes these practices, the 
gatherings and their scientific bent, as a direct answer to the civil and political uproar of the 
period: “[f]or such a candid, and unpassionate company, as that was, and for such a gloomy 
season, what could have been a fitter subject to pitch upon, then Natural Philosophy?” (55). The 
“candid and unpassionate” character of the private scientist steadied the disquiet that dogged the 
public, at least for the small group of men engaged in scientific inquiry: “[t]o have been always 
tossing about some Theological question, would have been, to have made that their private 
diversion, the excess of which they themselves dislik’d in publick: To have been eternally 
musing on Civil business, and the distresses of their Country, was too melancholy a reflexion: It 
was Nature alone, which could pleasantly entertain them, in that estate” (55-6). The focus of the 
private scientist on “Nature alone,” even on matters as seemingly mundane as dying cloth or the 
increased mass of heated matter, offered to refocus seventeenth-century England from the 
“melancholy distresses” of the period and balance the “excesses” of theological discussion or 
                                                 
8
 Goddard’s experiments tested physical properties to gauge whether correspond with a occulis mundi or opal: he 
weighed the stone dry and wet, after soaking in cold or boiling to record changes in weight, since it he observed that 
it “became transparent” wet (Sprat 230). His scientific report is less a modern report of scientific findings that draws 
conclusions than a narrative of the events he witnessed as he tested the weight of the opal in heat and water.  
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political warfare because these scientific endeavors held the possibility of neutrality and clarity 
(Sprat 56).
9
 
 Diverting attention from the turmoil that dominated the politics, religion, and print 
culture of the mid-century Civil Wars toward a scientific methodology substituted the practices 
of the new scientist for the identity of the Royalist or Republican. The shift redefined how 
selfhood could be identified and examined. A scientific methodology promised to define a 
standard for selfhood with the potential to refocus the infighting of opposing groups on natural 
philosophy: since “contemplation . . . Focused on the natural world and natural philosophy, 
draws our minds off from past, or present misfortunes, and makes them conquerers over things, 
in the greatest publick unhappiness,” the private scientist could better endure the conflicts in 
identity and ideology of the period (Sprat 56). Sprat asserts, moreover, that the development of 
this scientific identity and its focus on nature could accommodate and thereby resolve the 
divisions that had set other ideological identities at war during the period: “while the 
consideration of Men, and humane affairs, may affect us, with a thousand various disquiets; that 
[inquiry into the natural world] never separates us into mortal Factions; that gives us room to 
differ, without animosity; and permits us, to raise contrary imaginations upon it, without any 
danger of Civil War” (56). For Sprat, the shift away from larger, divisive, warring public 
                                                 
9
 The move toward regularity had implications beyond the Society—its practices had stakes in establishing a social 
and worldview. Michael Hunter has argued that the Society itself was not uniform in its opinions or practices, but 
through a common experimental goal, achieved some degree of unification that held promise for English society 
(41). J. Ereck Jarvis has argued that Sprat’s vision of uniform practices for the Society matched his goals for the 
Royal Society’s role in English society, that Sprat and his History sought a create a stabilizing social authority: he 
“forwards a discursive model for the blending of civility, philosophy, and publication,” which was bound to print 
culture for “mediating an authority that moves through yet exists beyond print, an authority manifest in social 
process” (69). William Bynum notes that, beyond the implications for the Society and society at large, the Isaac 
Newton’s own laws of the motion reflect Sprat’s earlier commitment to uniformity in a regularized model of the 
universe: one Newton’s contemporary physicists “used Newton’s laws of motion and his mathematical laws to show 
that the things one could see in the sky could be understood . . . and predicted with accuracy . . . such that the whole 
universe really did work like a well-made clock, and that it kept perfect time” (105-6). 
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identities is a move toward a more particular notion of selfhood, in which markers of a unique 
identity come into focus. 
To adopt the scientific identity, Sprat argues, the scientist must “first know himself” (33). 
Sprat pointedly illustrates this shift with the example of a politician, who cannot be successful 
simply by grasping legal and political ideologies as an “expert in the Nature of Government, and 
Laws, Obedience, and Rebellion, Peace, and War,” but rather through a more thorough, intimate 
understanding of selfhood and “sagacity of judgement in particular things: a dexterity in 
discerning the advantages of occasions: a study of the humor, and interest of the people he is to 
govern” (17). If the politician, the most ready embodiment of the identity associated with the 
Civil Wars and Restoration, can be improved by “sagacity” and a scientific “study” of the 
particular, then scientific method might also be applied to the study of selfhood in ways that 
could alleviate the violent ideological clash of identities of the middle and late seventeenth 
century. If examining selfhood could make individuals aware of their own and of others’ 
differences, then they might begin to prove manageable. 
This promise to accommodate difference without division was the goal of a private group 
of scholars secluded from the public arena where ideological identities had struggled viciously 
for control. Their practices emerged through the establishment of the Royal Society. When 
Charles II, who heralded himself as the Society’s founder, chartered this group of scholars as the 
Royal Society 1662 and renewed the charter a year later, the informal, empirical model of private 
scientists became the basis for the formal methodology ultimately espoused by the Royal 
Society. While the seeming decidedness of a royal charter might suggest a fixing of policy and 
standardization of scientific inquiry, these earliest, emergent stages allowed the Society a more 
nebulous, nominal authority to research and elaborate its epistemology. Michael Hunter argues 
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that the establishment of the Royal Society institutionalized practices that came to define the 
dictates of modern science, despite its initial variability (40-1).
10
 While the establishment of the 
Society purportedly offered an answer to the discordant political and religious questions posed 
heatedly in war and print and while it sought to correct the vicious rhetorical trends that 
opponents wielded to characterize each other, it was still, however, marked by dissent within its 
scientific community. Resolving these differences became one of the Society’s strengths, just as 
the institutionalization of its epistemology and the identity of the scientist inaugurated a new way 
of understanding selfhood and the rhetorical means for expressing it. The royal charter might 
have authorized the new scientific epistemology, but it by no means regularized the variable 
practices that would come to be the official methodology of the Royal Society.
 11
 Michael Hunter 
points out, for instance, Society member Henry Oldenburg, for instance, distrusted the 
experimental model that Sprat endorsed because of its diffusive tendency to develop new 
experiments to explore experimental discrepancies—Oldenburg believed that, without some 
                                                 
10
 Sprat’s history of the fledgling Royal Society functioned officially to situate the its inductive methodology among 
vying scientific paradigms. It is a foundational text that presumed to delineate scientific tenets which were not yet 
standardized among Society members. Sprat’s official history represents the members of the Society practicing a 
uniform, inductive method of inquiry. In his history of the Society’s inception, Hunter stresses that to “presume 
undue unanimity among” the members of the Royal Society is a mistake, noting that “this is the case with their 
views on political and religious issues . . . underlined by the disparate affiliations of the Society’s founders and their 
stress on how their enterprise might transcend such differences” (28). The “transcendent” promise the new scientific 
paradigm offered, that a model of inquiry could allow disparate views to cohere, suggests a stability that is at odds 
with its emergent methodology. Brian Vickers alludes to the competing methodologies from which the Society 
grew: the “Royal Society, although mostly admirable, was the establishment organization for science; that did not 
represent all the valuable work taking place in England . . . and that its own achievements were, and were seen by its 
own members to be, variable, and in some areas disappointing. It represents one view, not necessarily the right one” 
(3-4). When I reference the epistemology, methodology, or empiricism of the Royal Society, I refer to Sprat’s 
representation  of the Royal Society as a institution with institutional practices, even though the standardization of 
these practices was itself emerging within the Society. 
11
 While the variability of opinion on scientific practice and discourse among the early members of the Society 
might undermine the very principle of accommodation that Sprat praises in the Society’s new scientific model, 
Hunter interprets it as an effort at self-propagation: “the Society’s organisers were anxious to spell out the broader 
implications of what they were doing because of a genuine—if naïve—belief that the enterprise of the Royal Society 
was innocuous and reconciling, and that, if this were expounded, the suspicions that people harboured towards it 
could be swiftly overcome and many other enrolled in support of a worthwhile activity in which the Society’s 
members often felt themselves embattled pioneers” (48). In this reading, the institutionalization of the Society was 
an attempt to demonstrate the reliability of the Society’s practices; more importantly, it was an attempt to convert 
others to the scientific understanding and means for making knowledge espoused by the natural philosophers in the 
Royal Society. The argument for accommodation, then, is an argument for dissemination and incorporation. 
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ordering principle, there could be no system of knowledge that experiment discovered; there 
would be little Church influence (56-7, 68-9). 
In this chapter, I will examine how this identity of the new scientist reshaped the 
questions of identity raised by political and religious ideology in the Restoration and made the 
emergence of the Royal Society possible. The identity of the scientist promised to mend the 
dissent among differing ideologies and, thus, promised social progress, which depended on 
personal, moral improvement. I argue that the identity of the Restoration scientist, which was 
bound up in a shift from a deductive to an inductive epistemology, fundamentally altered the 
ways selfhood would be determined and represented rhetorically, as well as the didactic effects 
of these representations. The emergence of this new scientific context made possible the 
emergence of a biographical form different from earlier modes of life writing. This emergent 
form embodies a rhetoric of self that links the new scientific epistemology to its corresponding 
rhetoric to represent selfhood biographically. I focus on two seminal works grounded in the new 
science of the Royal Society, which mark the paradigm shift from a deductive to inductive 
epistemology: Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal Society and John Locke’s Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. Both Sprat and Locke were members of the Royal Society in the 
seventeenth century. While their works were not in direct conversation, their application of the 
new science to methods for general inquiry and inquiry into the self certainly were. Sprat’s and 
Locke’s account of the Society’s practical foundation and the epistemological justification for its 
methodology frame the emergence of new fields for inquiry into the natural world at large, in the 
case of Sprat, and into self-conceptualization and selfhood in particular, in the case of Locke. 
They are, consequently, vital to the emergence of biography in the eighteenth century, both as a 
means of inquiry and as a literary form for representing what is found.  
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I argue that Sprat’s History, which is more of an apologetic than an actual history of the 
Society, challenges extant methodologies for understanding, as well as the means for 
communicating that understanding. The refinement of the Society’s scientific procedures that 
Sprat outlines had an influence on seventeenth-century life writing, but these procedures had 
direct application for the emergence of eighteenth-century biography and its own approaches to 
researching, obtaining, and interpreting the information that constituted biography. More 
specifically, Locke advances an epistemology that narrows Sprat’s focus from an institutional 
program to the understanding of a single person. I argue that the relationship between self-
understanding and selfhood that Locke theorizes offers a conceptual framework that gives 
continuity and coherence to biographical organization. Just as importantly, Sprat and Locke 
propose particular rhetorical approaches for communicating scientific findings and facilitating 
self-understanding that emphasize clarity, straightforwardness, and transparency—scientific and 
rhetorical attributes crucial for organizing an accurate, biographical rhetoric of self. The 
methodological and rhetorical considerations that Locke and Sprat address are complementary 
parts of an epistemology emerging in the late seventeenth that, by the eighteenth century, would 
shape modern biography.  
To argue the relationship between scientific inquiry, its rhetoric, and eighteenth-century 
biography, I will locate the effects of Sprat’s conceptual modeling in the biographical theory of 
Roger North’s General Preface and Locke’s epistemological theorizing in the identity of Joseph 
Addison’s and Richard Steele’s Mr. Spectator. While their Spectator is not biographical, the 
identity of the scientist stands in through its periodical persona, “Mr. Spectator,” who evaluates 
aesthetic considerations and arbitrates taste in order to guide readers toward their own moral 
improvement. This transference from science to taste suggests that the Royal Society had great 
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hopes for the implications of its theory, the potential, adaptable fluidity of the Restoration 
scientist’s identity: as the scholars at Gresham College and the members of the Royal Society 
hoped, the identity could shape social concerns beyond a strictly scientific purview. In the final 
section of this chapter, I argue that the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive science not 
only shaped North’s biographical theorizing and Addison and Steele’s periodical persona.12 
 
Emergence and Shift: Scientific Epistemologies and Their Rhetorics 
In his study of the emerging science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Peter 
Dear draws a connection between the epistemology of the new science and its rhetorical 
expression. He argues that “the Scientific Revolution was . . . a matter of a cognitive shift rather 
than the simple acquisition of new information that demanded new theoretical frameworks to 
accommodate it,” an epistemological shift that is evident in the need “to identify a technical 
practice as new rather than as an unimportant variable variant upon an old practice” which 
“requires particular conceptual and cognitive expectations on the part of the knower” (Discipline 
12). To recognize a new set of practices for making knowledge is to acknowledge a new set of 
“expectations” for what can be known and how it is constructed. His argument echoes Thomas 
Kuhn’s classic conceptualization of shifts in scientific epistemology. In The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn postulates that a paradigm gives a theoretical structure to normal 
practice in the sciences: a paradigm determines how knowledge is to be made, “the problems that 
can be solved” and the “instrumental and conceptual techniques” for solving them (96), and it 
also prescribes a rhetorical means for discussing what is found, a particular “esoteric vocabulary” 
                                                 
12
 These principles would lay a foundation for the didactic and biographical strategies of prominent eighteenth-
century biographers Samuel Johnson, Oliver Goldsmith, and James Boswell. 
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unique to the conceptual obligations of the paradigm (64). Kuhn’s argument essentially defines 
the paradigmatic as what can be known and how it can be expressed.  
Kuhn’s account largely limits the rhetorical change in paradigm shifts to an 
“incommensurability of standards” about the “vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and 
manipulative,” so that old and new paradigms cannot properly speak to one another (149). 13 
Dear, likewise, argues that larger changes in narrative, “scientific literary practice,” are 
necessary to report new knowledge in the larger context of a new epistemology (“Narratives” 
135). These epistemological shifts and their corresponding rhetorics move from an emphasis on 
the generalized principles that can be deduced, in the geometrical pattern of a syllogism, for 
instance, to an inductive emphasis on particulars that only offer insight corporately, induced 
from accumulation of details rather than deduced from a single example. In essence, deduction 
moves from the generalize major premise to the specific minor premises as a means of affirming 
the major premise; induction moves from the specific, experimental details to the general 
principle. The standards that the Society’s natural scientists sought to institute mark a significant, 
epistemological shift away from classical models of logic as a means for scientific inquiry. It is a 
move from Aristotle’s syllogistic model of deduction and Cicero’s rhetorical theory, toward a 
more inductive, empiricist paradigm that emerged through the models for scientific inquiry. As 
philosophers on the cusp of the new science, René Descartes and Francis Bacon illustrate the 
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 Stanley Fish reads Kuhn’s theory as a conceptualization of discursive practice rather than scientific advancement. 
He describes Kuhn’s argument not as purely scientific, but as “rhetorical through and through,” which points to 
inextricable link between scientific practice and rhetorical representation (“Rhetoric” 486). In his reading, Kuhn’s 
theories of normative practice have nothing to do with “the larger world of nature,” since “science does not proceed 
by offering its descriptions to the independent judgment of nature; rather, it proceeds when the proponents of one 
paradigm are able to present their case in a way that the adherents of other paradigms find compelling” (“Rhetoric” 
487). By depending on the rhetorical ability of competing, synchronic claims to persuade those in opposition, 
methodological practices are normalized by offering representations of facts that are “compelling” by design, that 
persuade by offering credible claims. Fish regards the rhetorical of articulating scientific fact as important as the 
techniques and apparatus used to construct the facts themselves.  It is both the scientific knowledge and its 
expression that make the paradigm creditable and its credibility that makes it normative. 
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different epistemological poles between which the new science emerged, each accompanied by 
rhetoric suitable to their epistemological ends. Descartes illustrates the older, deductive model, 
while Francis Bacon advocates a new, inductive mode of inquiry.  
Descartes’ methodology depended more on the classical, deductive methods in his 
formulation of a scientific model based on his ideas of coordinate geometry, “which supposes the 
problem is already solved, and examines the consequences of the supposition” (Russell 560). In 
its structure, this epistemology is fundamentally Aristotelian, a deductive model based on the 
enthymeme, in which the “problem already solved” guides inquiry: the task of science in this 
deductive framework is simple demonstration
14
. Showing “the truth of fundamental statements,” 
such demonstration reinforces overarching principles that are “simply accepted at the outset” of 
an inquiry, like the established given of a geometric proof (Dear, “Narratives” 139). Enthymemic 
argument applies a major premise, an accepted generalization or widely held belief, to a more 
particular case. The conclusions this line argument draws, no matter how specific they are, 
ultimately support the major premise. This method readily lent itself to medieval theological 
arguments that sought to give proof to established ideas. Thomas Aquinas adopts Aristotelian 
deduction in his Summa Theologica to prove and explore the fundamentally inexplicable nature 
of the Christian God, the Trinity and angels.  Rhetorically, this model arranges a scientific 
inquiry syllogistically to verify what is already known and emphasizes the experiential expertise 
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 In discussing the distinction between rhetoric and logic in the eighteenth century, Howell cites an illustrative 
example of the distinction eighteenth-century authors drew between deduction and induction from Thomas Reid’s 
“A Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic. With Remarks”: “The art of syllogism produced numberless disputes, and 
numberless sects, who fought against each other with much animosity, without gaining or losing ground; but did 
nothing considerable for the benefit of human life. The art of induction, first delineated by Lord Bacon, produced 
numberless laboratories and observatories, in which Nature has been put to the question by thousands of 
experiments, and forced to confess many of her secrets, which before were hid from mortals. And by these, arts have 
been improved, and human knowledge wonderfully increased” (Eighteenth-Century 258). Drawing a comparison 
between syllogistic logic and inductive science can prove challenging, as Reid’s comments indicate—deductive, 
after all, is not understood today, after the advent of induction, to be any more scientific that Aristotelian science and 
the importance it ascribes to an elemental theory. 
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of the scientist that, as a given, is articulated by experimental records: what the expert scientist 
knew from the outset is confirmed by the conclusion (Dear, “Narratives” 160). The rhetoric 
follows the epistemological constraints of the deductive paradigm, a largely circular argument 
for proving and demonstrating what is already known.  
Within an epistemological and rhetorical context dominated by Aristotelian deduction, 
life writing was organized around an overarching principle, a definitive attribute that the life 
writer would locate in all the instances of a life. It was the given, the major premise, that the 
experiences of the life would demonstrate and reinforce. In his Parallel Lives, for instance, 
Plutarch represents men of ancient Greece and Rome comparatively in light of a particular virtue 
or moral failing. Izaak Walton’s seventeenth-century account of John Donne, similarly, 
represents Donne as a holy sermon writer rather than a secular poet. Walton’s introduction notes 
that Donne’s “glorious spirit . . . is in Heaven” and promises to relate “those Vertues that were 
but sparks upon Earth, [which have] become great and glorious flames in Heaven” (21-2). 
Walton’s life writing borders on panegyric, but his approach is germane to his original purpose: 
“when Doctor Donn’s Sermons were first printed, this [their printing] was then my excuse for 
daring to write his life; and, I dare not now appear without it” (22). Walton’s account framed 
Donne’s sermons as the holy works of a devout Christian man, works that reflected Donne’s life. 
Walton’s life writing begins with the assumption of Donne’s devotion and piety and 
demonstrates this overarching trait through the most of Donne’s experiences. Walton’s method 
has the same reductive quality that equates religious ideology with identity that characterized the 
crises of ideology during the Civil Wars, but also follows a pattern like the Aristotelian 
enthymeme, both epistemologically and rhetorically.  
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The paradigmatic shift from Cartesian deduction to Baconian induction depended much 
more heavily on organizing multiple, sometimes contrary, pieces of information and 
experimentation other natural philosophers could replicate in order to derive specific principles. 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer describe, for instance, how important the collection of data 
was in proving Robert Boyle’s law of pressure—while other experimenters could not reproduce 
his results with the apparatus of his air-pump, they confirmed the findings through apparatuses of 
their own design (281). As a precursor to the Royal Society’s practices, Bacon’s scientific model 
privileged particularity over Aristotelian generality. Bacon’s inductive model formulated more 
thorough conclusions that followed facts rather than major or minor premises: through his 
method, Bacon sought “to arrive at general laws, having, in the first instance, the lowest degree 
of generality. From a number of such laws he hoped to reach laws of the second degree of 
generality and so on” (Russell 543). Bacon’s extreme aversion to older models suggests an early 
attempt in the emergence of a new epistemology to distinguish it from other, competing 
epistemologies, but still underscores the emergent quality of the shift. In the case of the 
experimental new science advanced by the Royal Society, experience and experiment require a 
new rhetorical arrangement: any “account of an action is an inseparable part of its meaning, just 
as the meaning of the account itself relies on its implicit referent . . . there cannot be an account 
of an experimental event without reference to the spatiotemporally defined region, while the 
spatiotemporally defined region cannot  be an experimental event without its constitution as such 
in the account” (Dear, “Narratives” 136-7). This arrangement reflects the Society’s practices for 
constructing knowledge because it aimed at relaying “spatiotemporally defined” limitations of an 
experiment. To relate an experiment is to relay time, place, and happening. More simply put, it is 
to relay experience.  
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The shift in epistemology was a shift in the accompanying rhetoric of the overall 
paradigm from deductive to inductive reason. The rhetorical method that emerged alongside the 
epistemology depended on “singular contrived events . . . as foundational elements in making 
natural knowledge,” representing them “by detailing a historical episode” or “experimental 
report—an example of the characteristically seventeenth-century genre of the event experiment” 
(Dear, Discipline 13, 14, 15). The “event experiment” recorded a spatiotemporal event, so that 
“experience increasingly took the form of statements describing specific events . . . The new 
scientific experience of the seventeenth century established its legitimacy by rendering credible 
its historical reports of events, often citing witnesses. The singular experience could not be 
evident, but it could provide evidence” (Dear, Discipline 25). The rhetorical arrangement of the 
“event experiment” made the new epistemology possible by providing a necessary conceptual 
frame in which the experiment could unfold. Without the rhetorical component, the epistemology 
would have been unimaginable and untenable: “formulating natural knowledge . . . means 
investigating the literary constitution and function of experience in scientific argument, because 
it is in texts that the knowledge is made” (Dear, “Narratives” 163).  As the site where the new 
inductive epistemology and its corresponding rhetoric met to make knowledge, these 
experimental accounts offered a means for making new understandings and representations of 
selfhood that reflect commitments to the new methodology.  
From the outset, Sprat seeks to justify the methodology and its inductive epistemology. In 
the “Advertisement to the Reader,” Sprat signals that his work is, of necessity, more than simply 
a historic account, conceding that“[t]hough this Book does Treat of many Subjects that are not 
Historical, yet I have presum’d to name the whole a History, because that was the main end of 
my Design.” Sprat claims that the “Objections and Cavils” leveled against the new Royal Society 
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made “it necessary for me [Sprat] to write of it, not altogether in the way of a plain History, but 
sometimes of an Apology.” Sprat’s apologetics in the History act as formal defense of and 
justification for the Royal Society by regularizing it as an institution with a set of definitive 
practices and beliefs. His History explained the Royal Society’s inductive paradigm, its 
epistemology and rhetoric, which was in the process of emerging during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to supplant the traditional model of deductive inquiry. Sprat sought to 
institutionalize the epistemology of the new science; Locke, later, sought to individuate it in 
order to conceptualize selfhood scientifically.  
 
Instituting the New Scientific Epistemology: Sprat’s Apologetics 
In the History of the Royal Society, Thomas Sprat ascribed an inductive epistemology and 
methodology to the Royal Society five years after its official inception. Sprat’s apologetics 
aimed to make the new inductive paradigm the most persuasive model for scientific inquiry, 
which his attack on other paradigms clarifies. While he exhibits the Royal Society’s platform on 
inductive reasoning and empirical understanding, Sprat sets the Society’s epistemology in 
historiographical conversation with other approaches, treating the new inductive science as the 
culmination and correction of earlier methodologies for scientific inquiry. Instituting a scientific 
epistemology as the dominant paradigm involves the representation of previous scientific 
epistemologies as a linear historical progression, at the head of which would be the Royal 
Society (Kuhn 137).
15
 In this way, the new paradigm is justified as a culmination of and an 
improvement on earlier methodologies (Kuhn 153-6). Sprat’s criticisms reveal the practices he 
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 For Kuhn, this representation of an epistemology is accomplished through textbooks, since they are “pedagogic 
vehicles for the perpetuation” of a dominant paradigm, and they must be “rewritten in whole or in part whenever the 
language, problem-structure, or standards” of the new epistemology change (137). The link between epistemology 
and rhetoric make a shift possible, as the shift from deductive science and the rhetoric committed to articulating its 
inquiry to an inductive model demonstrates.  
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seeks to institutionalize for the Society’s epistemology and rhetoric. He claims to argue against 
the “prejudice remaining on many mens minds, towards any new Discoveries in Natural 
Things,” an argument warranted by the “Age itself, wherein I [Sprat] write; which (if I mistake 
not) is farr more prepar’d to be perswaded to promote such Studies, then any other time that has 
gone before us” (4-5). The inductive epistemology for scientific inquiry is the result of a lineage 
that, for Sprat, runs from the ancient Greeks and Romans, through the early Christian church and 
the medieval Catholic Church and early modern Scholastics into the competing scientific models 
of his contemporaries that are now trumped by the inductive model of the Royal Society’s 
natural philosophers.  
How Sprat distinguishes the Royal Society’s scientific practices and agenda from other 
historical and contemporary models emphasizes the epistemological and rhetorical commitments 
that make it unique.
16
 To establish the superiority of the Society’s research methodologies 
against other ancient and the modern epistemologies for inquiry, Sprat’s History sets the 
Society’s inductive approach against the then-popular, deductive means of inquiry espoused by 
classical philosophers, the Greeks in particular, and medieval Scholasticism, particularly in the 
context of the Catholic Church. Sprat aligns the method of inquiry employed by the ancient 
Greeks between two poles, the individual philosopher and factions of philosophers. He criticizes 
the divisiveness that developed around competing philosophical inquiries, noting that “at the 
same time, some few men did continue an earnest, and laborious pursuit, after Natural causes, 
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 As a part of his apologetics, Sprat uses his historiography to direct interpretations of the Royal Society’s practices 
by reducing the complexity of earlier practices. Sprat takes on a deliberate, significant role in instutionalizing the 
Royal Society and in normalizing its scientific epistemology and rhetoric in his representation of scientific history: 
“[o]n the one hand, it refers to a practice, hence to a reality; on the other, it is a closed discourse, a text that 
organizes and concludes a mode of intelligibility” (Certeau 21). The historical approach of Sprat’s apologetics is not 
the final word on the practices of the Royal Society. As a “closed discourse” and institutional document, it 
“organizes” and renders “intelligible” the emergent trends in how scientists or natural philosophers were coming to 
view themselves in relation to the natural world and how they were articulating those positions. By establishing the 
Royal Society as a consequence and correction of earlier models, Sprat establishes a set discursive context in which 
other modes of discourse, like biography, can emerge and evolve.  
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and effects . . . But these Philosophers, digging deap, out of the sight of men; and studying more, 
how to conceive things aright, and persuade their conceptions, to others; were quickly almost 
quite overwhelm’d, by the more plausible and Talkative Sects” (9). Sprat’s critique underscores 
two problems with the deductive scientific methodology in order to recommend the inductive 
method of the Royal Society as a credible, accurate means of inquiry. According to Sprat, 
historical scientific study was limited in its focus on factions rather than an actual inquiry. It is a 
critique that recalls Sprat’s distrust of social and religious factiousness during the Civil Wars; the 
new scientific paradigm would naturally oppose these problems. In such a context, scientific 
inquiry would be reduced to individual labor, Sprat’s first critique of the older, deductive model. 
Such individual endeavors would be free of the disadvantages that attend corporate inquiry, like 
factiousness, but it would also forego the advantages of collaboration, like accountability, which 
is the second problem Sprat locates in the older model.  
The first problem with classical scientific inquiry, as Sprat represents it, is this lack of 
accountability: it was at best the work of lone individuals “digging deap, out of the sight of 
men.” The obscurity of their methods made the findings of lone individuals vulnerable to the 
larger context: one person lacks the intellectual or personal clout to redirect or even challenge the 
philosophical disputations of the “more plausible and Talkative Sects.” Since singularity is 
suspect in a larger culture of contending opinions, the Royal Society answered with a motto by 
member John Evelyn and other fellows for the royal charting of the Society—nullius in verba, 
which is usually translated as “take nobody’s word for it” (Hunter 17). By nature of its 
singularity, the word of one person operating “out of the sight of men” is suspect. As a 
methodology, inquiry not held accountable by other scientists risks undermining the import of 
natural philosophy, which Sprat explains is “to make faithful Records, of all the Works of 
41 
 
Nature” and “to inlarge it, from being confin’d to the custody of a few; or from servitude to 
private interests” (61, 62). In his critique of the lone scientist or natural philosopher of ancient 
Greece, Sprat makes clear a fundamental principle of the new inductive methodology that will 
resonate through the emergence of the biographical form: knowledge about the natural world or, 
derivatively, about a biographical understanding of selfhood cannot rest on the authority of one 
person’s inquiry. The emerging empirical methodology of the Royal Society required multiple 
proofs to credit scientific claims or to credential scientific understanding.  
Seventeenth-century life writers also increasingly stressed the importance of arranging a 
biographical selfhood with evidence of the life from multiple sources. Roger North, a 
contemporary of Sprat and Locke, postulates a theory of life writing that, though it was not 
published during his lifetime, bears the unmistakable stamp of the new inductive science.
17
 Peter 
Millard notes that North “was an enthusiastic supporter of the empirical science which 
transformed thinking the seventeenth century [which] is obvious in his writings,” and that he 
“accepted the Baconian doctrine that all nature, man included, was suitable for objective study” 
(20, 21). His comprehensive, empirical approach to selfhood has the tenor of the “Baconian 
doctrine” he endorsed. Roger North demonstrates this emerging biographical practice in his own 
writing. Although his account of his brothers depends largely on his personal perspective—what 
he witnessed and experienced first-hand and what he can recall—he also recognizes the 
limitations of this approach: life writers, “knowing no better, must take what they find” for their 
“accounts of lives” (77). Unlike a public “state history [which] hath the assistance of public 
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 As Peter Millard, editor of Roger North’s General Preface & Life of Dr John North, explains, Roger North’s son, 
Montagu North heavily edited and published his father’s Life of Dr John North in the mid-eighteenth century, after 
his father’s death (14). Therefore, determining when Roger North drafted his manuscripts is nearly impossible. The 
theory of life writing Roger North expounds in his General Preface to those lives went “unpublished and virtually 
unnoticed until 1962” (Millard 14). Roger North’s statement of biographical principles offers a unique insight to the 
emergence of the biographical form, its epistemology for and rhetorics of self within the larger cultural context of 
the new science. 
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registers, records, pamphlets, gazettes, and often the memoirs of private persons,” the history of 
a private life offers few venues for a life writer “to be informed of the course of any one man’s 
life” (North 77). He asks the readers of his posthumous life writing to “take his word for it,” 
while acknowledging that the word of one person cannot sufficiently, credibly represent another 
person’s selfhood. It is a paradox that leads North to “question whether there is now in the world 
extant the history of any one man’s life so full as it ought to be, and since we have nothing to 
judge by but what is left us, such as it is, who can say whether any one account is full and just or 
no” (77). The “fullness” of an empirical account of selfhood depends on how much can be 
known about the person and the materials that determine that understanding. Empirical life 
writers, “knowing no better, must take what they can find.” What they can find to arrange as a 
life must be credible, another value that Sprat ascribed to the Royal Society’s practices and its 
inductive paradigm. 
Because of the importance that Sprat places on accountability as credibility, the second 
fundamental attribute Sprat ascribes to the Royal Society through his critiques is the Society’s 
inductive means for credentialing knowledge and fact. He evaluates medieval learning and its 
deductive method of inquiry: “[m]oncks, in their solitary, and idle course of life” were as limited 
in their group inquiry as the solitary, classical philosopher (14). The Scholastics or “Schole-
men,” for Sprat, illustrate “how farre more importantly a good Method of thinking, and a right 
course of apprehending things, does contribute towards the attaining of perfection in true 
knowledge, then the strongest, and most vigorous wit in the World, can do without them” (15). 
By comparison, Sprat implies that the Society’s method is “a good Method of thinking and right 
course of apprehending things”; it is transparent, publicly credible, and focused on natural 
philosophy. He characterizes the method of the Scholastics, on the other hand, as disputation or 
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word play devoted to syllogistic deduction. Its fundamental shortcoming is that it “rely’d on 
general Terms, which had not much foundation in Nature; and also because they took no course, 
but that of disputing . . . insisting altogether on establish’d Axioms” (16-7). The dependence on 
axioms that Sprat critiques is itself a critique of the larger, deductive methodology for inquiry 
opposed to the indicative epistemology of the Royal Society.
18
 A deductive epistemology begins 
with what is already known, “some generall Definitions of things themselves according to their 
universal Natures: Then divided them into parts, and drew them out into several propositions, 
which they layd down as Problems: these they controverted on both sides: and by many nicities 
of Arguments, and citations of Authorities, confuted their adversaries, and strengthened their 
own dictates” (Sprat 16). A method based on disputation creates a paradigm that substitutes 
rhetoric for the epistemology it should complement. “Nicities of Arguments and citations of 
Authorities” become rhetorical maneuvers that take the place of inquiry and limit what can be 
known. The Society’s inductive epistemology corrects flaws in the deductive method, which are 
“confin’d, within their own Bounds, and not be suffer’d to hinder the enlargement of the 
territories of other Sciences” (Sprat 21). In Sprat’s estimation, deduction confines itself to 
proving the validity of assumptions, axioms, and givens, rather than focus on the details of the 
natural world and experience. Scientific practice is reduced to rhetorical ornament. 
 Enlarging knowledge, the goal Sprat assigns the Royal Society, shifts the methodological 
focus from strict, rhetorical disputation to an inquiry into “all the Works of Nature, or Art, which 
can come within their reach” (61). Sprat does not renounce rhetoric completely. It is, after all, 
bound up with the process of making knowledge inductively. Instead, Sprat outlines an 
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 The main historian of eighteenth-century rhetoric Wilbur Samuel Howell notes that a methodology based on 
axioms, “self-evident propositions and lucid definitions,” was characteristic of philosophers “who recognized 
Descartes as their leader and who proceeded through reason and principle”—reasoning through disputation and 
proofs—as opposed to the “method of experimental philosophers or Baconians who proceeded through induction” 
(63). Sprat’s critique recommends the experimental method that “proceeded through induction.” 
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epistemology that determines a complementary rhetoric that makes natural facts plain so that a 
reader can induce truths about the “works of nature.” It is not the equivocal rhetoric of deductive 
disputation. The emerging inductive epistemology that Sprat describes is a collective endeavor of 
the Royal Society: “They have labor’d . . . They have striven . . . They have try’d . . . They have 
studied . . . They have attempted” (62). His apologetic replaces isolated deductive disputation 
with an active, collaborative induction, that “labors, strives, and studies” to expand 
understanding. Sprat implies that the collaborative and active work among the Society’s 
scientists builds on a broad range of perspectives and information in order to yield greater 
scientific understanding. The members report “[t]heir Matter . . . before their weekly meetings, to 
undergo a just and full examination . . . [so] that they might enjoy the benefits of a mix’d 
Assembly, which are largeness of Observation, and diversity of Judgments, without the mischiefs 
that usually accompany it, such as confusion, unsteddiness, and the little animosities of divided 
Parties” (91). The collaboration of the Society’s members in knowledge-making not only held 
scientists accountable by putting them in conversation with one another, but it also gave them a 
venue for sharing the knowledge their active effort has generated. The limited inquiry of a single 
researcher could achieve neither goal. As an apology for and defense of a new scientific 
epistemology, the History must represent the Society’s practices as stable or potentially 
stabilizing after the “little animosities of divided Parties” during the Civil Wars in order to make 
a case for the Society’s viability. The diversity of opinions yields a broader range of information 
that scientists might observe and consider to draw more reliable conclusions.  
Paradoxically, the Royal Society’s methodological attention to accuracy and reliability 
also accommodated a large degree of uncertainty. Steven Shapin explains that scientific 
collaboration was modeled on the “practice known as civil conversation,” in order to establish 
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and maintain a reliable network of scientists, which would consequently guarantee the 
perpetuation of empirical inquiry (351). Civil conversation was the Society’s answer to the 
factious politics that shaped the earlier part of the seventeenth century: “[t]he goal of 
conversation was not understood as instrumental, save in the sense that the maintenance of 
public discourse, and one’s continuing participation in it, offered members the possibility of 
future instrumental actions in which they might require the assistance of others. Knowledge, of 
course, figured in the practice of conversation as did judgments of the legitimate content and 
character of knowledge” (Shapin 351). Essentially, conversation ensured future participation and 
inquiry, which would further the inductive program. However, that “establishment of a space 
which was so securely bounded that dispute could occur safely within it was a difficult 
accomplishment in social cartography” (Shapin and Schaffer 303). The concession to this 
challenge and to civility was a social arrangement of the new scientific community that, contrary 
to modern expectations for scientific rigor, emphasized the discourse of seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century conversation more than the actual scientific knowledge it generated: “[t]o 
require too great a rigor, precision, and certainty might be to put too great a strain upon 
conversation; it was to endanger its continuance. Certain conceptions of truth and precision were 
not worth that price” (351). The scientific context of a collaborative, “civil conversation” could 
absorb differing opinions as well as fostering new ones. The “price” of civility, the price for 
maintaining this fecund, scientific trying ground, was the “rigor, precision, and certainty” that 
post-Restoration scientific epistemologies would come to prefer.
19
 Although falling short of 
                                                 
19
 What could be known or revealed about a person biographically was a controversy in biography throughout the 
eighteenth century. Whether letters should be published without an author’s permission or even posthumously, for 
instance, was a question of what biography should protect to maintain the civil character of the biographical subject. 
North noted that leaving out “what is scandalous and unfit for common practice” in representing the private person 
has advantages for inculcating “good sense” (59). By the end of the eighteenth-century and the intimate nature of 
Boswell’s Life of Johnson, questions of biographical propriety were largely answered or, at least, reframed.  
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modern scientific methodology, this emergent scientific epistemology negotiated what could be 
known in order to open a space for later findings.  
The mutual acknowledgement of such open spaces also protected some knowledge from 
inquiry: Sprat’s apologetics, for instance, insist that the methodology of the Royal Society does 
not challenge doctrinal Christianity, the worship of God, or any religious practice (345-78).
20
  
Restoration conceptions of Christian truth “were not worth the price” of exacting precision. As 
Dear points out, natural philosophers or scientists in the Restoration such as Robert Boyle “spoke 
of things that were ‘above reason,” he was demarcating a proper role for philosophy—
experimental philosophy, in his case—that by its very nature was not exhaustive or everything 
that existed or could be known. What was left over was the transcendental part, whether ‘God’ or 
‘Nature’” (“Intelligibility” 149). The distinction that Boyle draws acknowledges limits on 
understanding, whether it is based on a deductive or inductive model. The social unrest that had 
intertwined politics and religious practice necessitated such demarcations for maintaining social 
order. Yet an inductive epistemology that operated on an accumulation of information would 
also require an indeterminate space for drawing conclusions and inducing knowledge if it were to 
allow what was not yet known. The inductive paradigm, then, could function at a respectful 
remove from what “could be known” about the natural world or selfhood, yet incorporate such 
mysteries as facts to be considered when inducing patterns that comprise knowledge.  
                                                 
20
 Michael Hunter argues that Sprat’s apologetics in the History had to adopt a Latitudinarian tone in which reason 
necessarily complements spirituality if the Society’s scientific paradigm was to be reconciled to that of established 
religion: the rationalist methodology of the Royal Society had to be represented as harmonious with a rationalist 
tendencies embraced by much of the Anglican Church at the time (67). Yet it is also possible to interpret this 
connection not as a purely Latitudinarian alignment, but instead “to see this union of the two bodies, one old, one 
very new, rather as a self-legitimating move by the Royal Society to attach itself to the established center” (Vickers 
51). From a practical perspective, Sprat’s anchoring of the Royal Society to the Anglican Church was as cautiously 
politic as it was paradigmatically devout.  
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 Just as North asserted the importance of multiple sources for achieving accuracy and 
reliability in life writing, so did he also acknowledge the necessity of uncertainty. North notes 
that “all history of one sort or other is like painting, never exactly true; that which comes nearest 
is best, and however discrepant, there may be some use or other that makes it reasonable not to 
slight, but to preserve it” (North 77). Because the history of a life is “never exactly true,” the 
uncertainty that discrepancies can introduce into life writing might “make reasonable not to 
slight but to preserve it” regardless. North’s methodological approach to life writing and its 
ability to accommodate uncertainty emerges within the context of the new inductive 
methodology and its focus on multiple, diverse proofs as the source for establishing knowledge. 
The deductive epistemology from which scientific induction was emerging allowed for no 
uncertainty. This sort of rhetoric and methodology were well-suited to metaphysical questions 
that philosophers like Thomas Aquinas would have raised in his Summa Theologica about the 
existence of God, angels (and how many might fit on the head of a pin), Creation, and the 
purpose of humankind. The unassailable given of Aquinas’s methodology was that God was the 
immutable, fundamental fact of existence; for the inductive scientist God was out of bounds, 
scientifically unobservable and, thus, accepted as neither proven nor disproven.
21
 Uncertainty 
would undermine the deductive methodology and fundamentally disprove the knowledge it 
presumed to reinforce. Such a model provides a basis for genres of life writing like hagiography, 
which seek to frame every action in the context of sainthood and hold every aspect of the life 
accountable to that definitive saintliness.   
                                                 
21
 Since the Royal Society took up scientific inquiry of the natural, diurnal world rather than the transcendent, 
spiritual realm, the rhetoric of deductive epistemology would, indeed, seem like “theory composed of 
generalizations constantly revised by reference to practice, as a body of ritualistic conventions that have forgotten 
their original contact with the real world” (Howell, England 65). The New Science sought to link rhetorical 
convention to an inductive epistemology that prided itself on reflecting a natural operation of observation and 
conclusion. 
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In this emergent period, life writers contemporary to Sprat and North deferred to a 
deductive model. By Izaak Walton’s account, every sin Donne might have committed and every 
ribald word he might have written were filtered through the man’s faith, so that the life writing 
expressed less about the life written than about a religious epistemology. In Gilbert Burnett’s 
account of John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, a single moment, a deathbed conversion, overwrites 
Rochester’s questionable ethics and religious practice; indeed, it overwrites the political and 
social implications of libertinism in full, converting them into a cautionary tale that reaffirms the 
importance of Christianity in a period reacting to the earlier strictures of Puritanical, Christian 
governance. As the Royal Society institutionalized itself during the Restoration and eighteenth 
century, it made analogous shifts based on its epistemology possible in other fields. Instances of 
both epistemologies can be located in the life writing of the period, but North’s General Preface 
in particular illustrates the transitional, emergent nature of this epistemological shift. 
Unpublished during his lifetime and remaining unpublished for roughly two centuries after the 
Royal Society’s beginnings, the Preface advocates an inductive approach for life writing that 
would be honed in Samuel Johnson’s, Oliver Goldsmith’s, and James Boswell’s approaches to 
develop increasingly intimate biographical form.  
 The degree of intimacy with selfhood that North’s life writing adopted and eighteenth-
century biographies assumed was possible through facts credentialed by multiple sources for 
accuracy and reliability and an ability to absorb, accommodate, and use any uncertainty that went 
beyond those facts. More importantly, however, Restoration life writing developed through an 
epistemological dependence on the hallmark of the new inductive sciences: experiment is the 
method for establishing and inducing facts that the inductive scientist could use to make 
knowledge. Sprat’s History describes numerous experiments by the Society’s earliest natural 
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philosophers. Their scientific methodology demonstrates the interconnectedness of experiment 
and experience that provide a reference for the inductive epistemological context in which the 
new biographical form emerged. For instance, in relaying “A PROPOSAL For making WINE by 
Dr. Goddard” and “A RELATION OF THE PICO TENERIFFE Receiv’d from some 
considerable Merchants and Men worthy of Credit, who went to the top of it,” Sprat’s 
apologetics equate experiment with experience (193-99, 200-27). The observations of Dr. 
Goddard comprise a narrative of the means of making wine from cane sugar grown in the 
Barbados, with special attention to the connections between natural occurrences that threaten 
crops of cane and the consequences of superstitious responses to these events. Likewise, the 
narrative of “considerable,” credible merchants who climbed a volcano in Barbados gives an 
account of what they saw of the land and its inhabitants.  
As instances of the Royal Society’s scientific methodology, these scientific accounts 
provide examples of what Peter Dear has labeled the Restoration “event experiment,” which is 
more of a historical account than a scientific report (Dear, “Narratives” 15). The event 
experiments provided narratives that, when credentialed collaboratively and considered 
corporately, allow the Royal Society’s natural philosophers to induce truths about the natural 
world that conflate experiment with experience. Sprat gives a succinct description of the Royal 
Society’s epistemological considerations that made the event experiment necessary: 
The True Philosophy must be first of all begun, on a scrupulous, and severe 
examination of particulars: from them, there may be some general Rules, with 
great caution drawn: But it must not rest there, nor is that the most difficult part of 
its course: It must advance those Principles, to the finding out of new effects, 
through all the varieties of Matter: and so both the courses must proceed orderly 
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together; from experimenting, to Demonstrating, and from demonstrating, to 
Experimenting again. (31) 
The Society’s approach to inquiry and understanding is essentially experimental: its members are 
“scrupulous,” rational, and regimented in their inquiry. They begin with “severe examination,” 
proceed with “great caution,” and cycle through experimentation and demonstration of the 
findings in an “orderly” fashion. To force too much order on the process of experimentation, 
however, restricts its usual direction: “it is certain, that Experimenting is; like that which is call’d 
Decence in humane life; which, though it be that, by which our Actions are to be fashion’d; and 
though many things may be plausibly said upon it; yet is never wholly to be reduc’d to standing 
Precepts; and may almost as easily be obtain’d, as defin’d” (Sprat 90). Sprat makes the 
experimental epistemology of the Royal Society analogous to “decency,” linking it to an inborn, 
personal quality that is more naturally practiced than formulated into “standing precepts.” In this 
regard, the new scientific epistemology was framed by experience, and the practice of scientific 
experimentation or human decency is determined situationally, not the other way around. 
Experience and decency cannot be made to conform wholly to standing precepts or deductive 
axioms, and any epistemology that represents them thus is not, Sprat implies, accurate and true to 
nature.  
Sprat’s description of “experimenting” as a fluid, responsive practice that depends on 
disinterested experience and personal observation contrasts with the deductive epistemology and 
its deference to established, determined, external standards. Not only is it a methodological 
distinction, but inductive experiments are also an autodidactic moments, which Sprat cites as 
additional justification for the new method. Later forms like novels, periodicals, and biographies 
would justify their literary methods with the same autodidactic value. Since the emerging science 
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represents the “honest pursuit of the conveniences, decences, and ornaments of a mortal 
condition, by just and regular ways,” a necessary and productive consequence of this experiential 
grounding is the experimental scientist’s commitment to “regard the least, and the plainest 
things, and those that may appear at first the most inconsiderable; as well as the greatest 
Curiosities” (367, 90). The “just and regular” scientific approach assigns value to “things” that 
allow empirical observers the most ready means of fashioning modes of experimentation, “the 
least and the plainest things” that are most common to experience. The move to an inductive 
model that challenged older, classical models of inquiry reprioritized the process of inquiry and 
knowledge making: an empirical scientist began in observation of the least and plainest things 
which might “appear at first the most inconsiderable.” The larger model is a product derived 
directly from these seemingly insignificant details. The Royal Society’s inductive epistemology 
transferred experience from the commonplace to the consequential, forming the pattern of a 
larger principle. The biographical form that emerged in this context thrived on the significance of 
the seemingly inconsiderable details and used them as a basis for inducing a principle of 
selfhood, representing the self more intimately and accurately through the least and plainest 
things than earlier life writing practices.  
 The inculcation of “decency” possible in the natural scientist or, more broadly, the 
scientific observer, is a function of personal observation and crucial to the practice of inductive 
science. Sprat compares the function of inductive, experimental philosophy to the improvement 
of Christian virtue: “spiritual Repentance is a careful survay of our former Errors, and a 
resolution of amendment. The spiritual Humility is an observation of our Defects, and a lowly 
sense of our weakness” (367). In Sprat’s estimation, the Christian practice of “repentance” 
comes through an inductive process of examining available data through a “survey of our former 
52 
 
errors,” in order to induce the more general “defects” in character that define a set of specific, 
personal, human “weaknesses.” Sprat balances religious practices for improvement against the 
practices of the “Experimenter . . . [who] must have some Qualities that answer to these: He must 
judge aright of himself; he must misdoubt the best of his own thoughts; he must be sensible of 
his own ignorance, if ever he will attempt to purge and renew his Reason” (367). By Sprat’s 
account, the practices of the new inductive science hone the practices of Christian repentance. To 
“renew one’s reason” is to strengthen the personal means for improving personal religious 
practice. It becomes a means for teaching people to teach themselves, to inculcate the means for 
personal religious improvement. The epistemology that Sprat describes puts the burden of 
responsibility on the observer to recognize and verify facts in order to induce patterns that are 
credible as scientific truth. This crucial feature of the new epistemology provides the means 
through which the identity of the scientist can come to supplant the contending identities that 
stoked the furor of the Civil Wars in England. 
The distinction between the static deductive system and the autodidactic inductive 
epistemology is evident in Roger North’s biographical theorizing, which models a life writing 
that can instill “decene” in readers. In his General Preface, North invites readers to recognize his 
inductive approach and acknowledges the distinction between a deductive pattern of life writing, 
like his contemporary Izaak Walton, and the new inductive model: 
One thing remains for me to clear, and that is the reason why, after so much as 
hath been said of private biography, I produce here three lives of persons who had 
all considerable posts of preferment, and two them concerned deep in affairs of 
the public. I grant this to be so, and yet I stand to my point, that the lives I write 
are private; for I shall not go out of my way to fall upon foreign affairs or national 
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concerns, at least not so much as may be expected, and indeed no more than in the 
lives of those persons is absolutely necessary to account for their passing their 
time, and what they immediately transacted, and no further. (North 82) 
Life writing before North and the advent of the Royal Society would have focused on the larger, 
public personae of the three lives North writes for his brothers: Francis, the Lord-keeper, Sir 
Dudley, and Dr. John North. Deductive life writing would have taken the public offices of each 
man as a given premise, indicative of every aspect of each man’s life, so that their public policy 
would become the guiding principle for understanding their private lives. North acknowledges 
that some of this public persona is “necessary” to discuss their lives fully, but only to the degree 
that it can help “account for their passing their time, and what they immediately transacted, and 
no further.” The private details balanced against the public personas give readers the opportunity 
to improve themselves by observing the lives of the Norths. In this arrangement, their lives 
become the sum of the specific events marking the passage of time. Personal experience 
becomes a narrative of event experiments that make observation, understanding, and selfhood 
possible.  
 By linking the close observation of event experiments to “Decence in humane life,” Sprat 
charges inductive experimentation and the particularity it examines with a moralizing force (90). 
North, too, locates life writing’s promise to impart “decence” through the seemingly 
inconsequential details that define simply how people passed their time. He asserts that the 
“history of private lives adapted to the perusal of common men is more beneficial (generally) 
than . . . the acts and monuments of famed [leaders]. The gross reason is because the latter 
contain little if anything comparate or applicable to instruct a private economy, or tending to 
make a man either wiser or more catelous in his own proper concerns” (51). The individual 
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events of a person’s life are, according to Sprat, more applicable to the “common” readers who 
“peruse” life writing. The larger, overriding principles that a deductive approach might use to 
interpret a person’s life can “induce a positive inconvenience, as was feigned of Quixote,” since 
“great actions and events superior to a [common] man’s own condition” have more potential to 
confuse rather than illustrate (North 51). The small particularities of private life, evident through 
an inductive approach to selfhood, relate to the everyday experiences of readers, and so “instruct 
a private economy” to help the reader be “wiser” and “more cautious (catelous).” The process 
moves the reader to apply inductive observations of another person’s experience to oneself, 
through life writing that can be observed in the same manner that a Restoration scientist would 
have observed a scientific event experiment. The shift toward an inductive epistemology evident 
in Sprat would, forty years after Sprat’s history, come to make the intimate biography of the 
eighteenth century and its didactic project possible on the foundations postulated by John Locke. 
 
Articulating the New Scientific Epistemology: Sprat’s Call for Rhetorical Reform 
 A crucial part of the development of later literary genres and biography in particular 
depends on the writing’s accessibility for later readers. Long the province of the educated, 
deductive and syllogistic reasoning seemed even more at odds with the pragmatic approached of 
the Royals Society. In the earlier part of the seventeenth century, rhetoric had served divisive 
ends. Scientists like Sprat and Locke theorized how it could unify differences and disperse 
scientific knowledge for the improvement of humankind. Kuhn has argued that a unique rhetoric 
develops alongside any epistemological shifts in science as a means of expressing concepts 
unique to the paradigm (64). A new paradigm must develop a language for expressing itself and 
its findings to convey the knowledge it generates. Dear builds on Kuhn’s assertion, arguing that 
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the rhetoric used to relay information that supports the epistemology is as important to the 
paradigm as the epistemology itself:  
An account of an action is an inseparable part of its meaning, just as the meaning 
of the account itself relies on the implicit referent. Thus the meaning of an 
account of an experimental event—that which makes it an account of an 
experimental event rather than a series of marks on paper—is provided by its 
implicit reference to a spatiotemporally defined region . . . manipulated by a 
human agent. The meaning of that spatiotemporal region itself—what makes it 
discernible as an experimental event—is conferred, reciprocally by the account of 
an experimental event. (Dear, “Narratives” 136-7) 
An account of the event experiment depends on “scientific literary practice,” and for Royal 
Society writers like Sprat and John Locke, such accounts stress the importance of a new rhetoric 
that departs from the older, disputative rhetoric of deduction (Dear, “Narratives” 135). The 
rhetoric of the event experiment must frame the experiential action within time and place to give 
“meaning” to the experience, representing it as “discernible,” observable, and thus factual. 
Biography had the potential to give meaning to selfhood as an experiential event, its factuality 
bounded spatiotemporally like the event experiment of the natural philosopher. The emergence 
of a new rhetoric to accompany the inductive paradigm made its design compelling and 
persuasive in the face of other paradigms, opening possibilities for new areas of inquiry. As an 
emergent form, eighteenth-century biography tacitly refined a rhetoric of self that corresponded 
to the model of scientific developments and to their prescribed, rhetorical, and literary practices 
for representing experience.  
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By involving readers as experiential witnesses, the narrative account of an event 
experiment models its rhetoric on the epistemological practice of inductive science: readers 
become observers who must draw conclusions from the facts that the event experiment presents. 
They become, as Shapin and Schaffer argue, virtual witnesses: “[t]he technology of virtual 
witnessing involves the production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene 
as obviates the necessity for either direct witness or replication . . . The validation of 
experiments, and the crediting of their outcomes as matters of fact, necessarily entailed their 
realization in the laboratory of the mind and the mind’s eye” (60). The onus of credentialing fact, 
as a virtual witness, lies with the reader who must virtually construct an experiment and observe 
its outcomes. The intangibility that frames this experience does not negate the “outcomes as 
matters of fact.” Empirical readers must still induce the scientific truths it indicates as if the 
experience were first-hand. The account of the experiment translated and transferred experience. 
In order to make this reconstruction possible, a reader required rhetorical clarity that encouraged 
conceptualization of the event experiment’s narrative.  
Sprat’s distrust of older rhetorical models linked to a deductive epistemology is evident 
first in his proposal for a new English academy that will promote a rhetoric amenable to the 
“English Genius” that “generally love[s] to have Reason set out in plain, undeceiving 
expressions” (40). It would facilitate an understanding within “the laboratory of the mind and the 
mind’s eye” (Shapin and Schaffer 60). A rhetoric modeled after the “English genius” is aligned 
with the simple pleasures “of the Fields,” rather than the “Humour, and Wit, and Variety, and 
Elegance of Language, are chiefly to be fetch’d” of those who indulge the in the “Pleasures of 
the Town” (41). An English academy would entail some “labor spent about in its [the English 
language’s] polishing,” since it had been “fashioning, and beautifying it self” from the early 
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modern period “down to the beginning of our late Civil Wars” (41, 42). He reasons that the “late 
Civil Wars . . . themselves” are a culture moment “wherein all Languages use[d] . . . to increase 
by extraordinary degrees; for in such busie, and active times, there arise more new thoughts of 
men, which must be signfi’d, and varied by new expressions . . . which were introduc’d by our 
Religious Sects; and many outlandish phrases” (42). The tumult that shifts language to address 
the needs of “busy and active times” consequently introduces a superfluity that obscures 
meaning and, worse still, threatens civil society.  Sprat claims that “if some sober and judicious 
Men, would take the whole Mass of our Language into their hands, as they find it, and would set 
a mark on the ill Words; correct those, which are to be retain’d; admit, and establish the good” 
(42). Such a language and a rhetoric would be more amenable to the English genius, but such 
improvements would only be possible “when minds are somewhat settled, their Passions allai’d, 
and the peace of . . . [the] Country gives . . . opportunity for such diversion” (42). The call for an 
English academy mirrors the chartering of the Royal Society: each seeks to institutionalize 
complementary parts of an emergent, inductive paradigm for improving English society that 
depends on the “sober and judicious” application of empirical reason.22  
Various approaches to inductive rhetoric emphasize alternately the content and structure 
of the writing, even though they are epistemologically inseparable. In the final analysis, 
however, these approaches underline the didactic consequence rhetoric has on the reasoning, 
empirical reader.  Howell summarizes the arguments for rhetorical reform that many inductive 
scientists made as “recommend[ing] inductive procedures in rhetorical argumentation, strict 
                                                 
22
 Howell asserts that the “main conclusion to be drawn from” his tome “is that the changes which took place in 
logical and rhetorical doctrine between 1700 and 1800 are perhaps best interpreted as responses to the emergence of 
the new science” (Eighteenth-Century 5). His argument depends on an assumption since shown to be lacking in 
social and cultural nuance, that scientific empiricism alone drove discursive changes in the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, rhetorically and epistemologically, re-articulaing what could be known and how it could be 
expressed rhetorically in the eighteenth-century 
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standards in probable arguments . . . and the concept of plainness in . . . literary style” 
(Eighteenth-Century 698). Stanley Fish, on the other hand, challenges Howell’s argument 
outright, asserting that scholars “must . . . give up the notion that the decisive or explanatory 
influence in the fashioning of late seventeenth-century style was the rise of science,” religious 
belief, and political affiliation (Self-Consuming 375-6). He prefers examining seventeenth-
century rhetoric on the level of an author-reader relationship, in which readers are led to “a point 
of certainty and clarity” or, conversely and more productively, to complication that raises “more 
problems than it solves” (Self-Consuming 376). A reader, consequently, is forced to make 
choices in order to make meaning, gaining experience, knowledge, and self-understanding in the 
process. The dispute between Howard and Fish, however, shows how modern biography 
produced a via media that brought the procedures of the Royal Society to the ethics of reading. 
Fish’s theorization complements Sprat’s practice and the impetus for a rhetoric that matches 
inductive practice. Despite his attack, his model also complements Howell’s outline for the uses 
of the straightforward plainness that invites readers to experience an experiment: Fish argues that 
rhetorical arrangement invites engagement; Howell, that the scientific content engages the 
reader. Modern biography brought both practices into alignment. 
Restoration life writing demonstrates an appreciation for the balance between rhetoric 
and its effects on the reader. Roger North distinguishes between the “choice of words, charming 
periods, invention of figures, interspersion of sentences, and facetious expressions” as the 
primary “ingredients . . . brought to adorn fiction” and that they might even be applied 
judiciously to improve histories and life writing in particular (59-60). For North, a judicious 
application of complex “periods,” “figures,” and “facetious expressions” is contingent upon how 
true to the original subject such application an might be, how truthful it is, and, most importantly, 
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how edifying the complicated rhetoric renders the writing: “fiction, however deliciously dressed, 
hath not those advantages to improve as history hath, for that it is not true is a cooling reflection. 
And what force can any moral arguments or sentences have that are derived upon feigned 
events? Nothing can invigorate eloquence like truth” (60). The value of life writing is in its 
adherence to truth in North’s estimation, and the more true the writing in relating a life, 
rhetorically and factually, the more valuable it is. This factuality is bound to the experience of 
engaging the rhetoric, like observing the event experiment.  
But the value of truthful life writing does not diminish the rhetorical adornment 
characteristic of fiction. According to North, life writing and fiction are set apart by their end 
function, their capacity to improve the lives and minds of common readers. North’s claim—that 
“[t]here is great art, as well as felicity, in making a good description of plain facts, and it is . . . 
justice and integrity of sense, and significancy of language, that sets it off”—recalls an inductive 
paradigm that privileges “plain facts” over axiomatic principles and writing that translates 
experience through accounts of an event experiment (60-1). Translations of experience, like 
accounts of the complicated event experiment, were connected to the “justice and integrity of 
sense, and significancy of language” that would provide a straightforward record, inviting 
readers to induce truths about a person’s life. If life writers were to manage all of the information 
about a person’s experience, they would need a style that would make the self accessible and 
engaging in order to make moral improvement possible.   
While a scientific understanding guided the choice of details and their arrangement as 
rhetorics of self, these details themselves become distinctly characteristic of a particular person 
by their connection to other epistemologies. What reads like an absolute denouncement of 
rhetoric in Sprat’s History, Brian Vickers argues, is actually a call for stringent language reform 
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to yield a more lucid, concise rhetoric amenable to civil conversation, both in the Royal Society 
and British society at large (6-7). Sprat claims “when I consider the means of happy living, and 
the causes of their corruption, I can hardly forbear recanting what I said before; and concluding 
that eloquence ought to be banish’d out of all civil societies, as a thing fatal to Peace and good 
Manners . . . it is a Weapon, which may be as easily procur’d by bad men, as good” (111). Sprat 
levels his vehemence against not only against the rhetoric of the “religious sects” who wielded it 
during the Civil Wars, but especially against their characteristic rhetoric, which he obliquely 
associates with the classical traditions of Aristotle and Cicero, a rhetoric that obscures 
understanding with ornamental language: “[w]ho can behold, without indignation, how many 
mists and uncertainties, these specious Tropes and Figures have brought on our Knowledge?” 
(112). Sprat argues that the use of language becomes the place where classical epistemologies, 
logical and rhetorical, have cultural purchase and dangerous implications if left unchecked. For 
Sprat, the connection between science and rhetoric has consequential social and cultural 
implications. 
The History articulates a new paradigm that sets specific assumptions for how knowledge 
can be acquired and how it can be expressed, advocating a rhetorical approach with “some kind 
of economical relation to its subject matter” (Vickers 7). Sprat calls for a transparent rhetoric that 
facilitates participation in civil conversation, an approach to language that is succinct and simple: 
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, 
that can be found for this extravagance . . . to return back to the primitive purity, 
and shortness, when men deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal number of 
words. They have extracted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of 
speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness: bringing all things 
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as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of 
Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that of Wits, or Scholars. (113)  
The length of Sprat’s definition contrasts sharply with the lengths he takes to describe and 
disprove other models for language. Using words like “purity,” “shortness,” “close,” “naked,” 
“natural,” “clear,” and “plainness,” he phrases this definition to stress the virtues of 
straightforward brevity that the definition itself lays bare. Sprat credentials his definition of 
language by associating it with nationality and mathematics. He proposes a language that 
exhibits mathematical attributes: the economical ratio of “things” to “words” almost “in equal 
number” and with a “mathematical plainness.” Mathematics can be reasoned through without 
any training in superfluity that has corrupted language in Sprat’s estimation, since such plainness 
makes scientific research accessible for those outside of the Society.  
From the importance experimental philosophers placed on mathematical language, Mary 
Poovey extrapolates a larger world view that influenced the development of the self in relation to 
larger social structures in England: “experimental moral philosophers were able to claim” that 
their observations of the natural world “were simultaneously derived from (a kind of) 
observation, aligned with the (visible) harmony of God’s universe, and universally true. Thus the 
figure of mathematical harmony—not the instrument of numerical representation—was used to 
ground the kind of knowledge considered useful to self-government” (History 156). A 
mathematical language was based on a mathematical worldview, in which an inductive 
philosophy could tally and observe facts then draw conclusions. The rhetoric that facilitated the 
practice of this epistemology within this scientific paradigm was “useful to self-government”—
the responsibility to draw judicious conclusions about oneself and one’s place in the world. Sprat 
underscores the importance of a rhetoric that recognizes its epistemological commitments. 
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Accessibility to scientific fact was enabled by an appeal to the “native easiness” of a 
straightforward rhetoric that would encourage virtual witnesses among the “Artizans, 
Countrymen, and Merchants.” A transparent style would enable the Royal Society to 
communicate with merchants and laborers as well as “wits and scholars” and, more importantly, 
would encourage a self-governance that made the didactic potential of the inductive paradigm 
more efficacious. It had the potential to open selfhood to the view of all. 
 Both the excesses of language that Sprat derides and the reforms that he prescribes as a 
remedy have strong implications for conceptualizing selfhood and representing it biographically 
through rhetorics of self in the eighteenth century. A biographical selfhood would invite the 
reader to witness the life of another person virtually in order to induce the self through a 
narrative account of experience. As Roger North asserts, such witnessing encouraged self-
governance and self-improvement, “to instruct a private economy, or tending to make a man 
either wiser or more cautelous in his own proper concerns” (51). Epistemologically, John Locke 
further elaborates on the relationship between selfhood and the rhetoric that translates it in his 
theorization of understanding. Locke individuates the inductive paradigm, moving it from the 
Royal Society’s larger scientific program with implications for self-improvement to 
conceptualize a selfhood founded on the practice of self-government. 
 
Individuating the New Scientific Epistemology: Locke’s Empirical Selfhood 
The tenets of the new science in the History and the General Preface correlate tidily, yet 
the intersection between Thomas Sprat’s attempt to institutionalize the new paradigm and Roger 
North’s conceptualization of induction-based life writing point to a causal relationship between 
science and life writing: this paradigmatic causality resonates through eighteenth-century 
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thought, even fields as dissimilar from science as the humanities. Nowhere is this resonance 
more clear than in John Locke’s influence on eighteenth-century epistemology and rhetoric, and 
no form is more conscious of Locke than eighteenth-century biography. McKeon asserts that, for 
the arts, “the effort to define the integrity and autonomy of aesthetic response and aesthetic 
judgment . . . took place not in opposition to, but in explicit emulation of, a normative model of 
empirical and scientific cognition. It was by imitating the emergent method and value system of 
the natural sciences that the arts learned their own distinctive mode of being” (“Mediation” 385). 
The scientific mode of writing that emerged alongside the inductive epistemology to translate an 
experiment into narrative as experience provided the “normative model” for Restoration life 
writing and eighteenth-century biography, and increasing thoroughness of this scientific 
paradigm’s articulation created an increasingly normative model. Biography’s focus on 
translating lived experience into print took its cue directly from the scientific epistemology and 
corresponding rhetoric that sought to relay experimental experience into a repeatable experience 
that observes could witness at a remove. Not only could it be a means for an institutional 
method, but also a means for understanding selfhood biographically, within the context of a 
community of readers and, ultimately, in relation to structures of authority, both governmental 
and clerical. Locke’s essay narrowed the focus of the emerging, scientific paradigm from the 
broader institutional model to a more specific, unique model of selfhood that biography would 
emulate and put into practice.
23
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 The process of articulation that McKeon sites recalls the articulation of a scientific paradigm that Kuhn theorizes: 
a paradigm’s “refinement,” as is evident in the articulation of earlier paradigms, has occurred when scientists “were 
working both with fact and with theory, and their work produced not simply new information but a more precise 
paradigm, obtained by the elimination of ambiguities that the original from which they worked had retained” (34). 
Articulating the paradigm of the new, empirical science would have been first a matter of refining the system and 
the practices, followed by a refinement of the participants in the system and, eventually, of people themselves. The 
shift moves from the larger systematic context to the fields that emerge as the context is articulated, like biography.   
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The institutionalization of the Royal Society set the terms in which John Locke’s An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding could conceptualize an empirical model of selfhood, 
developed by scientific practices and systems of value. Locke’s model of self and language 
articulated the Royal Society’s experimental, scientific paradigm by deepening its scientific 
implications. He individuates the paradigm by applying the same standards for inductive 
empiricism that Sprat iterates as Royal Society practice: careful, disinterested observation of 
experimentation; a judicious consideration of all facts, no matter how mundane or seemingly 
trivial; and an inductive pattern-finding that reinvents its conclusions as new facts emerge from 
continued observation. Epistemologically and rhetorically, these standards depend on self-
awareness and self-governance to foster self-recognition. In Locke’s model, selfhood is the 
persistence of self-recognition over time. He approaches human understanding within the larger 
context of the Royal Society’s increasing emphasis on empirical knowledge acquired through a 
regular, experimental method: “[t]he Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and 
perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a 
distance, and make it its own Object” (1.1.1). His emphasis on observation, “the eye,” and 
method, “art and pains,” point to an empiricist model of human understanding that emphasizes 
the role of observation and methodology for recognizing selfhood. It is through Locke’s model 
of selfhood and the language that defines selfhood that the inductive paradigm finds its 
expression in fields of inquiry outside of the natural sciences studied by the Royal Society and its 
members.  
Just as Sprat’s articulation of the Royal Society’s guiding principles and practices is 
evident in the theory of life writing that Roger North expounds, Locke epistemology of selfhood 
develops those same guiding, scientific principles into a model of consciousness widely 
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deployed in novels and periodical. Jill Marie Bradbury cites inductive scientists and Locke in 
particular whose “theories of language and science had . . . [a] strong influence on the 
conceptualization of prose kinds. The scientific revolutionaries . . . concern with semantics, 
referentiality, and rhetoric was perhaps the most important philosophical influence on the 
eighteenth-century understanding of literary kinds” (29). Because of their concern, the “new 
science unsettled relations between the fields of knowledge and their textual forms” and, more 
specifically, that the “epistemology of the new science influenced not only specific literary forms 
and general forms of discourse, but also systems of prose genre” (30). Bradbury coins “systems 
of prose genre” as a designation for deal with the indeterminate quality of many genres emerging 
in the period: “genre itself was a critical problem during the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, when there was no consistent principle for distinguishing among forms of prose 
literature. The increased diversity of print matter after the suspension of the Licensing Act in 
1695 made classification even more problematic” (29). Her assertion points to three general 
effects the empiricist movement had on eighteenth-century literature: it influenced ways of 
knowing available through extant, “specific literary forms”; it shaped rhetorical models; and it 
enabled the emergence of new “systems of prose.”  
Locke’s model of selfhood articulates practices that shape specific literary genres, giving 
form and function based on a Lockean epistemology. Titles of the novel form, in particular, were 
often character’s names, marking a narrative of selfhood. The titles of periodicals, likewise, 
established a selfhood that determined the tenor of their articles and commentary. And 
biography’s grounding drew heavily on the scientific epistemology espoused by the Royal 
Society and Locke. The novel’s and the periodical’s commitment to credentialing a fictionalized 
selfhood with a recognizable reproduction of experience is similar to biography’s 
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representational effect, its depiction of a hypothetical selfhood. But biography depends on actual, 
observed experiences, like those that shape the development of the self in Locke’s model. As a 
conceptualization of selfhood, Locke’s individuated model is useful for interrogating the 
emergence of new systems of prose like biography, and the form’s epistemological commitments 
to a rhetoric of self based on principles germane to the new science.  
Like Sprat, Locke advances an inductive epistemology over the earlier deductive 
paradigm, and like many of the Restoration scientists articulating the inductive paradigm, Locke 
argued that the deductive epistemology is flawed in its misapplication of reason: its primary 
method of drawing conclusions, the syllogism, “shew[s] the connexion of the Proofs in any one 
instance, and no more: but in this, it is of no great use, since the Mind can perceive such 
Connexion where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps, better without it,” since the “Understanding 
is not taught to reason by these [syllogistic] Rules; it has a native Faculty to perceive the 
Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing 
Repetitions” (4.17.4). Locke’s proto-psychological model of the mind gives it an inductive 
“faculty” that is capable of inducing natural “connections” between multiple, related things or 
differentiating unlike things. This faculty makes self-governance possible. The syllogistic model 
of deductive understanding, on the other hand, tries to force this mental faculty into an “artificial 
form” comprehensible “only to those who have thoroughly studied Mode and Figure” (4.12.4). 
Locke stresses the importance of the disinterest that Sprat advocates for members of the Royal 
Society and applies it to an individuated conceptualization of selfhood that emphasizes 
disinterested self-examination and self-discovery. Locke argues that his inductive 
conceptualization, more than Sprat’s generalized scientific method, is more amenable to the 
ways people come to understand themselves and their world in a condition of civil liberty.  
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Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood hinges on the assumption that understanding is the 
result of two interrelated sets of observation, sensing and reflecting, and the self’s increasing 
recognition of both: the former comprises empirical observation of objects outside of the self; the 
latter, on what can be observed inside the self through memory (2.1.3-4). Each set converts 
observation into experience, in the same way that the Restoration event experiment rendered 
scientific models into experiential accounts. In Locke’s model, observing the world empirically 
provides people with a collection of experiences, which they can use to synthesize a distinct, 
internal, coherent selfhood in relation to the outward world. In this configuration, the most 
decent person is able to improve by a disinterested examination of outer observations and inner 
reflections. On their own, these outward and inward functions offer no certainty of selfhood, but 
through the operation of consciousness, they come to cohere: 
For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and ‘tis that, that makes 
every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all 
other thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of 
a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to 
any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the identity of that Person; it is the 
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now 
reflects on it, that that Action was done. (2.27.9) 
That “consciousness always accompanies” thought indicates a separation between awareness and 
mental action; a person might be thinking, but also unaware. The “sameness of a rational being,” 
for Locke, indicates sameness in the “rational” awareness that observes and reasons through the 
function of its own thinking processes. “what Person stands for . . . is a thinking intelligent 
Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in 
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different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from 
thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it” (2.27.9). The persistent self observes its 
persistence over time and becomes a distinct person, distinct from outward circumstances and 
other people, in the same way that the Royal Society’s experimental model called for deriving 
principles from available facts put to experimental tests (Sprat 31). Single moments cannot 
define selfhood in this epistemology; the sameness of a rational being is comprised of many 
distinct details. The task of biographical representation is to locate a selfhood that can cohere 
spatiotemporally, but at different times and in different places.  
 A consistency of self over time and place, experienced through discrete observation 
unites disparate pieces of information about a person’s life in an accommodating rhetoric of self. 
Selfhood is the pattern that develops from the pieces, not an imposition or a deductive 
enthymeme. Such inductive continuity connects significant attributes with the least, plainest, 
most inconsiderable things, as Sprat describes them, which fall within the purview of an 
empirical scientist. Thus the character of a consistent selfhood runs throughout the situations in 
which it occurs, at different times and different places. If applied disinterestedly, the self-aware 
operation of the consciousness can objectify selfhood so that it can be it might be self-analyzed. 
Charles Taylor traces Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood along a trajectory of historical 
precedents for modern notions of self, characterizing Locke’s conceptualization of self as a 
hyper-objectivity so disinterested that it can actually substitute selfhood with an observation of 
the self. The practice of substituting the observation of selfhood for selfhood recalls the event 
experiment that Sprat describes, in which the written, second-hand observation of an experiment 
could stand in for witnessing it first-hand. A life written as experience, too, could stand in 
rhetorically as a second-hand observation of a person self. 
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Observing another’s selfhood is easier, however, than observing one’s own. Taylor 
classifies the process of forming a Lockean selfhood as “radical reflexivity,” through which 
consciousness brings about the “transposition of first-person experience into an objectified, 
impersonal mode” (163). Taylor outlines the consequence of this disconnect and its reflexivity as 
an empirical process: “[t]he point of the whole operation is to gain a kind of control. Instead of 
being swept along to error by the ordinary bent of our experience, we stand back from it, 
withdraw from it, reconstrue it objectively, and then learn to draw defensible conclusions from 
it” (163). The innate capacity the self has for defining itself would offer a mechanism through 
which a self-aware consciousness could empirically “reconstrue” and “draw defensible 
conclusions from” the continuity of another person’s selfhood from an almost empirical and 
experimental remove. This self-governance, which Taylor illuminates in Locke’s theory of 
consciousness, allows for the construction and reconstruction of selfhood. It not only gives 
constitutive integrity to the self, but it allows for change over time. The continuity that Locke’s 
model presupposes offers an epistemological reason for biographical continuity among the 
ostensibly disparate aspects of the self’s experiences or character. 
The radical reflexivity that produces selfhood through a re-reading of multiple 
experiences over time depends on a degree of self-objectification that, as McKeon points out, is 
the primary challenge of Lockean reflexivity: “[i]n the empiricism of philosophical inquiry, 
reflexivity is a problem because it threatens to compromise the degree of distance required by the 
understanding to disembed the nature of the thing itself as an abstract and general idea” 
(“Mediation” 407). Full empirical inquiry, particularly in comprehending the self, must 
“disembed” what is observed to “abstract or generalize” it. But he distinguishes between the role 
of objective reflexivity in the “empiricism of philosophical inquiry” that characterized the new 
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science and the “empiricism of aesthetics” that emerged, reasoning that, “[i]n the empiricism of 
aesthetics, however, reflexivity marks the crucially lesser distance that the imagination takes on 
its object, signifying that what is being represented is not only the nature of the thing but also, as 
figuration rather than full abstraction, the formal process of its representation” (“Mediation” 
407). Methodologically, scientific facts of empirical, inductive inquiry had to “disembed the 
nature of the thing itself as an abstract and general idea” that could be constructed objectively 
through observation. As McKeon reasons, aesthetic empiricism still required a remove, but the 
reader’s “imagination” more readily credentials the details the reader perceives as accurate 
reflections 
The practices and rhetoric of this new science, the empirical epistemology of the Royal 
Society and John Locke, shared a less formalized practice—spectating. Addison and Steele 
introduced a literary eidolon, the Spectator, who presumes to arbitrate questions of eighteenth-
century taste and opinion in the Spectator papers empirically, through observation, evaluation 
and discussion, and finally a discerning conclusion. The literary uses for a Lockean concept of 
selfhood are evident in the empiricism of aesthetics contextualizing the fiction and non-fiction 
genres of the period, including the popular Spectator periodical. McKeon argues that Joseph 
Addison and Richard Steele draw on the normative, scientific epistemology to formulate a 
critical theory for art dependent on observation, imagination, and understanding, which can 
disengage and construe an understanding of the artistic endeavor from a distance (McKeon, 
“Meditation” 391-2). What is significant is that Addison and Steele anchor the inductive 
empiricism on a particular self-awareness that defines itself by its empirical observations of the 
world. 
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Locke’s model for inductive selfhood rippled through the literary selfhoods like the 
Spectator and, especially, through social practices, such as educating taste. The practices of the 
Spectator demonstrate the benchmarks of a scientific epistemology. Addison and Steele chose an 
appropriate venue for informal spectating common in the period, a coffee-house club, 
Habermas’s trope for the public sphere where “Matters of Importance” are “laid and concerted” 
and where advanced aesthetic theory was brought into the consideration of different classes and 
professions (1.6). Empirically, an array of observations and viewpoints held the promise of a 
more sound social commentary, one induced from multiple perspectives. Since a broader range 
of participants would more likely appeal to the common experiences of many groups, the social 
commentary was likely to be more reliable as well.
24
 Such epistemological practices indicate an 
inductive influence, but the Lockean construction of self is particularly evident in the 
conceptualization of the periodical’s speaker, Mr. Spectator.  
The Spectator, his club, and its scrutiny of the world beyond the coffeehouse define them. 
They recognize their selfhoods as distinct from others, taking the normative, empirical strategy 
Locke postulated to define selfhood as a way of creating a persona that seeks to observe and 
analyze the world morally and aesthetically. For Locke, the consciousness of self over time can 
only come through sensation and reflection, which comprise experience (2.1.3-4). Sensation and 
perception are the sources of retention and discernment, which in the Spectator accounts for the 
development of taste (2.9-11). Locke defines these three attributes of understanding as the “true 
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 Scholars often try to pin down the distribution and audience of the Spectator, but it was available through 
subscription, sharing, republication and distribution.  Such widespread popularity suggests that spectating, after the 
empirical fashion of the new science, had become a pervasive model for understanding. It was a prose coffee-house 
group whose scrutiny was framed by the larger public scrutiny of the coffee-house culture that took up the 
Spectator’s topics to direct its own inquiry and discussion. The paper was subject to the scientific analysis it 
modeled as social practice—a group of participants engaged in civil discourse around an event experience like Sprat 
describes in the History. Essentially, the club spectated and its conclusions were, in turn, spectated by readers. The 
conversation of these small reading communities came to define the larger public. Habermas asserts that the 
“periodical articles were not only made the object of discussion but were viewed as integral parts” (42). While the 
figure of the Spectator was not an  inductive scientist, it practices align to the observation and induction of the  
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History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge; whence the Mind has its first Objects, and 
by what steps it makes its Progress to the laying in and storing up of those Ideas, out of which is 
to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of . . . The best way to come to Truth . . . [is] to 
examine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or 
have been taught by others to imagine” (2.11.15). Experience makes self-reflexivity possible, 
allowing a selfhood to draw distinctions based on empirical “examinations of things as they 
really are,” which is to perceive and discern distinctions between oneself, others, and other 
things. Addison and Steele devote the first two essays in their periodical series to distinguishing 
the Spectator as namesake of the papers and his club, a speaker whose empirical modus 
operandi, spectating and retaining information, yields aesthetic and moral conclusions.  
Addison and Steele’s Spectator establishes a relationship with readers through identity, 
claiming that “a Reader seldom peruses a Book with Pleasure ’till he knows whether the Writer 
of it be a black or a fair man, of a mild or cholerick Disposition, Married or a Batchelor, with 
other Particulars of the like nature, that conduce very much to the right Understanding of an 
Author” (1.1). Acknowledging that he is in his readers’ view and subject to their observation, 
Mr. Spectator invites them to join him as spectators of his social practice. Spectating implicates 
them in the inductive process of a scientist. The Spectator acknowledges that, since “the chief 
trouble of Compiling, Digesting and Correcting will fall to my Share, I must do my self the 
Justice to open the Work with my own History” (1.1).25 In order to discern the world and draw 
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 Wahrman situates Locke’s conceptualization long eighteenth-century selfhood—a model in which “personhood, 
or selfhood, can in certain cases roam away from the man, move to another man, or be superseded by another self 
within the same man”—within a larger epistemology he labels the ancien régime (197). As he defines it, the ancien 
régime blurs the boundaries between the coherence of the selfhood and its exact, external expression, and he 
“insist[s] that equating interiority or deep emotion with self at the outset of the inquiry, as a universal experience 
rather than as a historically specific understanding of this experience, presupposes what needs to be demonstrated” 
(xvii). Wahrman argues Locke that establishes a “conceptual doubling, and especially the dissonances that it allowed 
one to imagine possible, appear to have been a persistent thread that ran through the ancien régime of identity” 
(Wahrman 197). While both uncertainty and certainty can be accommodated by a biographical rhetoric of self, the 
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moral and aesthetic distinctions about what he sees, the Spectator must relate the experiences of 
his “own history” that define his awareness of himself as a spectator. Observation, self-
awareness, and experience empirically define the continuity of selfhood, which an observer can 
recognize and construct from patterns in experience. 
Mr. Spectator and his papers illustrate how the use of empiricism to form “right 
judgment” was spreading beyond scientific inquiry. For Locke, this methodology came to 
represent an approach to the natural world and to the interior recesses of human understanding 
and self-consciousness. The intersection of science, society, and selfhood embodied in the 
persona of Mr. Spectator models the foundational practices the new scientific epistemology 
deployed in establishing “the integrity and autonomy of aesthetic response and aesthetic 
judgment—of the epistemology and psychology of the art experience” (McKeon, “Dramatic” 
198). The “psychology of the art experience” is of particular importance to the formulation of a 
rhetoric of self. An understanding of selfhood based on the epistemology of the new science 
would shape its biographical representation and organization and, more importantly, the 
psychological response to an experience with that rhetorically-mediated selfhood.  
Locke’s argues that selfhood is a matter of self-consciousness perceiving itself over time 
and discerning the natural world to recognize itself as distinct. Locke asserts self-consciousness 
as the practice that allows the induction of selfhood from disparate experiences and 
characteristics: “[n]othing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into the same Person” 
(2.27.23). His conceptualization of “remote existences” that can define a person’s selfhood 
accommodates variation so that the self is not static or bound by a single, definitive 
characteristic. As in Sprat’s account of experimental practice, Locke postulates a selfhood that is 
                                                                                                                                                             
fluid character of identity in the ancien régime shifts the significance from a core trait that defines the selfhood 
throughout its life, as would suit a deductive understanding of selfhood, to a set of empirical observations that reveal 
the experiences or, inductively, the experiment of selfhood.  
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fluid and responsive. While the experiences that define a self might seem contradictory, they 
complement each other and give nuance to a particular selfhood in Locke’s model. This line of 
thought is predicated on an epistemological argument that Sprat makes when he gives equal 
importance to both glaringly significant and seemingly inconsequential facts (367). All facts are 
necessary for inducing a larger pattern for understanding: “[e]very Man’s Reasoning and 
Knowledge, is only about the Ideas existing in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, 
particular Existences: and our Knowledge and Reasoning about other Things, is only our 
particular Ideas” (Locke 4.17.8). Collected, “particular existences,” no matter how remote, 
provide a body of experiential detail from which the unique patterns that define selfhood can be 
induced. 
The Spectator, too, employs this normative, scientific practice to interrogate morality and 
aesthetics by considering all facts as particular experiences. Discussions in the Spectator’s 
fictitious club and the London coffee-houses depend on disinterested observation as a basis for 
analysis and interpretation. Mr. Spectator establishes a protocol for spectating eighteenth-century 
society through his own spectating selfhood:  
[W]here-ever I see a Cluster of People I always mix with them, tho’ I never open 
my Lips but in my own Club. Thus I live in the World, rather as a Spectator of 
Mankind, than as one of the Species; by which means I have made my self a 
Speculative Statesmen, Soldier, Merchant, and Artizan, without ever medling 
with any Practical Part in Life. I am well versed in the Theory of an Husband, or a 
Father, and can discern the Errors in the Oeconomy, Business, and Diversion of 
others, better than those who are engaged in them; as Standers-by discover Blots, 
which are apt to escape those who are in the Game. (1.4-5)  
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The observation that the Spectator models requires the observer to be at once both present and 
absent: it depends on the experience it garners through a reflexivity that is simultaneously 
present and distant, to “mix” with society, but to observe it as if he is not “one of the Species.” 
Applied to the development of selfhood, the Spectator’s function matches radical reflexivity 
Taylor finds in Locke. The Spectator must be “resolved to observe an exact Neutrality” in order 
to preserve the clarity and accuracy of observation, which will allow him to collect a variety of 
accurate insights into whatever social “cluster” he has chosen to observe (1.5). It is a pattern of 
self-recognition that positions selfhood in relation to the rest of society. The practice of 
spectating that Mr. Spectator embodies, both as namesake and interlocutor, is an epistemology 
concerned with observation that is characterized by disinterested experience free of “medling,” 
with the goal of accumulating a variety of information.  
 Jürgen Habermas has argued that, through periodicals like the Spectator, “the public held 
up a mirror to itself; it did not yet come to a self-understanding through the detour of a reflection 
on works of philosophy and literature, art and science, but through entering itself into ‘literature’ 
as an object . . . The public that read and debated this sort of thing read and debated about itself” 
(43). The periodical selfhood translated experience scientifically into self by individuating the 
inductive experimentation of the Royal Society. As a methodology, the informal spectating in the 
Spectator offers insight into practices and theories that, as the Spectator asserts, allows for a 
knowledge even “better than” the understanding of “those engaged in them.” The Spectator’s 
“exact Neutrality” opens his inquiry to consider all aspects of the people he observes, and 
through this impartiality he has become conversant with the full range of practices particular to 
any field, the “Statesmen, Soldier, Merchant, and Artizan.” By scrutinizing the particulars of 
practice closely, the Spectator has become “very well versed in the Theory” of husbandry or of 
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“Oeconomy” and “Business.” The knowledge he has garnered autodidactically through his 
empirical inquiry even trumps the self-understanding of the people he observes. The Spectator’s 
inquiry allows him to “discern the Errors” that “are apt to escape those” whose practices actually 
constitute “the Game.” In this instance, inductive practices affect selfhood by eliciting a self-
governance on the part of the observer based on the actions of the observed. The function of the 
Spectator as a self represents the empirical practices and didactic effects of an inductive 
epistemology on selfhood.
26
  
 
Individuating the New Scientific Epistemology: A Responsible Rhetoric for Relaying Selfhood 
 As daily periodical writers, Addison and Steele describe themselves as scientists of the 
human condition with a responsibility to communicate with their audience. They eschewed the 
“rests and Nodding-places” of the “voluminous Writer,” because, as writers who publish “by 
Piece-meal,” they must “immediately fall into . . . [the] Subject, or . . . [their] Papers are thrown 
by as dull and insipid” (1.506). Given the periodical essayist’s limits, an “Essay writer must 
practise in the Chymical Method, and give the virtue of a full Draught in a few Drops” (1.506). 
Their scientific approach exhibits a responsive and responsible rhetoric, aligned with Locke’s 
prescriptions for rhetoric and language. Since rhetoric and epistemology are inseparable, Locke’s 
call for rhetorical reform simultaneously helps create the inductive paradigm by opening a 
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 While the Spectator endorses a method that invites readers to apply their own empirical reason and learn from 
what they see, the aesthetic moralizing of the Spectator papers are not fully inductive and can be heavy-handed in 
their prescriptions. J. Paul Hunter has commented that the “sheer amount of . . . advice provided in popular print—in 
periodicals like The Athenian Mercury or The Spectator, in journalistic narratives of contemporary life, and in 
dedicated treatises and tracts—argues a voracious public appetite for being told what to do. . . the attitude is all 
‘ought’ and ‘must’” (246). It is a criticism that underscores the emergent quality of the inductive epistemology. It is 
a motif that drives the periodical, but it is not the only methodology at play. McKeon reminds that “[t]he later 
authority of ‘scientific method’ should not lead us to suppose a more or less instantaneous success. Indeed, 
throughout the seventeenth century, ‘empirical’ continued to possess largely pejorative connotations as an 
ungrounded practice . . . based on observation and experience, whose efficacy could not be explained” (“Dramatic” 
200). Its emergence is a context for the emergence of other genres and advanced through the application of existing 
ones, like the periodical. 
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discursive space and by giving expression to its full articulation. Kuhn describes the particularity 
of any scientific rhetoric as “an esoteric vocabulary,” suited to describing and articulating the 
epistemology (Kuhn 64). Of the four books that comprise An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke devotes an entire book to words, language, and rhetoric. A rhetoric that 
matches an inductive epistemology must represent experience accurately, giving evidential 
details that lay bare a discovery or invite readers to understand a new scientific principle, “giving 
the virtue of a full draft in a few drops.” In order for the articulation of the scientific paradigm to 
become normative, it must embody reproducible methods and practices for research, as well as a 
vocabulary that accounts for these new means of knowledge making.  
The insights garnered from this process were also a part of articulating the new scientific 
paradigm. Another important step in this process that Sprat records was the documentation of the 
Royal Society’s findings to advance scientific understanding by rendering older paradigms 
obsolete (61). The goals for documentation make clear the larger, pedagogical program of the 
new science that Sprat and the Society promoted. Locke’s epistemology of selfhood is connected 
to a rhetorical model that emphasizes accessibility, like Sprat, for fundamentally pedagogical 
ends. Locke argues that “those, who pretend seriously to search after, or maintain Truth, should 
think themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity, 
Doubtfulness, or Equivocation,” and  he provides “Rules” in order “[t]o remedy the Defects of 
Speech” (3.11.3, 8). The new science develops alongside a new rhetoric that asks readers to draw 
conclusions and make judgments based on language that expresses facts without “obscurity, 
doubtfulness, or equivocation.”   
Locke’s conceptualization of selfhood, Jude David Law suggests, cannot be 
oversimplified simply as a model for cognition. Law notes how closely both parts of the 
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epistemology, the theoretical and rhetorical, are intertwined: “Locke’s account of knowledge and 
experience relies alternately on two radically different accounts of cognition: one modeled on 
visual perception and the other on the structure and effects of verbal language. The distinction is 
not an openly acknowledged, let alone a systematic, one in the Essay” (51). A focus on how 
Locke’s theories aided the formation of the biographical rhetoric of self must foreground the 
“effects of verbal language” Locke outlines in his model, while paying due attention to the 
epistemology that warrants claims about language and rhetoric. Language signifies a fluidity of 
selfhood that can evacuate or entirely redefine itself, since words form understanding and self-
recognition. The significance of language in exemplifying an epistemology of selfhood resonates 
in the rhetoric of self devised by eighteenth-century biographers, whose subjects that can be 
observed empirically and represented rhetorically 
For Locke, rhetoric and language are even more integral to the epistemology of the 
inductive paradigm than they are in Sprat. He assigns two functions, civil and philosophical to 
language and rhetoric. While the civic implications overlap the epistemological of philosophical 
rhetoric, Locke distinguishes between the “Civil” and “Philosophical” uses in the 
“communication by Words”:  
First, By their civil Use, I mean such a communication of Thoughts and Ideas by 
Words, as may serve for the upholding common Conversation and Commerce, 
about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life, in the Societies of 
Men, one amongst another. Secondly, By the Philosophical Use of Words, I mean 
such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise Notions of Things, and to 
express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted Truths, which the Mind 
may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge. (3.9.3) 
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A “civil use” in Locke’s account of language reflects his own scientific practices, which 
necessitated a productive interaction with people outside of the Society, so that the “Essay’s 
revaluation of civil discourse grows from a recognition that whatever progress is possible in 
natural philosophy depends on the efforts of mechanical hands” (Walmsley 145). The 
foundational role that artisans play in Locke’s delineation of the civil use of language implies a 
commonality of experience, “the ordinary and Conveniencies of civil Life,” maintained by a 
“Conversation and Commerce” in society at large. The task of language is to “uphold” these 
conversations and the connections they signify, much in the same way it made commerce 
possible between the sciences and the trades and between Locke and the laborers. In this use, 
language integrates society. A biographer seeking to portray selfhood in its context would have 
to attend to the affairs and “conveniencies” in which it occurred. In the “philosophical use,” on 
the other hand, language plays a much more specific role. Rather than upholding general, social 
discourse, the philosophical use Locke locates in language functions to express with “precision” 
and “certainty” of truths beyond doubt “which the Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with.” 
This philosophical use of language fixes ideas that are stripped of superfluity with an insight 
distilled from what might be the sort of dull and insipid excess of language that worried Addison 
and Steele. 
Both the civil and philosophical uses that Locke ascribes to language are social—words 
“are always made for the convenience of Communication, which is the chief end of Language. 
The Use of Language is, by short sounds, to signifie with ease and dispatch general 
Conceptions”—but this social aspect is more significant than simply facilitating the 
“convenience of communication” (3.5.7). In the first instance, language serves a necessary 
function, linking people and groups socially. This civil function is not as responsible to precision 
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or the attention to certainty that the philosophical use requires. It does not pin down truth. It 
does, however, respond to the “affairs and conveniencies” that delimit what will be considered 
“ordinary.” In its civil use, language requires a specificity to uphold and maintain relationships 
between groups like scholar and artisans. In examining the scientific rhetoric espoused by 
Locke’s own writing and advocated in the Essay, Peter Walmsley observes that “Locke’s 
scientific interests . . . tended toward practice and use rather than theory . . . Moreover Locke’s 
study of nature inevitably brought him into conversation with mechanics, craftsmen, and laborers 
as much as with scholars”(143). Locke’s practicality was in service of his own scientific inquiry 
and how scientific inquiry or natural philosophy might serve the world beyond the Royal 
Society.  
The practicality of language’s civil uses facilitated interactions between the Society and 
tradespeople, though each was guided by a different set of immediate interests: “[t]hose of his 
fellows in the Royal Society who were committed to the history of trades had all insisted on the 
importance of attending carefully to the artisan’s own account of his or her work” (143). For 
Locke, interaction with the tradespeople served the needs of his research, but for the Society 
members “committed to the history of trades,” the interaction and its careful recording was the 
object of the research itself. Walmsley aligns Locke’s conversation with the specialists of the 
Royal Society and of different trades. Sprat, too, stresses this conversation between science and 
commerce. It is a conversation that requires the Society to attend both to tradespeople’s practical 
expertise and their transmission of that expertise in order to make the work of both groups 
accessible to the other. Members of the Royal Society sought civil outcomes beyond advancing 
their own empiricism, rectifying “errors” in understanding, or opening news areas of inquiry. A 
rhetoric that reflects experience as accurately as possible would allow the Society to open its 
81 
 
findings and documentation, as Sprat argues, to scholars and tradespeople. Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer observe that “[w]hat sustained experimental space” in the seventeenth century 
was “[t]he nascent laboratory of the Royal Society and other experimental places [that] were 
producing things that were widely wanted in Restoration society . . . The experimentalist’s task 
was to show others that their problems could be solved if they came to the experimental 
philosopher and the space he occupied in Restoration culture” (Shapin and Schaffer 339-40). 
Given an audience ideally larger than the Society’s own members, documentation of the 
Society’s findings had to offer access to the full, potential range of readers. Like Sprat’s model 
for rhetoric, Locke called for one in which language facilitated inductive reasoning. 
The language that facilitated intersections between professionals and scientists was 
paramount for bridging the distance between members of reading communities, the varied “Taste 
of forty or fifty thousand Readers” of the Spectator, for instance (Addison and Steele 1.506). The 
civil use of language, too, would make the remove between a reader’s experiences amenable to 
those represented biographically. Addison and Steele comment on the writing of the new science 
and class scientific writing with historical writing that “describes every thing in so lively a 
manner, that . . . [the] whole History is an admirable Picture, and touches on such proper 
Circumstances in every Story, that his Reader becomes a kind of Spectator” (3.574). The 
aesthetic practice that Addison and Steele describe here echoes the scientific practice of the 
Restoration scientist, which renders a reader into a virtual witness of an event experiment’s 
narrative. They argue that “among this Sett of Writers, there are none who more gratifie and 
enlarge the Imagination, than the Authors of the new Philosophy, whether we consider their 
Theories of the Earth or Heavens, the Discoveries they have made by Glasses, or any other of 
their Contemplations on Nature,” and the effect is that “we are lost in such a Labyrinth of Suns 
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and Worlds, and confounded with the immensity and Magnificence of Nature” (3.574-5). The 
effect of thorough, careful documentation is to excite the imagination so that it appeals to human 
understanding, even though such documentation risks overwhelming it. Making the documents 
accessible would make the scientist and the epistemology more available, showing seventeenth-
century readers “that their problems could be solved if they came to the experimental 
philosopher” and, more importantly, teaching them how to draw their own conclusions from 
those developed by the new science and philosophers like Locke. 
The rhetoric championed by Sprat and Locke would invite readers to adopt an inductive 
methodology so that they would come to generate knowledge for themselves autodidactically 
from the facts that the new science presented. Not only do the Spectator’s empirical practices of 
observation, discussion, and conclusion lend themselves to social discussions of taste and 
opinion, but also to other fields of inquiry. The Spectator somewhat satirically acknowledges an 
affinity with his  
Brothers and Allies, . . . the Fraternity of Spectators who live in the World 
without having any thing to do in it; and . . . have no other Business with the rest 
of Mankind but to look upon them. Under this class of men are comprehended all 
contemplative Tradesmen, titular Physitians, Fellows of the Royal Society, 
Templers that are not given to be contentious, and Statesmen that are out of 
Business. In short, every one that considers the World as a Theater and desires to 
form a right Judgment of those who are Actors on it. (1.45-6) 
In this instance, spectating provides a means for those who would “form a right Judgment.” No 
conclusion can be drawn without it. Observation is a ready starting point for empiricism that the 
“fraternity of spectators” can apply to fields as varied as the arts, sciences, and business, as well 
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as printing and the market for periodicals like the Spectator. The rightness of a judgment, its 
soundness and accuracy, depends on the empirical standards to which the Spectator initially 
gestures: close observation from a careful remove in order to amass the information allows him 
to induce more thoroughly the practices of a larger system or, as he labels it, a game played 
artizans, craftsmen, soldiers, and other professions. But it also encourages the “decence” that 
Sprat postulated as the outcome of a scientific practice (90). The Spectator conceives right 
judgment in scientific terms as a verifiable conclusion drawn from inductive practice about any 
topic that plays across the “theater” of the “world.” 
 The civic uses of language that Locke emphasizes recall Sprat’s own appeal for an 
English academy that would match the Royal Society to improve communication. Establishing a 
mode of common language that made event experiments and demonstration accessible to all 
would also make widely available the didactic experiences through which readers would become 
virtual witnesses and apply their own reason to draw conclusions about scientific principles. 
Procedurally, people could also apply their reason to an understanding of others to improve 
themselves. For Locke, such social considerations are important, but less substantive than the 
philosophical implications of language and rhetoric for his conceptualization of human 
understanding. Language plays a fundamental role in the definition of selfhood and is 
foundational for translating sense and reflection into the details that a person might come to 
recognize as a persistent selfhood over time. For Locke, a careful consideration of words “may . . 
. lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how great 
a dependence our Words have on common sensible Ideas . . . to conceive those Operations they 
experimented in themselves . . . [and] to signify those internal Operations of their own minds” 
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(3.1.5). Language gives personal, individuated significance to what is perceived, retained, and 
discerned; it gives a vocabulary to neutral, empirical self-recognition. 
In its philosophical use, language also serves a social end, since it requires an exactitude 
that relates knowledge authoritatively, without doubt or need for any disputation to define its 
meaning. The precision and certainty that Locke prescribes for the philosophical use of language 
corrects what Locke regards as a fundamental failing in understandings of language:  
It has not, that I know, hitherto been taken notice of by any Body, what Words 
are, and what are not capable of being defined: the want whereof is (as I am apt to 
think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling, and obscurity of Men’s 
Discourses, whilst some demand definitions of Terms, that cannot be defined; and 
others think, they ought to rest satisfied, in an Explication made by a more general 
Word , and in Restriction, . . . when even after such Definition made according to 
rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of 
the Word, than they had before. (3.4.4)  
“Wrangling” with “obscurity” to establish a certainty of meaning is, for Locke, fundamentally 
divisive and, thus, dangerous. Its end is not to advance knowledge or gratify understanding, but, 
rather, bald disputation. Such competition defies the collaborative science the Royal Society 
advanced: “[t]he purpose of disputation is not the discovery and sharing of knowledge, but rather 
the development and display of personal logical dexterity and, in most cases, the claiming of 
personal legitimacy . . . No one attending a dispute would expect to hear solutions but were there 
to witness and applaud the agility of disputants” (Walmsley 119). Locke promotes a collective, 
agreed-upon understanding over the “personal logical dexterity” of individual disputants. Rather 
than furthering contention, Locke advocates philosophical use of language upon “which the 
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Mind may rest upon, and be satisfied with, in its search after true Knowledge” (3.9.3). A 
perspicuous style inspires confidence that can resolve disputes in meaning, so that “minds may 
rest upon” the language it has in common.  
Because of the civic and philosophical implications of language, Locke famously attacks 
rhetorical practices that were typical of the Civil Wars throughout his Essay. Such direct attacks 
are a common trope in the empirical writings of the new scientists. They are as evident in Sprat’s 
History as in Locke’s philosophy. These attacks, however, are not directed at rhetoric and its 
epistemological import in general, but at the florid rhetoric associated with older models for 
understanding. Howell states that the “tradition [Locke] demolished had said that man obtained 
valid knowledge about himself and his world by examining propositions previously established 
in connection with all of the subjects of human concern, and by treating those propositions as 
alone capable of yielding complete certainty in all sciences” (Eighteenth-Century 267). Rather, 
Locke sought to displace the older rhetorical models with the empirical models of the Royal 
Society: Locke’s “denunciation of prearranged contrivances of style, and his advocacy of the 
plain, perspicuous utterance, help to convince all sectors of the public that speeches and writings 
did not have to keep to the vocabulary of the initiated, but could use the idiom of everyday life” 
(Howell, Eighteenth-Century 501). Much like the split between the civil and philosophical uses 
for language the Essay outlines, Locke also distinguishes between times when the rhetoric of 
“everyday life” is appropriate. Such rhetoric would prove appropriate for representing experience 
in an event experiment or a biography. Much like the accessibility Sprat requires of rhetorical 
expression in order for readers to draw conclusions from narrative accounts of fact, Locke calls 
for a rhetoric that is straightforward, transparent, and open, which can only be achieved through 
an accessible rhetoric that evinces a “calm, dispassionate manner, with its stylistic self-
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effacement and studied refusal of ornament and rhythm” (Richetti 67). It is the neutrality with 
which the Spectator claims to approach every human scene. Locke advocates an inviting style, 
like the Spectator’s neutrality, to unite a variety of readers in larger considerations, which offers 
the potential to uphold conversation and commerce.  
Johnson would commend Addison’s normative, empirical, democratic standard for 
rhetoric in The Lives of the Poets for being accessible both to specialists and non-specialists: 
“[h]is prose is the model of the middle stile; on grave subjects not formal, on light occasions not 
groveling; pure without scrupulosity, and exact without apparent elaboration; always equable, 
and always easy, without glowing words or pointed sentences” (Lives XXII.678). What Johnson 
locates in Addison’s rhetoric is the “model of the middle style” that can appeal to all readers and 
invite them to draw conclusions from factual information rather than “glow words or pointed 
sentences.” Addison’s rhetoric puts content before style, and “Addison never deviates from his 
track to snatch a grace; he seeks no ambitious ornaments, and tries no hazardous innovations. His 
page is always luminous, but never blazes in unexpected splendor” (Lives XXII.678). Johnson’s 
analysis assumes that the “luminous” page, one that lights the way for a reader to draw 
conclusions inductively, deserves commendation over the page that depends on “ambitious,” 
rhetorical “ornament,” the sort of “blazing” ornament characteristic of earlier models of 
deductive disputation.  
In Addison, Johnson finds a rhetorical approach to his Londoner readers and the 
widening British audience as the Spectator papers gained popularity because 
if his language had been less idiomatical, it might have lost somewhat of its 
genuine anglicism. What he attempted, he performed; he is never feeble, and he 
did not wish to be energetick; he is never rapid, and he never stagnates. His 
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sentences have neither studied amplitude, nor affected brevity: his periods, though 
not diligently rounded, are voluble and easy. Whoever wishes to attain an English 
stile, familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days 
and nights to the volumes of Addison. (Lives XXII.678) 
 Addison’s style follows the pattern of an inductive rhetoric employed by the new scientists to 
articulate an inductive epistemology. Locke argued that “Words, especially of Languages already 
framed, being no Man’s private possession, but the common measure of Commerce and 
Communication, ’tis not for any one, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in . . . 
Men’s intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood” (3.11.11). In following 
an easy, middle style, Johnson claims that Addison’s rhetoric achieves a “genuine Anglicism” 
that typifies an “English style,” high praise which unites methodology and national ideals. Such a 
style would not only enable commerce between members of reading communities, but it would 
help them improve themselves as self-governing readers.
27
 Locke’s distinction between 
entertainment and improvement matches the distinction Johnson makes in analyzing the 
strengths of Addison’s rhetoric. Locke’s theory makes a place for entertainment in service of 
instruction, “[s]ince Wit and Fancy find easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and 
real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and allusion in Language, will hardly be admitted, as an 
imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, 
than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass 
for faults” (3.10.34). But Locke criticizes the ends of entertainment by pairing “wit and fancy” 
with “pleasure and delight” and pitting them against “dry truth and real knowledge” and 
                                                 
27
 As increasingly self-governing readers, eighteenth-century reading audiences were developing the savvy reading 
practices within the context of a variably print culture. Modern readers can assume certain fixities in print that allow 
their degree of self-governance to focus less on print practice and more on interpretive practice. 
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“information and improvement.” He also brands “figurative speech,” “allusion,” and 
“ornaments” as undesirable outside of entertainment.  
Locke’s critiques point back to older rhetorical models, the disputations that “were 
central to the curriculum of English universities in Locke’s day . . . To Locke’s colleagues in the 
Royal Society, the disputation epitomized all that was stagnant and word-bound in 
scholasticism” (Walmsley 118). A style depending on ornamental language and figurative speech 
evoked this model of understanding and associated it with exclusivity and “stagnation.” For 
Locke, this sort of language is a “perfect cheat” (3.10.34). The nature of this cheat is stylistic, 
characteristically bound to a competitive model of disputation, “laudable and allowable [for] 
Oratory . . . in Harangues and popular Address” (3.10.34), but nonetheless a cheat because 
all the Art of Rhetorick . . . all the artificial and figurative application of Words 
Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move 
the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment . . . ‘Tis evident how much Men 
love to deceive, and be deceived, since Rhetorick, that powerful instrument of 
Error and Deceit, has its established Professors, is publickly taught, and has 
always been had in great reputation. (3.10.34)  
Locke implies that the outcomes of the “art of rhetoric” in “oratory,” “harangues,” and “popular 
address” signified the cheat, associating it with the university rather than the Royal Society. In 
creating a rhetoric of self, the eighteenth-century biographer who followed Locke’s critiques of 
older rhetorical models had to represent a person precisely.  
 The correction Locke prescribes for the deceptive ends of the “art of rhetoric” is 
directness and transparency. Locke argues that “Men’s Intentions in speaking are, or at least 
should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other 
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the like incommodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common Use. Propriety of 
Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Men’s minds with the great ease 
and advantage” (3.11.11). Directness of address can only accomplished by considering “common 
usage,” addressing a clear topic with a clear purpose. A direct, rhetorical style, one that “gives 
our thoughts entrance into other men’s minds,” is based largely on familiar expression that 
evokes a familiarity with common experience, through the directness of expression, coupled with 
transparency in purpose and explanation. It is a change preceded by the formative move from the 
primacy of Latin to the vernacular Benedict Anderson describes in theorizing imagined 
community (39-42). The crucial point, however, is that rhetoric gives a speaker, a scientist, an 
essayist, a biographer access and entrance to another person’s mind.   
 The effective inductive rhetoric that Locke prescribes for general use depends on a plain, 
transparent diction that strives to be as factual, accurate, and representative as the facts it relates. 
An inductive rhetoric is not devoid of calculated rhetorical moves, but characterized by rhetorical 
effects that invite a reader to draw conclusions, unlike a deductive rhetoric that begins with 
conclusions and proceeds to proofs. Coaxing readers to induce conclusions for themselves from a 
body of details is to defer to the new science’s epistemological obligations to an inductive 
paradigm. But as Locke argues and the Spectator demonstrates, an inductive rhetoric has the 
potential to enact what the substitution of the Restoration scientist’s identity for the factious 
identities of the Civil Wars had promised all along: to foster a civic and social responsibility that 
would train readers to induce civic and social patterns of truth from the facts they read and, 
especially, the facts of their experience. More to the point, an inductive rhetoric makes the 
didactic potential of the inductive paradigm plausible, giving rise to systems of prose genres 
charged with a responsibility to help readers educate themselves. 
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The emergence of the new science made a new notion of life writing possible in the late 
seventeenth century. The inductive epistemology that Sprat ascribes to the Royal Society hinges 
on an experimental model that renders experience into narratives that establish scientific fact: 
experimentation follows a cyclical, inductive pattern of inquiry that collects facts from which 
theories are developed, tested, observed, and adjusted based on the new facts generated by 
experimentation. The empirical methodology allows for an increasingly in-depth examination of 
the natural world. North applies this methodology to selfhood and life writing. While his theory 
follows the contemporary patterns of Restoration scientific methodology, North’s model for life 
writing was publish in full for three hundred years after he prescribed rules for an innovative 
approach to biography. The genre emerged independently of North’s theory of life writing, but 
nevertheless along the same empirical lines that the new science had established. In John 
Locke’s conceptualization, the epistemology of the inductive paradigm moved from a model for 
comprehending the natural world to an empirical model for comprehending human 
understanding. Locke’s inductive model for selfhood held the potential for a pattern of self-
improvement as cyclical as the empirical model Sprat had described earlier: by observing and 
reflecting on the facts of oneself and one’s experiences, a person could change and create new 
facts and new experiences that would lead sounder logic, ethics, and morals. The impetus for 
change lies in part in the late seventeenth-century vacuum of a fixed monarchical relationship 
between the governing and governed and a rising middle class that stood as a public in relation to 
traditional forms of state authority. A beheaded monarch and a deposed monarch of the same 
house necessitated the creation of an empiricism that would yield a logic, ethics, and morality 
removed from the passions of seventeenth-century civil discord and apropos of the social 
situation developing in the long eighteenth century.  
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The emergence of eighteenth-century biography within this empirical context emulates 
the core practices and values that distinguish the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive 
paradigm. The normative standards this scientific model provide made it possible for biographers 
to gather as wide a range of facts as possible that could be credited as the experiences of the 
person they sought to write. Such credit came from observation—facts from other people that put 
the person in observable view of many people. The biography itself also put the person in view. 
Eighteenth-century biography developed a rhetoric of self that would allow a reader to determine 
selfhood from the facts the biographer presented. This rhetorical arrangement allowed the 
biographer to create choices for the reader. In the next chapter, I will focus eighteenth-century 
print culture shaped the generation of the observable facts from which readers located selfhood, 
and, particularly, facts that allowed authors like Samuel Johnson and Oliver Goldsmith to 
arrange for a reader to discern a self in their Life of Richard Savage and Life of Richard Nash. 
The development of its methods that would come to define the new science made the emergence 
of other fields of inquiry possible, even in literature. The emergence of the new scientific 
epistemology redefined older models of life writing to develop a new biographical rhetoric of 
self that could scientifically interrogate selfhood and scrupulously represent it. The eighteenth-
century biographer becomes something like a literary scientist, devoted to a record of accurate, 
verifiable facts arranged into a clear, direct rhetoric of self.  
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Chapter 2—Locating the Self: 
Print Culture and a New Ethics of Reading 
 
Seventeenth-century life writing exploded into a fast-flourishing genre during the 
eighteenth century, “a time when the public appetite for biography was insatiable” (Butt 43). Not 
only were quarto and folio length biographies popular, but any writing that opened personal life 
to public scrutiny garnered attention and, too, the notoriety of scandal. Such a hunger for 
evidence of life also led to the rise of the obituary. The brief biographical records of personal 
lives began in 1731 with the first issue of Edward Cave’s ambitious, enduring project, the 
Gentleman’s Magazine. The growing popularity of the obituary form provided a context that 
allowed ephemera to swell into full biographical proportions and significance, not unlike 
biography’s own emergence in the eighteenth century. Obituary grew from a simple record of 
death to a more thoroughly-wrought memory of life. Readers had also been titillated by Lord 
Chesterfield’s personal Letters to his Son, which scandalized its public audience with insight into 
a famous man’s private thoughts. “It is now become so much the fashion to publish letters,” 
James Boswell recalls Samuel Johnson commenting as they dined with a bookseller, “that in 
order to avoid it, I put as little into mine as I can” (Life, iv.102). Johnson recognized his 
contemporary readers’ desire for anything personal. Booksellers did, too. They fed the market 
and were at the same time shaped by its appetites for personal life rendered as public selfhood by 
print. Increasingly, an undocumented life was an unlived life, and the greater the documentation, 
the more comprehensive the biography. 
The popularization of the biographical form emerged with the rise of a burgeoning print 
culture, increasingly hungry for the authentic details of private lives, which dovetailed with the 
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New Science’s inductive epistemology. The form consequently depended on new sources that 
privileged the sort of increased documentation that made biographical lives more verifiable and 
observable, more like the factual account of Royal Society event experiment. Most significantly, 
the inductive standards for credentialing print information developed a biographical form that 
forced readers to evaluate rhetorics of self in eighteenth-century English biography in order to 
educate themselves and improve their own lives. In this chapter, I examine how Samuel Johnson 
in An Account of the Life of Richard Savage, Son of Earl Rivers
28
 and Oliver Goldsmith with his 
Life of Richard Savage, Esq. locate the details of their biographies within the glut of documents 
and manuscripts that characterize the period in order to arrange rhetorics of self that force 
readers to make ethical, interpretive decisions about the lives they read.  
 
Inductive Choice: The New Ethics of Reading 
The empirical promise of inductive science was a fuller understanding of the natural 
world. Its experimental methodology cycled repeatedly through observation, experimentation, 
and theorization to accumulate information. The buildup of details ultimately allowed for 
scientific accounts that would more clearly depict the natural world in order to lay bare its 
fundamental operations. Such a lofty goal put a premium on experimental research and its 
representation, charging both with an ethical significance. The responsibility of the Restoration 
scientist was two-fold. First, the scientist owed a responsibility to accuracy in the 
implementation of experiments. Scientific reports required good data to draw the sort of 
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 When referencing Johnson’s biographical account of Richard Savage’s life, I will refer to his later publication in 
the Lives of the English Poets. Johnson revised it very little from his initial biographical account of Savage’s life, An 
Account of the Life of Richard Savage, Son of Earl Rivers. When reference to the former edition is necessary, I will 
distinguish it as the Lives; the latter, as the Account. A third complication will be important the discussion of 
Johnson’s biography: I will refer to Johnson’s anonymously-authored source text, The Life of Mr. Richard Savage as 
the Mr. Savage. 
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conclusions that would prove foundational to successive cycles of inquiry, experimentation, and 
hypothesis. Secondly, the scientist was also responsible to a community of readers made up of 
both scientists as well as laypeople, who should be able to discern the truth accurately for 
themselves given an apt representation of the findings, however voluminous those 
representations came to be.  
The cycle of research and reporting that characterizes the Scientific Revolution thrived on 
an excess of detail.
29
 Rhetorically, the accumulation of detail presented by scientific reports in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inverted the rigid, classical canon of deductive 
invention, in which the orator used to guide a passive audience to accept an argument 
syllogistically, in favor of a new, sprawling arrangement that invited the reader to engage facts 
and make specific, interpretive choices about what those facts mean. The more active, inductive 
model offered greater didactic promise. It inundated readers with possibilities for understanding 
and authorized them to use their reason in order to discern for themselves.  This new, active 
ethics of reading emerging in the Scientific Revolution required conscientious choice. Reader-
observers were not only authorized, but even obligated to choose the strongest argument for 
themselves. This process shifts the responsibility of interpreting information and drawing 
conclusions from the speaker or writer to listeners and readers, which makes the process of 
drawing conclusions from voluminous detail intensely personal. It is an effect that would be 
amplified by the period’s almost voyeuristic obsession: the publication of private letters and the 
intimate details of public lives. 
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 Thomas S. Kuhn has argued that “three normal foci for scientific investigation” articulate scientific paradigms and 
are marked by experimental inquiry that seeks to show how the paradigm is applicable to a “larger variety of 
situations,” to demonstrate continuity and “agreement” within that variety, and to find “alternative ways of applying 
the paradigm to . . . new area[s] of interest” (25). Such goals can only be accomplished through a repeated and 
extensive cycle of experimentation. 
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Ethically, this method of writing invited the individual reader to make a personal decision 
about the life represented in print, a decision characterized by its rightness. Other readers, 
drawing a similar conclusions based on their personal estimation of what constitutes right, would 
naturally group into a community of readers; their process of reading and drawing conclusions 
would determine a print ethic of sociability. Roger Chartier locates these communities within 
“the norms and conventions of reading that define, for each community of readers, legitimate 
uses of the book, ways to read, and the instruments and methods of interpretations” (Chartier 4). 
In order to theorize how communities conceptualize and imagine themselves, Benedict Anderson 
argues that print, particularly the newspaper form, made a communal identity imaginable 
because it conveyed a community mutually existing in time, though not necessarily in place, a 
complication balanced by members’ shared reading practices, through which they are able to 
imagine themselves and their differences from other communities (33-6). Joseph Addison 
famously dubbed the community-building effect of print culture the “republic of letters” (2.253-
6). Addison’s republic of letters marries a self-sustaining, self-governing notion of community to 
the print culture that opens a place for such a community.
30
 
Nowhere is the sociability of this republic of letters more clear than in the advent of the 
Gentleman’s Magazine in 1731, which introduced the magazine. This new print form sought to 
reprint articles from the prominent newspapers and news sheets of London. Newspapers 
appealed to political parties and responded both to the events of the time and to each other. They 
were a sometimes-subtle blend of propaganda and fact, rife with mis- and disinformation. The 
                                                 
30
 Jürgen Habermas has argued that the republic of letters Addison describes generated a public sphere, with 
participants defined not by their capacity to draw distinctions, but by their education and their property (42, 56). 
While they do participate in a critical-rational debate to define a bourgeois model of what public means, their 
choices are not characterized by an ethical authority, but rather the structuring a public sphere as an corporate 
authority that can stand against  the sphere of public authority, against established government (29-30). While 
Habermas claims his public sphere refers to a specific category of the middle class, the communities of readers that 
Anderson describes are not bound by specific class restraints. Anderson’s communities, however, do not have to 
imagine themselves in relation to socio-political authority, just in the shared context of like-minded readers. 
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Gentleman’s Magazine assembled these viewpoints under its own heading, often printing 
politically contrary news in side-by-side columns for easy comparison (Carlson 56). The 
magazine depicted various viewpoints within larger political conversations so that readers could 
exercise their reason on these viewpoints, defining themselves and the larger group their view 
matched.  
The importance of choice that moves a reader from the limitations of what is already 
known to what can be concluded by considering all that is known highlights the productive 
tension emerging from the empirical context of Restoration science as it was made manifest in 
the practices of a new print culture. Resolving this tension was a question of choice for the 
reader, the crux of the ethics of reading. Learning to make the most appropriate choices and to 
draw the best conclusions from what was known had an autodidactic effect that authors like 
Thomas Sprat and John Locke imagined. Induction is a process that depends on what can be 
known, but that ultimately privileges choice as the hallmark of understanding. Restoration and 
eighteenth-century authors channeled the autodidactic implications of these new protocols of 
representation into rhetorical choices that would set up readers to develop their own 
understandings.  
Distinctly eighteenth-century forms like the novel and biography did not emerge in a 
literary vacuum. Each informed the other, adapting generic markers for different ends, much like 
the novel mimics the biographical selfhood’s dependence on actual lived experience with 
imagined approximations of experience. Poetry was not exempt: the didactic operation of a 
complex, fictional character like John Milton’s Satan demonstrates the autodidactic potential of 
biographical selfhood, stronger for its application of lived experience. Stanley Fish describes the 
experiential, empirical operation through which rhetorical choices have autodidactic effect on the 
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reader of Paradise Lost. The process he locates might just as easily refer to an eighteenth-century 
biography. Reading is an experience that he terms “affective stylistics” and treats the process of 
making “meaning as an event” (Self-Consuming 383, 392). It is a pattern with inductive 
foundations that frame a relationship between authors and readers in which reading is “no longer 
an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of, 
the reader,” and as an event, “[i]t is an experience; it occurs; it does something; it makes us do 
something” (Self-Consuming 386, 393). What can be known and what can be concluded “does 
something” to the reader that, in turn, makes “us do something” as readers—the autodidactic 
upshot is a right action. If reading is an experience that moves readers to act, reading biographies 
would invite readers to an experience an actual selfhood and react to the print person they meet 
there, both to understand that person and themselves.  
The experience of a print selfhood that triggered an autodidactic effect through an 
affective stylistics was prevalent in most systems of prose emerging alongside an inductive 
epistemology, such as the novel, biography, and the periodical, and in reimagining 
representations of self in extant genres like poetry. The print self’s operation on the reader, 
whether it is factual or fictitious, has didactic potential, since readers must induce the life and 
character from fictitious or, in the example of biography, factual experiences. Meeting a self in 
print, the Spectator, a biographical selfhood, or John Milton’s Satan, is itself an experience for 
the reader, “an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader.” This 
ethical imperative of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writing is the impetus that drives John 
Milton’s Paradise Lost to make the reader “do something.” 31 Milton’s poem poses doctrinal 
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Suggesting a defined difference between science writing and imaginative literature of the period neglects an 
overlap in ethical function and content. Samuel Johnson, for instance, points Milton’s application of contemporary 
astronomical research and discovery to Paradise Lost.  In his “Life of Milton,” Johnson notes that  Milton’s “great 
excellence is amplitude, and he expands the adventitious image beyond the dimensions which the occasion required. 
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questions centered on the character of Satan that had famously dogged readers: how could 
Milton’s “justify the ways of God to men” (I.26) by valorizing the figure of Satan and his 
demonic subversiveness?  
Historically, Milton’s readers have drawn the wrong conclusions from Paradise Lost in 
their experience with Satan’s character. Their misunderstandings of a fictional character 
underscore the experiential significance of a witnessing factual self. Readers in Milton’s own 
generation found the tension between Satan’s dominance and God’s order in Paradise Lost hard 
to resolve. John Dryden, for instance, introduces his own translation of Virgil’s Aeneid by 
compiling a list of heroic poets: Milton might have lain claim to the distinction “if the Devil had 
not been his Heroe instead of Adam” (v.276). Dryden’s reading reduced the ethical and religious 
import of the poem to character study, the Devil versus Adam. Joseph Addison, likewise, 
focused on Milton’s poetic personae and also found the tension impossible to resolve within the 
possibilities the poem itself presents: “Paradise Lost is an Epic, or a Narrative Poem, and he that 
looks for an Hero in it, searches for that which Milton never intended, but if he will needs fix the 
Name of Hero upon any Person in it, ‘tis certainly the Messiah who is the Hero, both in the 
Principal Action, and in the chief Episodes” (3.59). Addison reasons that, since the Messiah is 
the victor in the “Principal Action” of the Christian story of human redemption, then the Messiah 
must also be the hero in Milton’s retelling. What could be known about Paradise Lost was a 
matter of faith so fixed it hardly needed Addison’s reminder. Every seventeenth- or eighteenth-
century reader approaching the Christian story of humankind’s downfall would know that the 
Messiah is the hero. What could be concluded from Milton’s poem, however, inverted readers’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, comparing the shield of Satan to the orb of the moon, he crowds the imagination with the discovery of the 
telescope, and all the wonders which the telescope discovers” (Lives 191). The fullness of Milton’s detail, even in 
seemingly nonessential imagery, “crowds the imagination” and invites the reader to connect the religious and the 
scientific to the poetic. 
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expectations so sharply that it hardly needed Dryden to point it out—the character of Satan is the 
hero or, at least, the sympathetic anti-hero.
32
 The poem’s tension forces readers to make a 
discomforting, contrary choice with ethical implications. They can distrust their reason or their 
faith.  
Stanley Fish unravels the knot of these equally unappealing conclusions about Satan in 
Paradise Lost to argue that Milton’s theodicy and heroic vision of Satan cohere doctrinally and 
educate readers, since it makes an event of reading that forces an ethical choice on the reader. In 
Fish’s explication, “the reader is presented with a series of interpretive puzzles whose solution 
either contributes to or undermines his understanding of the poem’s great issues” (Surprised 
236). These “puzzles” hinge on a rhetoric that tempts the reader to misinterpret the satanic causes 
and consequences of the Fall. This rhetorical strategy forces the reader into an experience with 
the poem that can only be resolved through “two stages: in the first, the reader is brought face to 
face with the corruption within him, as he is made aware of the confusion reigning in his scale of 
values and of the inadequacy of his perceptions” (Surprised 340). The educational upshot of this 
tension comes in the second stage: the heightened awareness invites the reader “to cooperate 
with the poem’s effort to effect his regeneration,” to reshape an understanding free from satanic 
sympathies (Surprised 340). The experience of reading catches readers in the interpretive, 
rhetorical puzzles Milton has written into Paradise Lost so that they will confront the 
shortcomings fundamental to their own selfhoods in order to become better people. Milton’s 
rhetoric depends on the same level of rhetorical challenge that drives a reader to make choices. 
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 Northrop Frye has argued in The Return of Eden that “Paradise Lost is a profoundly anti-romantic and anti-heroic 
poem,” which illustrates the dangers of letting the “ego,” in moments of self-doubt or failure, “support and console 
us”  (28). In Frye’s reading, “Satan is a rebel, and into Satan Milton has put all the horror and distress with which he 
contemplated the egocentric revolutionaries of his time . . . There is an almost uncanny anticipation of some of the 
moods of later Romanticism, also an age of egocentric revolutionaries” (28). Satan, in this argument, appears as an 
argument appealing to the passive reader. He is a given force (that should not surprise savvy readers like Dryden or 
Johnson) acting on a passive reader, who recognizes the disparity between an expected evil and the surprise of its 
prominence without engaging the experience that connects the two. 
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But his rendering of Satan humanizes abstractions of right, wrong, temptation, and sin 
fundamental to Christian theology in a literary character, a print persona with a distinct selfhood, 
however fictitious, that could challenge a reader’s ethics more directly than a collection of 
scientific observations.  
In order to present the reader with the sort of “interpretive puzzles” Fish identifies, which 
can effect a practical or practicable self-education in Christian theology, Milton had to envision a 
community of readers who were capable of self-improvement. Walter Ong has discussed the 
rhetorical implications of the relationship between readers and authors, arguing that a “writer 
must construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role [that] 
. . . correspondingly fictionalize[s] itself . . . to play the role in which the author has cast” it 
(Interfaces 60-1). Writers’ fictionalization of their audience and the audience’s “corresponding 
fictionalization” of itself point to a “game of literacy” that teaches readers “to conform 
themselves to the projections of the writers they read and to operate in terms of these projections. 
Within the specific context of biography, this fictionalization is a relationship between the reader 
and the selfhood of the real person, even though the real person is only a rhetorical 
representation created by the writer.
 33
 Writing, and biography in particular, “intensifies the sense 
of self and fosters more conscious interaction between persons. Writing is consciousness raising” 
(Orality 179). The fictionalization of this relationship positions readers to know the print person 
as intimately as a living person, giving them license to draw sympathetic conclusions. It is a 
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 Following this line of reasoning, the game biography asks fictional readers to play are distinct from the rules other 
genres beg of their fictionalized readers. Biography fictionalizes intimate acquaintance.  Ong argues that a “history 
of the ways audiences have been called on to fictionalize themselves would be a correlative of the history of literary 
genres and literary works, and indeed of culture itself” (Interfaces 60). These different fictionalizations are “the 
underside of literary history, of which the topside is the history of genres and the handling of character and plot” 
(Ong, Orality 102-3). More important than the chronological trajectory of a life is the set of details that define that 
trajectory. 
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game of literacy that allows them to comprehend how they can improve their own lives by 
empirically spectating the lived experience a rhetoric of self translates into print. 
The role eighteenth-century biographers fictionalized for their readers correlates to the 
role that Adam Smith theorizes for social interaction in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. In 
Smith’s social economy, shared ethical values develop through sympathy, which is only possible 
between spectators and the people they spectate. A sympathetic exchange of sentiments depends 
on a spectator viewing another person and understanding what that person should do in a 
particular situation, what the most moral course of action of is, by imagining what he or she 
would do in that same position: “[e]very faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of 
the like faculty in another. I judge your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason 
by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, your love by my love. I neither have, nor 
can have, any other way of judging them” (19). Although spectators substitute their own 
sentiments for those of the spectated, they sometimes “feel for another, a passion of which he 
himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when . . . [they] put . . . [themselves] in his 
case, that passion arises in . . . [their] breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from 
the reality” (12). A sympathetic exchange depends as much what can be known about the 
spectated as it does the self-understanding of the spectator.  
The autodidactic process that Smith describes begins with recognizing the feelings of an 
observed person, comparing them with one’s own feelings as a spectator, and drawing 
conclusions that, consequently, affect self-understanding. This feeling for another, what Smith 
deems “fellow-feeling” (10), is complemented by the sentiments of the observed who will 
modulate the strength of his or her own passions in response to those of the spectator (22). The 
exchange depends on each participant trying to understand the other by imagining the other 
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through the own experience and understanding. The result of this mutual, social interaction is the 
formation of shared sentiments that connect a single spectator to an observed person, either real 
or fictional.  This process unifies people who read such situations similarly, and who thereby 
define or reassert shared values.  
Eighteenth-century biographers capitalized on the role of imagination in the sympathetic 
exchange between people and cast the reader in a fictional role, as an intimate acquaintance of 
the figure they represented rhetorically. Biography turns lived experience—like an “event 
experiment” of the new science—into print so that readers can share the experience, as if they 
are having a personal relationship with the subject. It is a game of literacy after the fashion of the 
experimental cycle of inductive science. Reading the print person allowed the reader to act as a 
sort of print spectator, engaging the biographical rhetoric of self with the same sort of fellow 
feeling appropriate to observing and interacting with a living person. This observational process 
and the subsequent sympathetic exchange are matters of choice that depend upon and produce an 
ethical readership.  
What could be concluded sympathetically depends on what can be observed and 
known—this rhetoric of self required the specificity and vivacity of the details that the 
biographer provided to produce it. In a print culture characterized by a “glut of information” too 
large “to be crammed into a single volume or to be absorbed by a single reader,” the excessive 
volume of print swelled by the publication of private documents like letters and diaries 
(Eisenstein 88). Evidence of lived experience was increasingly scattered across printed matter; 
documentation was the marker of experience. Print became the invitation for all readers to 
engage with private lives. Biographers drew on this documentation as a source for locating 
selfhood, for gathering the details necessary to present selves so authentic they could be 
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interlocutors in a sympathetic reading process, which required readers to make choices about the 
information they presented.
34
 The rapid rise of a print culture, its procedures for documentation 
of the self, and its scientific standards for credentialing information developed a biographical 
rhetoric of self that required readers to evaluate print selves in order to educate themselves and 
improve their own lives.  
 
The Life of Richard Savage: Publicizing the Personal Self in Documentation 
Johnsonian scholarship is often at pains to delineate Johnson’s philosophical system since 
Johnson never set one down himself. Whatever philosophical model he had in mind as he wrote 
poetry, fiction, essays, criticism, and biography is easier to describe than define, particularly 
given Boswell’s representation of Johnson’s combative incredulity. This skepticism marks many 
of the encounters a reader has with Boswell’s Johnson. He recalls, for instance, Johnson’s 
pointed attack of Dr. George Berkley’s theory of immaterialism and the doubt it casts on sensing 
the material world. In his Life of Johnson, Boswell shares the anecdote of Johnson’s answer: 
“After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkley’s 
ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is 
merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to 
refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with 
might force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus’” (Life, i.471). As 
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 The tension between what a reader could know and what a reader could conclude was made richer by the 
instability of eighteenth-century print culture “In an environment where unauthorized printing was seen as a real 
possibility, the identity of the author, the authenticity of the text, and the credibility of the knowledge contained in 
the text were all therefore destabilized” (Johns, Nature 620). The reader’s experience with the rhetorical, interpretive 
puzzles of the text was further complicated by the reader’s experience with the materiality of the text and its 
subsequent reliability. 
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much as his attack of Berkley resolves the doubt the theory raises in conversation, his 
straightforward, self-assured, authoritative style is anything but self-assuring for the reader.  
In such an unstable context, a healthy incredulity is a necessity for drawing conclusions 
about the immaterial and material, about philosophy and common experience. Howard D. 
Weinbrot has observed that Johnson’s thought exhibits a Janus-like quality that simultaneously 
looks back, giving deference to the past as a set, guide, but especially attending to the present, 
with a distinctly modern “flexibility of approach” (56). Johnson’s flexibility is evident in his 
“achievements . . . so varied, so complex, and often so situational that one should not confuse the 
part with the whole, or impose our limited categories upon his broad-ranging mind. Johnson after 
all was empirical and proceeded ‘according to experience.’ He nonetheless recognized the limits 
of experience” (Weinbrot 69). According to Weinbrot, Johnson’s method, if one might be set, 
depends on recognizing a situation and the right action it allows. That one approach will not 
serve every situation challenges readers to weigh facts and choices judiciously and trains them to 
make ethical choices conscientiously. 
Perhaps the Janus-like tendency that Weinbrot ascribes to Johnson is part of the reason 
Johnson proved to be such a gifted biographer. Michael Maner locates this philosophical ethics 
of reading in Johnson’s biographical writing, particularly his Lives of the Poets, where Johnson 
applies “constructively skeptical criteria” to evaluate the experiential facts of the poets’ lives he 
writes (310). Maner claims that Johnson applied a rigorous skepticism for evaluating the veracity 
of evidence or detail presented as a life, like Locke in general (306). His biographical writing 
balances the experiential facts that could define a person’s life against what contemporary 
readers needed in order to draw conclusions for themselves, both about the life of the person they 
read and, autdodiactically, about their own lives. By choosing details that would frustrate easy 
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answers or understandings of a person’s life, Johnson represents distinct, recognizable marks of a 
selfhood in a biography that would force the reader’s judgment “[b]ecause he believes that the 
ultimate moral purpose of biography is the philosophical one strengthening the reader’s 
judgment, . . .draw[ing] us into the process of skeptically weighing probabilities . . . Johnson’s 
skeptical manner is a form of philosophical dialectic, a way of juxtaposing probabilities and 
forcing us to choose” (Maner 302). Johnson’s biographical output, like Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
is charged with moral purpose that places ethical demands on readers in order to develop their 
own sense of right action.  
The booksellers who contracted Johnson “to write,” as he put it, “little Lives, and little 
Prefaces, to a little edition of the English Poets” were not investing in his reputation as an 
essayist, a literary critic, or even as a moralist, but as one of the preeminent biographers of the 
eighteenth century (Life iii.109). The volume of biographical writing that Johnson published 
from the outset of his career—ten biographies between 1738 and 1754 in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine alone—as well as his particular regard for the form, evident in his conversation and his 
essays, helped to popularize biography as it emerged. Johnson’s early reputation as a biographer 
rests largely on a biography he published outside of the Gentleman’s Magazine:  An Account of 
the Life of Richard Savage, Son of the Earl Rivers, which Johnson reprinted later almost 
verbatim in the Lives of the Poets. Paula Backscheider has argued that, in writing his Account of 
the Life of Richard Savage, Johnson is “examining the life of what might be called an anti-
model” (161). In order to write the selfhood of the “anti-model” that Savage’s life offered, 
Johnson “expanded the subjects and purposes of biography” and “introduced new kinds of 
evidence and new uses of evidence” (Backscheider 161). Through his Account, one of Johnson’s 
most noteworthy contributions to biography is the widening scope of evidence he employs, 
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drawing on a variety of facts to generate Savage’s textual selfhood, which forces readers to make 
ethical choices for determining which proofs are most compellingly and persuasively indicative 
of Savage himself. Readers who can come to understand Savage can understand themselves 
better. Johnson locates established facts in print that operate at three degrees of removal from 
Savage: first, documents penned by anonymous authors and subject to public approval; second, 
documents penned by Savage himself; and third, Savage’s own recollections, turned into 
documents by Johnson in his capacity as biographer. 
Johnson’s reliance on documentation derives from his own investment in eighteenth-
century print culture, which marked a significant departure from the earlier forms and conditions 
of writing. He helped to mediate a shifting understanding of authority and authorship in 
eighteenth-century print culture. In a famous dispute between Lord Chesterfield and himself, 
Johnson refused Chesterfield’s overtures of patronage for the forthcoming Dictionary,35  which 
Alvin Kernan reads as “a great event in the history of letters and print, the scene in which not just 
Samuel Johnson but the author, after centuries of subservience to the aristocracy, declares . . . 
democratic independence of patronage” (20). Johnson’s career, according to Kernan, Chartier, 
and others, was on a trajectory from the patron-based system to a model of professional 
authorship. Johnson, originally bound to editors, printers, booksellers, and patrons for his living 
as an anonymous Grub Street hack, had to embrace his commercial potential in order to subsist. 
One of Johnson’s regular assertions, according to Boswell, gives evidence of his market 
sensibility: “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money” (Life iii.19). The changing 
print standard of this shift, however, also held Johnson accountable to his readership, a paying 
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 In relating this episode, Boswell includes Lord Chesterfield’s protracted commendation of Johnson’s dictionary 
project in The World and Johnson’s prompt, epistolary answer (Life i.255-66). As a lord and patron, Chesterfield 
could afford to disseminate his comments in print, whereas Johnson, whose livelihood came from print, protected 
his name and his dictionary project by writing a letter to Chesterfield that, however popular its legend and contents 
grew, was a personal address.   
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readership that came to trust and respect his ethos as a writer. The booksellers who sought 
Johnson’s print expertise in delivering a canon of English poets would further contribute to his 
ethos that allowed him to broker the biographical relationship between these poets and Johnson’s 
readers. 
Reliability developed within fluid, market-based parameters in eighteenth-century print 
culture, particularly in more ephemeral publications like periodicals, newspapers, diurnals, and 
pamphlets. Adrian Johns describes the nature of the relationship between these readers and print 
as organic and responsive: “[t]hese were the sectors of print literature that most depended on 
being credited by readers. But they were also the sectors whose credit was most suspect. These 
were therefore the genres that first developed rhetorical procedures to project authenticity in the 
domains of print to the highest degree” (Nature 174). Johnson draws a comparison between the 
life of Savage he proposes and the lives of Savage other authors might pen, when he advertises 
his intention to publish a life of Savage in the Gentleman’s Magazine: “It may be reasonably 
imagined, that others may have the same design; but as it is not credible that they can obtain the 
same materials, it must be expected they will supply from invention the want of intelligence; and 
that under the title of ‘The Life of Savage,” they will publish only a novel, filled with romantick 
adventures, and imaginary amours” (Life i.165).36 Johnson undermines the veracity of competing 
lives of Savage by aligning them with the fictional sector of the print market. These forms, 
novels and romances, were not accountable to the sort of credentialing that established print fact 
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 In the first edition of his Dictionary, Johnson provides five definitions for “invention.” The three Johnson has in 
mind connote some sort of intentional deception: invention is both a “fiction” or a “forgery,” and it might also be 
simply the “thing invented.” Traditionally, and prior to the Scientific Revolution, the primary association with 
invention would have been rhetorical. Cicero’s first text, De Inventione focused on invention as the first canon for 
composing an oration, drawing on commonplaces or topics, syllogism, and other modes of inquiry typical of 
deductive epistemology. The connotations Johnson suggests by characterizing invention as spurious demonstrates a 
preference for inductive means of knowing, in which facts are not generated by syllogism or traditional 
understandings, but through empirical methods of research, observation, and demonstration. The details Johnson 
uses to define selfhood for Savage draw on this preference for an empirical methodology. 
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among readers. The scandals and obscurity so obvious in many sections of Savage’s life might 
have a sort of generic appeal to the “adventures and imaginary amours” typical of novels and 
romances, but an eighteenth-century print culture would require something more creditable than 
lurid detail to convince them of Johnson’s authority and, by association, the authority of his life 
of Savage. 
Readers often criticize the reliability of Samuel Johnson’s Account of the Life of Richard 
Savage for valorizing Savage by distorting and misrepresenting the facts of his life. Boswell 
notes that “Johnson’s partiality for Savage made him entertain no doubt of his story, however 
extraordinary and improbable” (Life i.169). Questions of Johnson’s partiality and his 
interpretation of various biographical facts drive Richard Holmes’s biographical account of the 
friendship between the biographer and his subject, Dr. Johnson & Mr. Savage. Nevertheless, 
Johnson’s Account was highly esteemed by eighteenth-century readers. Boswell notes that it 
“was no sooner published, than . . . liberal praise was given to it” (Life i.169). It went through six 
editions between its initial publication in 1744 and its inclusion in the Lives of the Poets in 1781. 
Modern biographers recognize it as an important point in the growth of the contemporary 
biographical form. Despite Johnson’s glaring misinterpretations of the most controversial 
moments in Savage’s life, his empirical mode of defining selfhood marks the beginning of a shift 
from the more blatantly biased life writing of the seventeenth century toward an increasingly 
accurate biographical form that raised readers’ ethical stakes in choosing an understanding of 
Savage from a large body of biographical knowledge. 
 While Johnson does not directly lay claim to journalistic authority, he does cite print 
culture proofs that qualify him over other authors to write the life of Savage, his friend. For 
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eighteenth-century readers, a reliable author was tantamount to a reliable publication,
37
 and 
Johnson describes himself as “a person who was favoured with his [Savage’s] confidence, and 
received from himself an account of most of the transactions which he proposes to mention . . . 
the account will be continued from materials still less liable to objection; his own letters, and 
those of his friends, some of which will be inserted in the work, and abstracts of others subjoined 
in the margin” (Life i.164-5).38 Instead of generating a fictional account from pure “invention” 
rather than source materials, Johnson promises a biography distinguishable by its source 
material. Johnson’s application means for discovering biographical fact was necessitated by the 
print market of the eighteenth century and the ethics of reading developing within the 
biographical form. These innovative means were dictated by the moments of intense publicity 
that punctuated Savage’s life but, especially, by the public opinion that flared around them.  
Whether it was the scandal of his birth to Countess Macclesfield, the audacity of his 
claim to a birthright as the heir of Earl Rivers, or the murder of James Sinclair after a drunken 
dispute, the most significant moments of Savage’s life had divided opinion so much that the 
arguments for his birthright, his guilt, or his innocence were already familiar when Johnson 
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 The increasing emphasis toward the reliability of the author coincides with the in part, at least, with the so-called 
Copyright Act of 1710. Although he misattributes its enactment to 1709, Roger Chartier argues that the Copyright 
Act of 1710 marked the moment in the development of print culture “[w]hen the governing powers recognized the 
authors’ right over their works, they did so in the ancient logic of privilege. This was true in the case with the Statute 
of 1709, which attempted to break the monopoly of the London booksellers by giving authors the right to demand a 
copyright themselves” (33). The reliability of the author gained importance in direct correlation to the responsibility 
of the authors to the veracity of their own work.  
38
 Worth comparison is Johnson’s biographical treatment of Dr. Herman Boerhaave, which editor Edward Cave 
published in four 1739 issues of the Gentleman’s Magazine. In the January issue, Johnson promises his biographical 
account “will, we hope, be not unacceptable to our readers; we could have made it much larger, by adopting flying 
reports, and inserting unattested facts: a close adherence to certainty has contracted our narrative, and hindered it 
from swelling that bulk, at which modern histories generally arrive.” As in the his recounting of Savage’s life, 
Johnson stresses here the importance of “certainty” or reliability to which the narrative subject, so subject that it 
must shortened in the name of accuracy and truth. This would have been an important consideration for a Grub 
Street hack like Johnson who was paid by the length or his writing: “Of his friend Cave, he always spoke with great 
affection. ‘Yet (said he,) Cave, (who never looked out of his window, but with a view to the Gentleman’s 
Magazine,) was a penurious paymaster; he would contract for lines by the hundreds, and expect the long hundred” 
(Boswell, Life iv.409). 
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wrote his biography (Lives XXII.852-4, 858, 873-4). In fact, they invited the duality of what 
Weinbrot dubbed the Janus-faced Johnson, one who could manage divided public opinion 
biographically. Savage cultivated this publicity both in spectacle and in print, fashioning a 
selfhood that would garner sympathy and favor. Thus the facts of Savage’s life were clouded by 
the publicity that Savage himself had excited in order to define it. Since the divisive and 
pervasive familiarity of public opinion obscured the actual details of Savage’s life, Johnson’s 
task as a biographer is to sort publicity and opinion in order to determine the most authoritative 
facts of Savage’s elusive life from the most reliable print sources available.  
  
Conceiving Savage’s Life: Publications, Letters, and Recollections 
Of his three primary means for tracing the details of Savage’s life, Johnson depended on 
an anonymous pamphlet The Life of Mr. Richard Savage that, its modern editor Timothy Ervin 
explains, “had been composed some sixteen years earlier [than Johnson’s biography], in 1727” 
(iii).
39
 It was a propaganda piece, an intentionally divisive account meant to garner support by 
“stir[ring] public opinion in defense of Savage, who had committed a murder in a coffeehouse 
altercation” (iii). This print account for much Savage’s life had passed the tests of print culture: it 
effected the ends it sought—“pleading successfully for a royal pardon”—and its account 
continued to be compelling for readers, “running quickly into three editions” (iii). Eighteenth-
century readers had credentialed this document as an authentic, factual record and strengthened 
its authenticity through their positive reception of multiple editions, sanctioning the pedagogical 
potential of the biography through their consumption. The public reception of multiple editions 
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 James Gray, the editor of the Yale Edition of the Lives of the Poets, notes that Johnson drew most heavily on The 
Life of Mr. Richard Savage, but that “[f]or the rest of the information, Johnson relied on his memory (not always 
dependable), [and] the advice of friends of Savage . . . As well as letters written by Savage to friends in London, 
Johnson had access to papers he left behind, including the manuscript of his last, heavily castigatory poem “ and 
multiple, print editions of Savage’s poetic works (848-9). 
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reinforced its account, however biased. Adrian Johns reminds that, through print, “[c]ultural 
dispersion operated as a kind of chain reaction . . . it resembled not an orrery (representing the 
model of central illumination) but the kind of firework that amazed eighteenth-century observers 
by producing successive staggered bursts across the sky” (“Piratical” 303). These “successive 
bursts” cemented an image of Savage’s life while he was still living for fifteen years between its 
initial, 1727 publication until Savage’s death in 1742.  
In accounting for Johnson’s use of the pamphlet version of Savage’s life, James Boswell 
reveals how public documents and records could gain credit as fact in eighteenth-century print 
culture. He argues that “Johnson was certainly well warranted in publishing his narrative,” since 
“no attempt had been made to confute it, or to punish the authour or printer as a libeller” during 
that time (Life i.170). By choosing the facts of Savage’s life from a source certified by a 
sustained public response, however flawed in content, Johnson defers to the standards of 
credibility dictated by eighteenth-century print culture, which gave preference to public assent as 
a marker of factual accuracy. This document provided Johnson with a publicly authorized 
baseline for developing Savage’s selfhood by comparison to other documents that Johnson 
would incorporate into Savage’s life. 
Savage also did nothing to dissuade the reputation this pamphlet furthered, but instead he 
sought to cultivate the figure he cut through the literary or, more simply, the print world of Grub 
Street. Savage lived his life through print. Hal Gladfelder argues that Savage simultaneously 
eschewed the print culture of Grub Street authors and used it as a means to define himself in 
print: “Savage endeavored . . . to legitimate himself as an aristocratic heir for whom authorship 
was an expression of idleness. In the process he exposed how completely author’s lives can 
consume them” (447). This consumption is most obvious in the accusations that Savage lived 
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with the “appearance of friendship with some whom he satirised, and of making use of the 
confidence which he gained by a seeming kindness to discover failings and expose them” (Lives 
XXII.887).  But Johnson’s task as a biographer was to determine details about Savage that he 
could put in conversation with the details that had come to be accepted as fact through print and 
Savage’s affectation of aristocracy. Boswell reprints Johnson’s advertisement for his biography, 
in which Johnson promises an accurate rhetoric of self as a biographer “who was favoured with 
his [Savage’s] confidence,” but also, an accurate depiction based on “materials still less liable to 
object,” Savage’s personal and public documents, his letters and poetry (Life i.164-5). Johnson 
sought to create a tension between what readers assumed they knew about Savage and facts he 
would present to confront them, challenging the biography’s reader to draw ethical conclusions 
like the reader of Paradise Lost to make interpretive choices that allow for ethical conclusions. 
Johnson draws on facts authenticated by the eighteenth-century print market place to put 
Savage’s emotional and psychological self to the same scrutiny as the public self Savage 
cultivated. Johnson’s biography invites readers to observe Savage more intimately, between the 
public reputation and the intimate self. 
Johnson’s Life answers the question of Savage’s extraction with facts that address one of 
the most contested aspects of Savage’s life: whether he was the aristocratic son of a countess, 
Anne, Lady Macclesfield, and heir to Earl Rivers or the son of a common laborer, a nurse hired 
to “care” for and “to superintend the education of the child” (Johnson, Lives XXII.854). Johnson  
follows the account in the anonymous pamphlet, which presents Savage as the victim of the Lady 
Macclesfield’s divorce, through which “her Son, being thus bastardized, could not be born, as 
otherwise he would have been, a Lord by Courtesy, and Heir to the Title of an English Earl, with 
one of the finest Estates in the Kingdom, which was afterwards, for want of Male-Issue, the 
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Occasion of engaging two eminent Peers in a Duel, in which they had the Misfortune to kill each 
other” (4). In this version of the narrative, Lady Macclesfield’s actions betray her son and 
resonate throughout aristocratic circles to ill effect. The anonymous author characterizes her as a 
“resentful” woman who “forget[s] her sucking Child!” (4, 8). Johnson endorses the facts as the 
pamphlet and Savage himself present them: Lady Macclesfield does abandon her son; Savage is 
a dispossessed aristocrat; he has been cut off from what is his by natural and legal right.
40
 
Johnson’s appraisal of Lady Macclesfield’s character, however, is much more venomous than the 
pamphlet’s. He locates the scandal in her “barbarity,” which threatens, disease-like, to “infect 
others with the same cruelty” and so makes Savage the victim of her dissolute life (Lives 
XXII.854).  
More important than the unknowable fact of Savage’s birth is Johnson’s choice in 
presenting the facts of Savage’s birth so definitively. Backsheider blames it on a panegyric 
impulse in which Johnson’s “groundbreaking biography of Richard Savage is a fabric of wishes, 
speculations, and fantasies that put his friend and his most dubious actions in a favourable light” 
(76-7).
41
 Johnson is aware of the danger that any biographer faced when writing the life a 
personal acquaintance like his own to Savage and, without citing his Account, notes that  
[i]f the biographer writes from personal knowledge, and makes haste to gratify the 
publick curiosity, there is danger lest his interest, his fear, his gratitude, or his tenderness 
overpower his fidelity, and tempt him to conceal, if not to invent. There are many who 
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 Johnson’s endorsement seems unequivocal, unquestioning, and perhaps naïve. Backscheider notes that “[i]n spite 
of the fact that Johnson accepted his friend’s anecdotes and interpretations too uncritically, his Life of Savage is as 
important as Boswell’s Life of Johnson  for the modern history of biography” (241 n.30). The rhetorical effects he 
creates with these details allows him to give readers a Richard Savage they can know.  
41
 Johnson states that Savage displayed his affection for their relationship when “he left London in July 1739, having 
taken leave with great tenderness of his friends, and parted from the author of this narrative with tears in his eyes” 
(Lives XXII.945). Johnson’s own account seems to admit a tenderness that might overpower the veracity of a 
biographer. 
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think it an act of piety to hide the faults or failings of their friends, even when they can no 
longer suffer by their detection. (Rambler III.323)  
Balancing the risk he takes by representing Savage’s story as true against his regard for the 
“fidelity” of the biographer, Johnson risks his reputation as a biographer well before he has 
established it. In taking up the burden of biographical proof for a subject as hazy as Savage’s 
life, he must credential the facts through the contemporary channels of print culture, which 
introduce innovations for authorizing biographical fact.
42
 As a publicly documented scandal, the 
events of Savage’s birth had long been subject to public scrutiny. The anonymous pamphlet of 
Savage’s life presents the scandal to raise readers’ sympathies, beginning with the claim that 
“[p]erhaps no History in the World, either ancient or modern, can produce an Instance of any one 
Man’s Life fill’d with so many calamitous Circumstances, as That of the unhappy young 
Gentleman, who is the melancholy subject of the following Sheets” (3). This account begins with 
a direct appeal to the reader’s sympathies. It does not invite the reader to draw educational 
conclusions. Johnson’s anonymous source pamphlet depends on a one-sided account that appeals 
to readers’ emotions, rather than engaging their critical capacity.  
While Johnson’s sympathies undoubtedly lie with Savage, he recasts these print details 
and their persuasive bent in a didactic arrangement that can be easily misunderstood as 
sympathetic in the same way that Milton’s Satan can easily tempt readers into misreading him as 
heroic. The pamphlet casts Savage in a superlative light, harder pressed than anyone in the 
“history of the world.” On the other hand, Johnson recasts the print Savage as another of the 
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 Johnson almost seems to take up the biographical task of telling Savage’s life for the mere challenge of making it 
reliable as fact: given the slim record of their acquaintance—Johnson’s alone—such literary play might be the 
reason for his life of Savage, the challenge of making a bad man good. Such an approach would have cast Johnson 
as a novelist than a biographer, a role he never otherwise chose to play except, in sense, with the History of 
Rasselas, a highly fictionalized fable. But Johnson is not playing a literary game; his stake is in the allowing the 
reader to make ethical, educational choices.  At the other extreme, however, is Holmes’ interpretation, which 
brushes aside Johnson’s biographical rigor or fictional play to reconcile Johnson’s favorable treatment of Savage by 
suggesting that Johnson believed Savage’s fraud as truth because Savage believed it as truth (235). 
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“heroes of literary as well as civil history [who] have been very often no less remarkable for 
what they have suffered, than for what they have atchieved; and volumes have been written only 
to enumerate the miseries of the learned, and relate their unhappy lives, and untimely deaths. To 
these mournful narratives, I am about to add the life of Richard Savage” (Lives XXII.851). 
Johnson rearranges the established print details of Savage’s life for comparison to others whose 
“unhappy lives” make for “mournful narratives,” but he provides no specific comparisons to the 
lives of other “heroes of literary history.” Instead, Johnson opens Savage’s life with the 
observation that the “general lot of mankind is misery, and the misfortunes of those whose 
eminence drew upon them an universal attention, [that] have been more carefully recorded, 
because they were more generally observed, and have in reality been only more conspicuous 
than those of others, not more frequent or more severe” (Lives XXII.850-1). Johnson 
simultaneously affirms the accepted print facts of Savage’s life that have been and remain in 
public view, but he downplays their importance by making the publicity itself part of Savage’s 
mournful lot. This key element of what will become the celebrity biography uses the reader’s 
own interest in the celebrity’s life to show how prying eyes and print culture have shaped that 
life. 
Johnson invites the reader to observe the known circumstances of Savage’s life and his 
birth, without immediately crediting them as reliable facts. Johnson’s source text, the pamphlet, 
presented Savage’s highly publicized murder of James Sinclair and his trial as a fact not yet 
proven. It was, after all, written to garner support for Savage, and it casts the event in the 
passive: “Let it suffice in this place to say, that the direful Consequence of their going in there, 
was from an insult offer’d by Mr. Merchant to the company who were drinking there, a mortal 
Wound given to Mr. Sinclair, of which he languish’d till the next day, and then died, and the 
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Condemnation of Mr. Savage and Mr. Gregory for the said Fact” (21). The passive tone suits the 
pamphlet’s persuasive purpose, to garner public support Savage and to sway the sentencing 
decision. It sets what can be known against what must be concluded legally, acknowledging that 
a quarrel was the cause of the fight, that Sinclair was wounded, and that Savage was blamed. By 
leaving out Savage’s guilty action, his innocence is strongly implied. It also encourages the 
reader to see the partiality of any one source and asks the reader to judge for him or herself out of 
a larger body of evidence, to run a more extensive experiment on this life. 
Johnson again defers to public assent, but rather than recall the spectacular news story, 
Johnson uses the spectacle of the infamous fight and murder to orchestrate a sympathetic 
exchange between spectators or readers and Savage. In Johnson’s account, Mr. Merchant is again 
responsible for “a quarrel, [for which] swords were drawn on both sides, and one Mr. James 
Sinclair was killed. Savage, having wounded likewise a maid that held him, forced his way with 
Merchant out of the house; but being intimidated and confused, without resolution either to fly or 
stay, they were taken in a backcourt by one of the company and some soldiers” (Lives 
XXII.874). Johnson also deploys the passive in his version—“one Mr. James Sinclair was 
killed”—but he leaves no doubt about Savage’s guilt, noting that he “wounded likewise a maid 
that held him.” The word “likewise” sets Savage’s definite wounding of the maid in opposition 
to his murder of Sinclair. Rather than a straightforward recounting, Johnson again reaffirms the 
accepted account at the same time that he challenges it and challenges readers to locate the truth 
of this crucial incident in Richard Savage’s life. The rhetoric of self Johnson arranges addresses 
readers who are already confident in their understanding of Savage. He brings them to reevaluate 
Savage, not by confronting them with new facts, but by leading them to recognize the possibility 
of multiple points of view about Savage in Johnson’s account. 
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Johnson also enlarged the archive of the facts of Savage’s life with documents that 
reached beyond the popular pamphlet account of Savage’s life: Johnson revealed facts of 
Savage’s life and his character from Savage’s own publications. Johnson used the credibility of 
print culture to augment the popular pamphlet with Savage’s own publications, the poems and 
plays that proved to be a well of information from which Johnson could draw biographical facts. 
Savage’s publications could not bear the same type scrutiny applied to the pamphlet, but Johnson 
used this different rhetorical situation to his advantage. Johnson submits that Savage’s choice of 
topics and words offer an insight into his life; Johnson offers these documents to his readers as 
part of a life that is more a matter of interpretation than mere journalistic account.  
At points, Savage’s own poetry and prose crowds the narrative off the physical, printed 
page of Johnson’s 1744 Life, a reminder that Richard Savage was a man who seemed to be 
composed of documents, a man who could only be redeemed by public evidence, documentation. 
In the material space for representing selfhood on the page, Johnson equates Savage’s publicized 
print selfhood with this personal experience of a life lived in print and, by association and 
juxtaposition to Savage’s writing, with the rhetoric of self the biography has created for him. 
Johnson’s description of the common criticism of Savage’s poem, The Wanderer, might be well 
be a description of Savage’s lived experience. Johnson acknowledges the public criticism is 
“universal, and therefore it is reasonable to believe it at least in a Degree just,” (Account 55):  
It has been generally objected to the Wanderer, that the Disposition of the Parts is 
irregular, that the Design is obscure, and the Plan perplexed, that the Images, 
however beautiful, succeed each other without Order; and that the whole 
performance is not so much a regular fabric as a Heap of shining Materials 
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through together by Accident, which strikes rather with the solemn Magnificence 
of a stupendous Ruin, than the elegant Grandeur of a finished Pile. (Account 55) 
Johnson’s account of reviews of the Wanderer mirrors his own task as a biographer; to present 
disparate materials in a way that retains a sense of their authentic messiness while also allowing 
the reader to form his or her own experience of the whole of a life. As a biographer, Johnson’s 
task in arranging a compelling rhetoric of self for the paradoxically public and elusive Richard 
Savage regular is to thread the “heap of shining” experiences into consistent “disposition,” with a 
narrative “plan” for a “finished,” observable selfhood teased from the mysterious spaces in 
Savage’s life. 
Johnson locates much of Savage’s character in the Wanderer, defining him two ways: 
textually, in a narrative of his experience, and paratextually, in glossed text that stands as a 
marker of Savage’s narrative. Paired on the page, publicly verified ancillary text like the 
Wanderer corroborates Johnson’s recounting of Savage’s experience in the main narrative. 
Johnson defers to Savage’s account of the long-lasting effects of his life-long estrangement from 
his so-called mother, Lady Macclesfield: “[e]ven in this poem he has not been able to forbear 
one touch upon the cruelty of his mother, which, though remarkable delicate and tender, is a 
proof how deep an impression is had upon his mind” (Lives XXII.893). He provides thirteen 
lines of the Wanderer to support his commentary on the narrative. Similarly, he cites instances of 
Savage’s power of description as a poet, quoting thirty-two lines of Savage’s poetry. In this case, 
he juxtaposes Savage’s personal life with his own public printings—they even share a footnote 
space in the 1744 Account (69).
43
 Johnson’s credentialing apparatus suggests several important 
facts about Savage’s print selfhood. First, Johnson’s citation and footnoting fills gaps in the 
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 For instance, Johnson cites the dedication to the Wanderer on page 78; it continues through page 79, met on page 
79 by another reference to a poem, which provides an documentary example of Savage’s ability to appeal to the 
sentiments of his benefactors. This citation runs from page 79 through page 81. 
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narrative. The nature of the gaps is, quite often, psychological or emotional—even a first person 
witness to Savage’s experience could not discern the truth without recourse to some other aid. 
Significantly, this print evident of Savage’s emotional and psychological makeup become facts 
with the same gravity as the legal evidence subjected to public scrutiny in the Sinclair case. It 
marks a move from the externally observable toward observations of the intimate. Johnson cites 
Savage’s poem the Bastard, for instance, as “a Poem remarkable for the vivacious Sallies of 
Thought in the Beginning, where he makes a pompous Enumeration of the imaginary 
Advantages of base Birth, and the pathetic Sentiments at the End, where he recounts the real 
Calamities which he suffered by the Crime of his Parents” (Account 91). Johnson glosses 
excerpts of the Bastard with the effect of illustrating how Savage’s early circumstances shaped 
his later life. The poem and its placement in the biography give continuity to both the 
experiential and psychological components of Savage’s rhetoric of self.   
Likewise, Johnson locates a parallel between “the author of The Wanderer, the man of 
exalted sentiments, extensive views, and curious observations; the man whose remarks on life 
might have assisted the statesman, whose ideas of virtue might have enlightened the moralist, 
whose eloquence might have influenced senates, and whose delicacy might have polished 
courts” and a man who might be found “[o]n a bulk, in a cellar, or in a glass-house among 
thieves and beggars” (Lives XXII.929). In Johnson’s construction, the balance between Savage’s 
life as an author and as a destitute man is most evident in Savage’s most public self-
documentation and Johnson’s most ready source for Savage’s psychological and emotional 
experience. Johnson cites lines from The Wanderer as a “probable” example of Savage’s 
“reflections on his own conduct,” which, as the poem explains, “ev’n then he scorn’d, and 
blush’d to name” (Lives XXII.929). Johnson uses this poetry as a means of determining Savage’s 
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character: these excerpts from The Wanderer head a section that provides instances of Savage’s 
characteristic imposition on friends and benefactors, particularly his penchant for soliciting 
“small sums” of money from his acquaintance (Lives XXII.929). That Savage’s poetry 
documents and suggests a “probable” character for Savage indicates another print culture 
precedent for ascertaining factuality. Savage’s choice of topics and words becomes a 
fundamentally biographical, public documentation of the man’s life. What Savage offered to the 
public for critical examination opened him to public judgment, and for his biographer, this 
judgment delineated Savage’s character and put it in view of discriminating, ethical readers who 
would improve themselves through the print acquaintance. Johnson forces them to judge the 
evidence for themselves and, in so doing, to become implicated in the rhetorical construction of 
his life. 
Johnson’s innovative application of print documents to credential the murky life of 
Richard Savage included semi-public, epistolary records, which became print documents in 
Johnson’s biography. Their credibility for readers in eighteenth-century print culture was 
immense: they signified an older tradition of documentation, but they also made facts of social 
interaction. Later in the century, Boswell came to use epistolary evidence of Johnson’s life to 
lend continuity to these social interactions and to the character of Johnson overall. Even though 
Johnson would disparage the practice of publishing private letters, his own biographical practice 
indicates a different tack and then only out of necessity (Life v.102). Johnson’s biography 
depends on Savage’s correspondence from the end of Savage’s life when little other documented 
evidence of Savage’s experience existed.  
Unlike anonymous pamphlets, poetry, or speeches, epistolary documents record a social 
network as much as their authors’ reports and reflections. In addition to readers who could bear 
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witness to the proof of Savage’s life evident in his poetic output, an epistolary record adds the 
correspondent as a print witness. Unlike print documents that have been open to public scrutiny 
and are, as a result, subject to divisive interpretations, private documents like letters were, as 
Clare Brant points out, “[a]ssociated with instruction” which “strengthened the relationship 
between print culture and the lower classes . . . letters had liminal meanings for those in power 
and powerful meanings for liminal people” (15). As a person on the periphery of both the literary 
and aristocratic worlds to which he had at various times aspired, Savage is a letter writer whose 
personal words offer significant insight into how he could be read, as authentic, credible 
documentation. It is a documentary record that opens Savage’s experience to scrutiny, providing 
readers with evidence of Savage’s life that is much less nebulous Savage’s public reputation. 
From this record, readers can extrapolate how Savage wanted to be read more easily from the 
cues his self-conscious representation provides. They invited readers to draw ethical conclusions 
that would instruct them, like many letters, in how they should behave.  
Johnson develops much of Savage’s social life by situating it in correspondence, either 
letters written by Savage himself or letters written to be signed by Savage. From the act of letter-
writing alone, Johnson demonstrates the characteristic pride that Savage imposed on his friends 
and those he reckoned as enemies. In one instance, Johnson notes that Alexander Pope wrote a 
letter to be dictated to Savage, that he might write and beg the assistance of a patron he had once 
offended, but Savage refused, preferring his pride to his former social connection (Lives 
XXII.944-5).  Savage’s letters document his life more readily and offer the instructive, ethical 
choices that Johnson arranges throughout the narrative. When he is imprisoned in Bristol for 
debt, Savage’s correspondence forms the bulk of the narrative. Johnson describes that “having 
been at supper with two of his friends, he [Savage] was at his return to his lodgings arrested for a 
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debt of about eight pounds, which he owed at a coffee-house” (Lives XXII.952). In a letter to 
Reverend William Saunders a minor cleric at Bristol Cathedral, Savage relates and interprets 
these experiential facts:  
I was arrested at the suit of Mrs. Read [the coffee-shop owner], just as I was going 
up stairs to bed, at Mr. Bowyer’s; but taken in so private a manner, that I believe 
nobody at the White Lion is apprised of it. Though I let the officers know the 
strength (or rather weakness) of my pocket, yet they treated me with the utmost 
civility; and even when they conducted me to confinement, it was in such a 
manner, that I verily believe I could have escaped, which I would rather be ruined 
than have done, notwithstanding the whole amount of my finances was but three 
pence half-penny. (Lives XXII.952-3) 
Johnson’s choice to draw details of Savage’s life from his correspondence with a cleric 
associates Savage’s account with a religious veracity. Presented with the choice to take Savage at 
his word in his letter or to consider him in light of other evidence, a reader might choose to see 
Savage’s character here possessed of a stoic dignity that defied his circumstances. Johnson uses 
Savage’s relationship to money to authenticate his class position in this account.  The guards 
“treat him with the utmost civility,” suggesting they apprehend something about Savage’s natural 
authority and class position. Savage would rather be ruined than escape, affirming his 
relationship to older honor codes in a market-driven age of opportunity. The reader is shown, not 
told, that Savage has a native dignity, revealed to Johnson’s readers for their own evaluation 
through Savage’s exchange with Reverend Saunders.  
An ethical reader would experience this moment along the trajectory of selfhood that 
Johnson demonstrates. An ethical reader, through this experience, understands Savage in the 
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same light his acquaintance viewed him and as Johnson has presented prior to this moment: the 
perpetual borrower of The Wanderer. This epistolary narrative might equally be little more than 
the affectation of dignity as a precursor to begging, like his protest later in the letter, in which, 
Savage commands Saunders “not to offer me any pecuniary assistance, nor attempt getting me 
any from any one of your friends” (Lives XXII.953). Savage’s private address to Saunders 
becomes a public address through Saunders’ response, observing what Savage claims to be his 
wish or ignoring it and seeking assistance. In both instances, Saunders response is an epistolary 
address to the public. Through Johnson’s biographical representation, the epistolary privacy 
becomes a public document. The shift from private to public is a sympathetic move that allows 
readers a greater degree of sympathetic understanding for Savage. His personal dignity in the 
face of debtor’s prison becomes a nobleman’s warranted pride. In fact, Savage begs, “let me 
entreat you to let have your boy to attend to me for this day, not only for the sake of saving me 
the expense of porters,” justifying a request so close on his statement of his dignity “that my 
truly valuable friend [Reverend Saunders] may not think I am too proud to ask a favour” (Lives 
XXII.953-4). Nothing else may be documented in Savage’s confinement except his reflections 
and his relationships to friends. The end of Savage’s letter-writing roughly marks the end of his 
life in Johnson’s account. Without documentation, after all, there can be no life to recount. In 
using Savage’s private letters as a means of discovering hidden, experiential details, Johnson 
moves past the publicized and self-publicizing man to a more intimate portrayal of Savage’s 
selfhood that was available only to a coterie of correspondents and friends, albeit no less 
mediated by the rhetoric of self that Savage was already constructing.  
Johnson’s biographical approach to Savage depends on a third set of details that are more 
personal still than explicating Savage’s poetry or reading his letters: personal experience. In his 
124 
 
Rambler essay on biography, Johnson noted that “[t]here are many invisible circumstances 
which, whether we read as enquirers after natural or moral knowledge, whether we intend to 
enlarge our science, or increase our virtue, are more important than publick occurrences” (321). 
For Johnson, biographical narrative must utilize the available means for discovering the details 
of a person’s experience. This is one of the hallmarks of modern biography that has strengthened 
since print culture emerged, but the rhetoric of self that Johnson’s narrative of Savage creates 
depends on more than the documentation that drove print’s ascendancy in eighteenth-century 
London. In his biography of Addison, Johnson argued that experience with the person was a 
crucial for arranging a biography:  
History may be formed from permanent monuments and records; but lives can 
only be written through personal knowledge, which is growing every day less, and 
in a short time is lost for ever. What is known can seldom be told; and when it 
might be told, it is no longer known. The delicate features of the mind, the nice 
discriminations of character, and the minute peculiarities of conduct, are soon 
obliterated. (Lives XXII.637) 
First-hand experience allows the biographer to nuance the demonstration of selfhood, blending 
documentation and the accounts of other people into a depiction of selfhood more easily 
identifiable as a person whom the reader might spectate and know. Personal experience can 
connect the documentation of the person to the person. Johnson cites his own experience as his 
foremost credential in the advertisement he posted in The Gentleman’s Magazine for his 
biography of Savage (Boswell, Life i.164-5). 
Richard Holmes interrogates the relationship between Savage and Johnson that has, 
through Johnson’s account, come to be taken as a given—that Johnson and Savage were friends 
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brought together by their political beliefs, their Grub Street associations, and their poverty. 
Holmes notes “an extraordinary fact”: “no one, at any time, or in any place, ever left a first-hand 
account of seeing Johnson and Savage together. It was, from the start, an invisible friendship” 
(35). In publishing a biography so close after the death of his friend, Johnson is documenting the 
experiential “incidents which give excellence to biography,” details that “are of a volatile and 
evanescent kind, such as soon escape the memory, and are rarely transmitted by tradition” 
(Rambler 323). He is translating the shining heap of materials into a coherent, nuanced rhetoric 
of self. Part of Johnson’s function in this period of emergent eighteenth-century biography is to 
straddle the modern standards for factual accuracy to which Holmes defers and to be the fact, 
making a record where no record had previously been made in an unstable world of eighteenth-
century print. Johnson recalls the common, personal circumstances of the public, documented 
“author of The Wanderer”:  
He lodged as much by accident as he dined, and passed the night sometimes in 
mean houses, which are set open at night to any casual wanderers, sometimes in 
cellars among the riot and filth of the meanest and most profligate of the rabble; 
and sometimes, when he had not money to support even the expences of these 
receptacles, walked about the streets till he was weary, and lay down in the 
summer upon a bulk, or in the winter, with his associates in poverty, among the 
ashes of a glass-house. (Lives XXII.928) 
In describing the consequence of Savage’s impecunious lifestyle, Johnson associates the “author 
of The Wanderer” with “any casual wanderers” whose poverty forces them to take shelter where 
they can find it, and none of these “associates in poverty” were likely to recount these 
experiences, except one.  
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Not only as a witness, but a participant in Savage’s life, Johnson is able to raise the 
distinction of a man suffering from his poverty and “the man of exalted sentiments, extensive 
views, and curious observations; the man whose remarks on life might have assisted the 
statesman, who ideas of virtue might have enlightened the moralist, who eloquence might have 
influenced senates, and who delicacy might have polished courts” (Lives XXII.929). Johnson 
juxtaposes the extremes that framed Savage’s life, portraying him as a man who slept in ashes or 
on eaves, and whose views might easily range no farther than the next meal or place to sleep; in 
Johnson’s rhetoric, Savage’s views are the insights of a “statesmen,” “moralist,” or courtier. 
Readers of this life had to reconcile the tension between the facets of Savage’s character and his 
actions ethically. Johnson makes this selfhood something to be observed rhetorically, locating 
facts and presenting them to force readers to a conclusion. 
Johnson’s own biographer, James Boswell, prints a reflection on this moment in 
Johnson’s life almost fifty years after Johnson first reported it, suggesting that “[i]t is melancholy 
to reflect, that Johnson and Savage were sometimes in such extreme indigence, that they could 
not pay for a lodging; so that they have wandered together whole nights in the streets” (Life 
i.163). Boswell is not following Johnson in deferring to a private, first-hand account that is, as 
Holmes points out, undocumented elsewhere; rather, and much more significantly, Boswell is 
following Johnson’s example as a biographer in using an account that has become public fact by 
virtue of having been printed and attaining the public assent of readers. The reliability of the 
account is public acceptance. Boswell’s recounting of the time when Johnson’s life overlapped 
with Savage’s reinforces the usefulness of personal facts in the development of biography, and 
also emphasizes the fluid parameters in which facts came to be accredited through print in the 
eighteenth century. Johnson’s application of his own experiences as a spectator or witness of 
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Richard Savage’s life proves no less reliable and no less subject to public assent than the print 
details and personal letters in which he locates Savage’s self. 
Johnson not only bears witness to Savage’s circumstances, but also to his conversation. 
He relates the prosecution’s attack of Savage’s character in court during his trial for murder. 
Johnson’s selections give as evidence an “eloquent harangue” in Savage’s 1727 trial that was 
circulated by “Mr. Savage [who] used to relate it” (Lives XXII.876). Such “incidents . . . of a 
volatile and evanescent kind” show Savage imagining himself as a public figure (Rambler 323). 
Johnson recalls Savage’s narration of Mr. Page, Savage’s prosecutor, when he drew a 
comparison between specific aspects of Savage’s appearance that might characterize a man of 
means, suggesting that they hide a man capable of murder. Page accused Savage of affecting a 
well-dressed gentleman, when in fact, Page implies, Savage was thoroughly indigent. But 
Johnson, by presenting this gap between an old model of class that is heritable (in which Savage 
is authorized to wear good clothes by his birth, however illegitimate) and a new, more portable 
model of class that reads for a collection of economic, social, and behavioral markers. Page 
implies that Savage’s capacity for deceit is the mark of a murderer who could hide a crime while 
Johnson, by presenting the evidence as he does, leaves open the reading that Savage is a 
dispossessed noble whose very existence points to the voraciousness and injustice of new models 
of economic class. The prosecutor models what the reader must do with the facts of Savage’s life 
by presenting them directly to the reader: 
Gentlemen of the jury, you are to consider that Mr. Savage is a very great man, a 
much greater man than you or I, gentlemen of the jury; that he wears very fine 
clothes, much finer clothes than you or I, gentlemen of the jury; that he has 
abundance of money in his pocket, much more money than you or I, gentlemen of 
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the jury: but, gentlemen of the jury, is it not a very hard case, gentlemen of the 
jury, that Mr. Savage should therefore kill you or me, gentlemen of the jury? 
(Lives XXII.876) 
By a similar mechanism that could make fact from an unchallenged pamphlet, Savage’s 
recitation of his prosecutor’s damning criticism acquired some degree of factuality simply by its 
publicity and repetition. While Johnson employs it to establish the facts of Savage’s life, 
however, he must also represent its credibility as fact. Though it is “eloquent harangue,” Johnson 
cites it as the most accurate transcription of the trial. And it is, because it is the only record.  
Savage’s self-fashioning takes on the gravity and accuracy of documented fact, of a recorded 
transcript rather than a rehearsed memory. As a print fact that readers can examine objectively, 
the speech turns a reading public into the “gentlemen of a jury” who must judge the factuality of 
Richard Savage’s public claims about his own life and discern the person from rumor for 
themselves.  
The empirical impulse driving eighteenth-century biography would have guided Johnson 
to depict as many observable, credible, documented pieces of information about Savage’s life as 
possible, in order to locate the nuanced patterns in these details that would establish Savage’s 
life. Having drawn the facts of Savage’s life from publications, Savage’s own writing, and letters 
up to the moment of his death, Johnson uses his biographical collection of facts to depict 
Savage’s person and character, free of chronological narrative. After relating Savage’s death in 
debtor’s prison, Johnson goes on to describe Savage’s physical appearance, “a thin habit of body, 
a long visage, coarse features, and melancholy aspect”; Savage’s judgment, which was 
“eminently exact both with regard to writings and to men”; and Savage’s knowledge, attained by 
a thorough, intimate acquaintance with “coffee-houses” and company (Lives XXII.963-4). 
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Ultimately, Johnson’s documented facts of Savage’s life and his recollections of Savage’s 
private self pose a test for readers; he asks them to make up their own minds. Johnson catalogs 
the shortcomings of Savage’s character and the virtues of his authorship (Lives XXII.963-6). He 
balances in Savage a man whose “knowledge of life was indeed his chief attainment” but of 
whom “[i]t cannot be said, that he made use of his abilities for the direction of his own conduct” 
(Lives XXII.964, 965). Likewise Johnson represents Savage as a man “compassionate both by 
nature and principle,” but whose “friendship was . . . of little value” because “it was dangerous to 
trust him” (Lives XXII.965). He ultimately becomes a set of contrarieties that might be 
oversimplified as binaries—Savage is landed gentry or homeless vagrant, slighted heir or 
pretender, victim of circumstance or murderer, poet-philosopher or petty scribbler, and so on. 
These are the givens that Johnson establishes rhetorically, through details and their presentation, 
so that a reader may engage Savage’s selfhood, observe a nuanced selfhood somewhere within 
the binaries, and draw conclusions about who the man was. 
While Johnson’s rhetoric of self forces the reader to know Savage and to judge him, 
Johnson notes no “wise man . . . will presume to say, ‘Had I been in Savage’s condition, I should 
have lived or written better than Savage” (Lives XXII.968). Having engaged readers to draw 
conclusions, Johnson’s comment has a paradoxical edge, but it serves to remind the 
discriminating, ethical reader that no life bears easy judgment, especially not a life viewed 
intimately, and that readers must consider their own condition intimately as much as they would 
consider Savage’s, since “[t]hose are no proper judges of his conduct, who have slumbered away 
their time on the down of plenty” (Lives XXII.968). Readers of this new kind of biography are a 
sort of print spectator, engaging the biographical rhetoric of self with the same sort of fellow 
feeling appropriate to a living person. The process of spectating the subject of a biography as a 
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rhetoric of self is meant to produce ethical readers who engage Johnson’s Account and the 
Savage of the Lives. More importantly, Johnson’s biography makes the facts of Savage’s life 
more credible by inviting readers to apply the biography to their own “condition,” lives, and 
practices, since “[w]e are all prompted by the same motives, all deceived by the same fallacies, 
all animated by hope, obstructed by danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure” 
(Rambler III.320). In spectating the print self of Savage that Johnson constructs, readers come to 
understand him by understanding themselves. 
 
The Life of Richard Nash: Spectating a Person and a Character Type as Documentation 
While Johnson’s biographical work might not be as accurate as modern biographical 
standards require, his application of the print criteria to his biographical writing achieved the 
ethical ends that earned him the respect of his contemporaries. It also established patterns for 
writing biography that echoed through later works like Oliver Goldsmith’s Life of Richard Nash 
and James Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson. Their critical principles are predicated on 
Johnson’s methods of documentation, his empiricism, and the didactic, rhetorical effects of his 
approach. Eighteen years after the first printing of Johnson’s Account of the Life of Richard 
Savage, Oliver Goldsmith published his Life of Richard Nash, Esq., a rhetoric of self that reads 
like the biographical heir to Johnson’s Savage. The lives that Johnson and Goldsmith arrange 
engage readers to locate the person between the publicity they sought for themselves and the 
slim record of their private lives. They are both men whose private lives were marked by 
publicity and self-publicizing that invited public speculation; they are each, in different ways, 
celebrity biographies, but each is calculated for the improvement of the reader. According to 
Johnson, people read biography to improve their own characters (Rambler III.321). The fictional 
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reader that Johnson devises for biography reads purposefully; therefore, “the business of the 
biographer is often to pass lightly over those performances and incidents which produce vulgar 
greatness, to lead the thoughts into domestick privacies, and display the minute details of daily 
life, where exterior appendages are cast aside, and men excel each other only by prudence and by 
virtue” (Rambler III.321). The balance Johnson strikes between public records and his own 
experience with Savage’s “domestic privacies” and “minute details of daily life” invites readers 
to decide where Savage’s “prudence” and “virtue” fail or, less often, “excel.” 
From the outset of his Life of Nash, Goldsmith echoes many of Johnson’s sentiments 
regarding biography,
44
 either because he obliquely cites them or because Johnson’s biographical 
approach, demonstrated in his Savage and articulated in later essay projects like the Rambler and 
Idler, was emerging into a normative approach for writing biography. Much like the emphasis 
Johnson places on the biography of common lives over those of public renown (Idler II.262-3), 
Goldsmith stresses that “whether the heroe or the clown be the subject of the memoir, it is only 
man that appears with all his native minuteness about him, for nothing ever great was ever yet 
formed from the little materials of humanity” (III.290). The “native minuteness” that defines the 
“little materials of humanity” provides a counterpoint to the minuteness of a reader’s own 
circumstances that, again, make the contrarieties of character the biographer displays more 
amenable to the reader’s own self-conception and improvement. Goldsmith explicitly explains 
the value of discovering minute, incidental, and intimate markers of a person’s humanity, which 
are, paradoxically, more interesting in the case of the celebrity life. He asserts that “the 
generality of mankind find the most real improvements from relations which are levelled to the 
general surface of life; which tell, not how men learned to conquer, but how they endeavoured to 
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 Arthur Friedman, editor to the Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith, lists six such allusions to Johnson’s Idler, 
No. 84 (24 November 1759) at the beginning of Goldsmith’s Nash. 
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live; not how they gained the shout of the admiring croud, but how they acquired the esteem of 
their friends and acquaintance” (Rambler III.290). The experiences that illustrate the “general 
surface of human life” have more in common with the general experiences of most readers. The 
surface of human life, what can be observed empirically, holds sway over what a reader can 
internalize sympathetically. These experiences are more readily observed and, in their 
minuteness, more easily understood and more immediately applicable. 
In theorizing biography, Johnson notes that “[t]he mischievous consequences of vice and 
folly, or irregular desires and predominant passions, are best discovered by those relations which 
are levelled with the general surface of life, which tell not how any man became great, but how 
he was made happy; not how he lost the favour of his prince, but how he became discontented 
with himself” (Idler II.262). The sentiments overlap, deemphasizing the publicized, famous, or 
well-known person; the “prince” rather than the person most subject to front the “general surface 
of life.” In Johnson, the private aspect of the well-known or common person is most important. 
Goldsmith’s focus on the “heroe or the clown” who can be observed and situated in social 
networks follows a similar biographical approach to Johnson and sets the tone for the rhetoric of 
self he devises for Nash. Both Johnson’s and Goldsmith’s biographical approaches underscore 
the significance of biography’s autodidactic promise, the importance of choice that moves a 
reader from the limitations of what is already known about Savage or Nash to what can be 
concluded about the intimate selfhood by considering all that is known. 
Johnson’s focus on a person’s own happiness or discontentedness privileges the sort of 
detail he promised in his advertisement to the Account of the Life of Richard Savage as a balance 
to the documented aspects of Savage’s life. Documentation established readers’ expectations 
against which Johnson could present private aspects of Savage’s life so that readers would be 
133 
 
forced to challenge these expectations and draw their own conclusions. Boswell reported 
Johnson’s criticism of Goldsmith’s biographical approach to the life of Dr. Thomas Parnell: 
“Goldsmith’s Life of Parnell is poor; not that it is poorly written, but that he had poor materials; 
for nobody can write the life of a man, but those who have eat and drunk and lived in social 
intercourse with him” (Life ii.166). His critique recalls his own approach to Savage’s life and 
emphasizes a personal relationship between the biographer and the life to be written. But 
Goldsmith was not anymore personally familiar with Nash than he had been with Parnell. 
Moreover, Goldsmith lacked the body of public printings that Johnson balanced against his 
personal observations of Savage’s life. Nash was no poet, nor was he mired in scandals 
surrounding his extraction or an acquittal for murder. Consequently, the details Goldsmith must 
find might seem to compensate for the deficiencies in source materials Johnson utilizes in his 
biography of Savage.  
In the same way that Johnson extrapolates the facts of Savage’s life from public 
documents, Goldsmith also uses documentary evidence like letters, but invites readers to view 
Nash sympathetically. Their sympathies singly and collaboratively develop the facts about Nash 
that they can know for themselves, facts that Goldsmith often withholds, lacking materials to 
completely situate Nash in documents as a print self. Goldsmith’s most significant biographical 
approach sets the details for an inductive appraisal of the facts by renegotiating an older, 
deductive rhetorical tradition—character writing, instituted as the province of rhetoricians by 
Theophrastus, Aristotle’s acolyte and successor at the Lyceum, as a means of comprehending 
ethical values through a human lens. Goldsmith’s treatment of Nash’s character is more overtly 
Theophrastan than Johnson’s representation of Savage’s character. Whereas Johnson reveals 
Nash’s private character through the authority and purported nobility of an eighteenth-century 
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celebrity, Goldsmith resituates Nash in established public frame in order to locate his private 
character. 
Goldsmith’s first method for determining the details of Nash’s life, like Johnson’s, 
depends on documentation that situates the private person’s character within the networks of his 
correspondence. And, like Johnson, Goldsmith uses documents that have the imprimatur of 
credibility, and in his advertisement assures the reader that  
We have the Permission of George Scott, Esq; (who kindly undertook to settle the 
Affairs of Mr. Nash, for the benefit of his Family and Creditors) to assure the 
Publick, that all the Papers found in the Custody of Mr. Nash, which any ways 
respected his Life, and were thought interesting to the Publick, were 
communicated to the Editor of this Volume; so that the Reader will, at least, have 
the Satisfaction of perusing an Account that is genuine, and not the Work of 
Imagination, as Biographical Writings too frequently are. (III.287) 
Goldsmith compensates for what he lacks in personal knowledge of Nash (and what strengthened 
Johnson’s rhetoric of self in his Life of Savage) with letters that are so authentic they require the 
“Permission” of Nash’s executor to publish. More importantly, the epistolary evidence has 
“Publick” appeal, the potential to engage readers with “interesting” information that commands 
authority in eighteenth-century print culture.  
In order to gain print credit for his Nash, Goldsmith uses correspondence with people 
who have public renown. A pair letters from the Duchess of Marlborough (III.332-3) and two 
from Alexander Pope (III.342-3) add to the level of what public intimacy Goldsmith cultivates.
45
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 In his treatment of celebrity, Joseph Roach describes public intimacy: he compares celebrities to monarchs who 
“have two bodies—the body natural, which decays and dies, and the body politic, which does neither . . . celebrities 
foreground a peculiar combination of strength and vulnerability, expressed through outward signs of the union of 
their imperishable and mortal bodies. Let those marks of strength be called charismata; the signs of vulnerability 
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Unlike Johnson, Goldsmith only includes epistolary responses from Nash’s correspondents, 
never including Nash’s original letters. While this might underscore the lack of materials 
available to Goldsmith, it also opens a rhetorical possibility. Without a set of correspondence 
from the letter writer and the recipient, a reader must infer Nash’s correspondence. Goldsmith 
invites the reader to imagine the author of the originals by reading the responses. In short, he 
asks the reader to discover the facts of Savage’s own character themselves. They must 
reconstruct the documentation of Nash’s life in order to understand him. What is known about 
Nash is subject to the imagination of the reader, who must fill in the gap the one-sided sets of 
correspondence create.  
These sets of letters answer Nash’s, giving provocative cues that invite a reader to draw 
conclusions about Nash, much like Savage’s letter to his Reverend William Saunders in 
Johnson’s biography. Goldsmith points out that “[t]he duchess of Marlborough seems not to be a 
much better writer than Mr. Nash; but she was worth many thousand pounds, and that might 
console her. It may give splenetic philosophy, however, some scope for mediation, when it 
considers, what a parcel of stupid trifles the world is ready to admire” (III.333). She writes, after 
all, about trivial matters, like Nash’s recommendations on cloth for dresses or on likely 
landscapers for her grounds. Goldsmith frames these letters by characterizing their 
correspondence about “concerns of a private nature. Her letting leases, building bridges, or 
forming canals, were often carried on under his guidance; but she advised with him particularly 
in purchasing liveries for the footmen; a business to which she thought his genius best adapted” 
(III.332). Nash and Marlborough give Goldsmith’s audience the chance to decide whether Nash 
lacks depth or “not only took care . . . to protect ladies from the insults of our sex, but to guard 
                                                                                                                                                             
stigmata . . . [T]heir beguiling interplay . . . has a long history as well as a popular currency as the source of public 
intimacy” (24). Roach’s notion of public intimacy is particularly appropriate to Nash, whose celebrity, unlike 
Savage’s or Johnson’s later, is based on little more than the assertion of his selfhood in a popular resort area.   
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them from the slanders of each other” with prudent advice on style (III.331). These facets of 
Nash’s character, defender of women, foppish dilettante, confidant, and household manager are 
in contention for the reader who would know Nash. The process of judging depends on the 
ability to play the role that Goldsmith has established for his reader. Goldsmith fictionalizes his 
reader as the Duchess of Marlborough’s correspondent, as Nash himself. In this position, the 
reader constructs the facts of Nash’s interiority imaginatively.   
Pope’s letters to Nash offer a better insight into the sympathetic function toward which 
Goldsmith turns the letters. Goldsmith introduces the letters from Pope with his own unmet 
responsibility as a biographer to include enough epistolary detail for the reader to witness the 
exchange: “I should have been glad to have given Mr. Nash’s letter upon this occasion; the 
reader, however, must be satisfied with Pope’s reply” (III.342). The satisfaction the reader takes 
from Pope’s reply derives less from reading Pope than imaginatively reconstructing Nash’s 
initial letter and, biographically, the man who had written it. Pope cannot resist a mock-polite 
tone in his first letter that invites speculation about the man to which he addressed his derision. 
Nash, apparently, had written Pope requesting an inscription engraved on an obelisk honoring a 
visit to Bath, Nash’s home, by the Prince of Wales. Pope first thanks Nash for considering him 
worthy of praising a prince, but points out that “[y]ou say words cannot express the gratitude you 
feel for the favour of his R. H. [Royal Highness] and yet you would have me express what you 
feel, and in a few words. I own myself unequal to the task; for even, granting it possible to 
express an inexpressible idea, I am the worst person . . . who have received so few favours from 
the great myself” (III.342). Pope’s sarcastic reply could only have answered the letter of a man 
who Goldsmith has left the reader to imagine Nash from a social response. As in the instance of 
Marlborough’s letters to Nash, Pope’s letters raise the question of who Nash might be: was 
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Pope’s correspondence intended as vitriol directed at a man Pope deemed a fool? Or was it an 
upbraiding of a well-intentioned man who overstepped the etiquette of begging a favor from a 
stranger? However readers choose to define Nash depends on how they imagine him as a letter 
writer. As in the letter to Marlborough, the reader assumes the role of Nash. More importantly, 
how they imagine him through his celebrity determines the facts that define him.  
Pope’s subsequent letter answers neither question; again, it opens Nash to a sympathetic 
reconstruction by Goldsmith’s readers. Goldsmith frames the letter by inviting the reader to 
consider, again, “[w]hat Mr. Nash’s answer” to Pope’s letter was, and Goldsmith confesses that 
he “cannot take upon me [himself] to ascertain, but it was probably a perseverance in his former 
request” (III.342). He cannot take it upon himself; rather, he leaves ascertaining Nash’s answer 
to the reader. Pope’s letter makes the claim that Pope had unsuccessfully investigated who might 
be able to better write an inscription honoring the prince. In lieu of another writer, Pope drafts 
and sends a plain inscription that “is nearly the common sense of the thing” (III.343). Pope 
attaches Nash’s name to the inscription, and directly reminds Nash “I think I need not tell you 
my name should not be mentioned” (III.343). The final product was indeed plain, and Goldsmith 
almost seems to cite it to stress the almost triviality of Nash’s persistence: “The inscription 
referred to in this letter, was the same which was afterwards engraved on the obelisk; and is as 
follows. 
In memory of honours bestow’d, 
And in gratitude for benefits conferred in this city, 
By his Royal Highness 
Frederick, Prince of Wales, 
And his Royal Consort, 
138 
 
In the Year 1738, 
This obelisk is erected by 
Richard Nash, Esq” (III.343). 
In this gesture, Pope opens an imaginary space for Nash by assigning his name to the inscription 
he did not write. Nash becomes a presence who is signed to an inscription he did not write and as 
a silent correspondent in active communication. Yet he remains absent. In order to flesh out the 
presence Goldsmith outlines, readers must observe Nash’s rhetoric of self sympathetically, 
putting themselves in Nash’s position to imagine his selfhood. 
Challenging readers to draw conclusions about a print person allows the reader to become 
a spectator of lived experience through a print selfhood. By picturing the moments that frame a 
rhetoric of self, the biographer determines details that have the potential to excite the sympathies 
of their biographical spectators, readers who recognize their responsibility to judge other 
selfhoods in order to improve their own. By depending on the resources at his disposal and 
printing the letters available to him, Goldsmith forces readers to project their sympathies onto 
Nash. They must imagine the man whose correspondence drew answers from the Duchess of 
Marlborough and Alexander Pope. As Smith theorizes, “[e]very faculty in one man is the 
measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another . . . I neither have, nor can have, any 
other way of judging them” (19). To “measure” Nash by imagining themselves as the writers of 
his letters ties the experience of print to a rhetoric of self in order to utilize both as a means of 
inculcating virtue in readers. The details that Goldsmith establishes require readers to imagine a 
Nash from whom they can draw conclusions about the selfhood they can only envision 
experientially by putting themselves in his place. By imaginatively constructing themselves as 
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Nash, the effect of reading a print self is autodidactic and ethical, teaching them how to act by 
embodying Nash’s action.  
Like Johnson, who employs the role of documentation in a print culture increasingly 
dependent on tangible, documented evidence, Goldsmith also establishes biographical detail 
using a form with recognizable associations to periodical culture and an older, rhetorical 
tradition.
46
 Goldsmith draws on the conventions of character writing for details of Nash’s life 
that readers can evaluate inductively as factors for determining the character of the person.  By 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, character writing was most recognizably the 
province of periodical publications, led by The Spectator, in which authors framed essays 
through the voice of a familiar character given to set traits. They were a mainstay of one of print 
culture’s most popular eighteenth-century forms. Character types and character writing 
functioned, J. W. Smeed suggests, as “the relish in the sandwich, the entertainment between two 
slices of instruction” (67). Richard Steele’s Tatler and the Mr. Spectator personae he shared with 
Joseph Addison where characters whose attitudes guided the aesthetic discussions in their 
periodicals. Johnson contributed a Mr. Rambler, an Idler, and an Adventurer as essay-
spokespeople to broach moral and social topics, and James Boswell offered up a 
Hypochondriack whose character depended on eighteenth-century stereotypes of depression and, 
particularly, Boswell’s own identification with those stereotypes.  
As a standard for understanding character during the eighteenth century, character writing 
offers a useful means of accessing contemporary assumptions about personality and selfhood. 
Smeed notes that the rhetoricians following Theophrastus, “firmly regarded” character writing 
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 The tradition of character writing, thought grounded in the deductive rhetoric of ancient Greece, exerted a strong 
influence on eighteenth-century understandings of self and morality and on biography as an emergent form. Its 
influence is not paradoxical, despite the eighteenth century’s inductive bent, since character writing, like other 
biographical facts an author could invent, was evidential and could be used to induce conclusions about the self.  
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“as part of education, and . . . the depiction of types . . . has a moral function” (7). Elaine M. 
McGirr outlines how eighteenth-century character writing achieved this didactic aim: “[t]he 
‘character’ taught readers how to interpret the world and what values to attach to different 
classes or types of people. And because they were so pervasive in eighteenth-century England, 
‘characters’ operated as icons that needed no explication . . . The character sketch fixed 
identities, transforming individuals into ‘types’ that were both definable and consistent” (4).47 
Such iconic status operates as a cultural shorthand for signifying the values necessary for an 
ethics of reading. The drive to correlate a specific social value to a specific, fictitious identity 
provides another means for representing a character that can be accredited in print, through its 
periodical popularity with readers.  
But this approach was a vestige of deductive rhetoric: the namesake character of a 
particular character sketch was a sort of syllogistic major premise; the behaviors of their lives 
highlighted different aspects of the major premise, reaffirming it in the context of these different 
behaviors. Eighteenth-century periodicals where populated by such characters. Their unique 
attributes set the periodicals topics and tone—the Tatler was light and dealt with manners, while 
the Spectator took up larger social issues and aesthetic judgment.  Taken on its own, a single 
character study seems out of place in the inductive context eighteenth-century biographers were 
developing for arranging selfhood. Goldsmith, however, puts character types in conversation, 
like inductive data points that require the reader’s evaluation in order to induce Goldsmith’s 
selfhood. Goldsmith demonstrated a knowledge of this tradition in his critique of Samuel 
                                                 
47
 McGirr divides her treatment of eighteenth-century characters in three categories, men, women, and the other. 
Under these heads, she outlines general character types at a remove from Theophrastus’s ancient Greece and 
particular to the eighteenth century. For men, she outlines four characters, the Rake, the Fop, the Country 
Gentleman, and the Cit. The characters of women, she divides four sets of character types, the Heroine and Wife, the 
Coquette and the Prude, the Country Maid and the Town Lady, and Learned Ladies and Female Wits. The other 
characters of the eighteenth century are Catholic, Protestants, and Scots. 
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Butler’s character writing, noting that Butler’s characters “want that entertaining variety, and 
seem drawn rather from the designs of Theophrastus; and we must do our countryman the justice 
to own, that his sketches are not inferior to those of the refined Grecian” (I.209). Goldsmith 
associates the details of Nash’s character from the attributes that readers would recognize as the 
values typical of their reading community, recognized by their own republic of letters. Goldsmith 
develops two disparate character types that match Nash’s celebrity, reflecting eighteenth-century 
values and roles: the gamester and the king. Goldsmith establishes a productive tension between 
the types and the self that allows readers to prioritize different facts about the self in order to 
assess moral flaws in order to obtain self-knowledge through identifying with the native 
minuteness of Nash.  
For Peter Briggs, the incongruent character types that Goldsmith assigns to Nash’s 
celebrity, the difference between the character types Goldsmith assigns Nash and Nash’s own 
character amounts to “careful equivocation of large and small, importance and unimportance, 
social power and; mere vanity . . . unqualified praise and light blame . . . is momentarily 
stabilized in the notion that even triflers can have a significant social impact” (Briggs 214). He 
misreads the smallness that Goldsmith accords Nash as definitive. The function of the biography 
in this reading is to depict Nash “not [as] a unique individual but instead as a social symptom 
with great resonances or implications extending well beyond his personal story. In other words, 
Nash’s career was made to seem naturally figurative, a reflection of the aspirations and 
puzzlements of the larger society (and to which he lent) his essential energies and meanings” 
(215). For Briggs, Goldsmith’s Nash presents little more an artifact of “great resonances and 
implications,” the “aspirations and puzzlements” of Nash’s own time, rather than a rhetoric of 
self endowed with autodidactic application for readers.
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As a young man in London, Nash’s life typified that of the disreputable gamester, an 
admission that Goldsmith makes in the service of biographical integrity: “[n]ot to disguise any 
part of his character, he was now, by profession, a gamester, and went on from day to day, 
feeling the vicissitudes of rapture and anguish, in proportion to the fluctuations of fortune” 
(III.298). Treating this fact of Nash’s life as an admission rather than a simple fact invited 
readers to draw ethical conclusions about Nash. Goldsmith makes him the man of a historical 
moment, associated with a “spirit of gaming, [that] had been introduced in the licentious age of 
Charles II. and had . . . thriven surprizingly. Yet all its devastations were confined to London 
alone” (III.298). Within this larger context, Goldsmith’s audience would have anticipated certain 
stereotypical traits that marked a professional Restoration gambler: the inconstancy, unreliability, 
and rapacity that come from having “hitherto only led a life of expedients” and which had caused 
the middle-aged Nash to “thank chance alone for his support, and have been long precariously 
supported, he became, at length, totally a stranger to prudence or precaution” (III.298). 
Goldsmith portrays Nash’s character through reference to normative character types. Readers 
have to weigh the generality of the character type against the specifics of Nash’s character.  
While Goldsmith follows Johnson’s method of presenting all details of a self, regardless 
of how unflattering they seem, he makes an important rhetorical move here that underscores the 
differences between his mode of locating details for a rhetoric of self and Johnson’s. Johnson 
generates a rhetoric of self for Savage that situates the man between the matrix of his 
circumstances and the ethical nature of his choices within that matrix. Savage’s life was not 
simply a self-determined by the question of his parentage, his trial for murder, or his stint in 
debtor’s prison; rather, he was an actor accountable to his decisions. In Goldsmith, the possibility 
exists that the self can be determined by the context, a Restoration “spirit of gaming” in London 
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or even the excessive frivolity of Bath, either of which yields a gambler or a Master of 
Ceremonies. Such determinism is possible in Goldsmith’s Nash because Nash provides a human 
lens for spectating and observing ethical character traits more specifically and more closely. 
Goldsmith uses the possibility of this determinism to foreground character, but he 
ultimately defers to the autodidactic promise of the form: “I attempt the character of one, who 
was just such a man as probably you or I may be, but with this difference, that he never 
performed an action which the world did not know, or ever formed a wish which he did not take 
pains to divulge” (III.291). While few materials exist to document Nash, his transparency in 
performing actions and forming wishes makes his selfhood an easier lens for viewing the effects 
of ethical values on a person and for the reader identifying with them. As much Johnson and 
Goldsmith had used print documents mark the lives of Savage and Nash, the rhetorical mode of 
character writing provided an additional biographical source for inducing selfhood
 
In character writing, the traits of a character type are written into the character; they 
became “‘natural’ qualities,” which “taught readers how to assume or avoid identification with 
that character—how to ‘put on’ or eschew those natural attributes” (McGirr 4). But Goldsmith 
writes them onto the life of a real person, which requires the reader to choose between 
understanding the character of Nash as that of a gambler or discerning the “natural” character of 
the man. From the details Goldsmith arranges, the conflict between the character types that 
Goldsmith exemplified in Nash and the character that Nash embodied was a conflict between a 
“constitutionally passionate and generous” man who “never formed by nature of a successful 
gamester,” despite being a professional, and the “perfection” of the external type, a character 
“naturally phlegmatic, reserved and cool; [whose] every passion must learn to obey control” 
(III.313). Nash’s innate, “constitutional” character signifies a personal imperfection determined 
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by his social circumstances and subject to them. The natural qualities of the “perfect gamester” 
frame Nash’s Goldsmith for readers who must not only spectate and understand Nash through his 
correspondence, but also within contemporary understandings of character.  
Most significantly, Goldsmith evokes the character of a king to gesture toward the 
responsibilities and character of Beau Nash, the recognized Master of Ceremonies at Bath for 
fifty-seven years.  Peter Briggs notes that Goldsmith makes a representational decision to pit 
contrary aspects of Nash’s character against each (214). Despite reading selfhood and 
circumstance as contrary elements of Nash, the contrariety that Briggs locates in Goldsmith’s 
representation highlights the importance of ethical choices written into the biography. Lending 
the gravity of kingship to the triviality of a recognized but unofficial post as master of 
ceremonies allows Goldsmith’s biography to pose interpretative dilemmas. Goldsmith frames 
Nash as “a man placed in the middle ranks of life . . . whose vices and virtues were open to the 
eye of the most undiscerning spectator, who was placed in public view without power to repress 
censure, or command adulation, who had too much merit not to become remarkable, yet too 
much folly to arrive at greatness” (III.291). His position makes him easier for readers to view 
sympathetically, a familiar character. Goldsmith assures readers that Nash is worth their 
attention, that he has “one undeniable claim to their attention. Mr. Nash was himself a King. In 
this particular, perhaps no Biographer has been so happy as I [Goldsmith]” (III.291-2). 
Goldsmith’s “happiness” as a biographer derives from the character-typed choices he can give a 
reader for determining Nash’s personal character: “[t]hey who are for a delineation of men and 
manners may find some satisfaction that way, and those who delight in adventures of Kings and 
Queens, may perhaps find their hopes satisfied in another” (III.292). In addition to the character 
type of the gamester, Nash also embodies the public character type of a monarch, determined in 
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part by his circumstances in Bath, made real by his stature as a person in the “middle ranks of 
life.”  
Goldsmith pictures the character his monarch ruling in the period of Bath’s initial growth, 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century during a reinvigorated period in public works, most 
notably the Bath Pump-House, where Nash, “in order to proceed in every thing like a king, . . . 
was resolved to give his subjects a law, and the following rules were accordingly put up in the 
Pump-room” (III.303). Just as notable as Nash’s public proclamation of social order is the 
response Goldsmith records: “[i]t is certain, they were in general religiously observed by his 
subjects, and executed by him with impartiality” (III.304). In these instances, Nash is seen as a 
typical monarch, administering to the needs of the people to promote social order and unity and 
to maintain it “with impartiality.” By aligning Nash’s character with the character type of a 
monarch, Goldsmith is better able to put the facts of Nash’s life in contrast with the type. Nash’s 
monarchical decrees, listed under the posted heading “RULES to be observ’d at BATH,” 
stipulate, for instance, “[t]hat all whisperers of lies and scandal, be taken for their authors,” and 
also “[t]hat all repeaters of such lies, and scandal be shun’d by all company;—except such as 
have been guilty of the same crime” (III.303). They were, Goldsmith notes, “undoubtedly 
designed . . . for wit” and, “tho’ stupid, . . . were probably received with sympathetic 
approbation” (III.303). Typed as a king, Nash’s character could be aligned with classical 
precedent: “a weak man, governing weaker subjects, and may be considered as resembling a 
monarch of Cappadocia, whom Cicero somewhere calls, the little king of a little people” 
(Goldsmith III.289). The details that Goldsmith develops elevate Nash to a classical, 
monarchical rank while stressing his pettiness and weakness, the qualities of a person with whom 
a reader might sympathize.  
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 However, Goldsmith closes the biography with a didactic reminder to readers of the 
choices he has provided them for discerning the life of Nash and applying it to their own: Nash’s 
“singularities are forgotten when we behold his virtues, and he who laughed at the whimsical 
character and behaviour of this Monarch of Bath, now laments that he is no more” (III.392). But 
Goldsmith’s passive construction—“singularities are forgotten”—leaves the possibility that the 
collective “we” who will focus on virtue does not have to be the same as the unnamed collective 
who will forget Nash’s “singularities.” Readers, then, might either remember Nash’s faults or 
behold his virtue to improve their own lives; they can “laugh” and “lament” in order to 
understand the selfhood Goldsmith creates. Collectively or singly, readers must resolve the 
tension between what can be known about Nash and what can be discovered by making a choice, 
between the Nash’s celebrity and the public, external characters that frame it, and the experience 
of the man. 
The context of an inductive science that put the onus on the researcher to observe and 
draw conclusions engendered a literature that forced readers to read like scientists, observing and 
drawing conclusions from the details they saw. Authors like Milton, Johnson, and Goldsmith 
locate details to arrange into selfhoods that readers could observe, locating contrasts and 
contrarieties that create tensions within the character, which could only be resolved by the 
reader’s sympathies. Their sympathetic choices mark an ethics of reading that identified and 
defined virtue for the reader and the community of readers. Since the emergent biographical 
form presented rhetorics of self that could stand in for the lives they represented, so that readers 
could spectate those rhetorics as living selves and learn by reconciling what they saw with what 
they could conclude. Their role as readers was to play the acquaintance of the biographical selves 
they read. Eighteenth-century biographers discovered the details for the lives they wrote from 
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sources that were credited by public assent. The private character of the man comes through 
public evidence of his life—what the audience sees of these public selves invites it to draw 
conclusion about the private person and, in turn, about itself.  
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Chapter 3—The Intimate Rhetoric of Self: 
The Ethos of the Intimate Biographer 
 
 Scholars who plot the history of the biographical form often pass from seventeenth-
century life writing like Izaak Walton’s lives of George Herbert and John Donne to Samuel 
Johnson’s biography of Richard Savage and then on to James Boswell’s life of Johnson. The 
move from Walton to Johnson is a broad shift in form from life writing to biography. But the 
formal development from Johnson’s Savage to Boswell’s Johnson is a formal refinement, 
moving biographical selfhood toward a deeper, representational interiority. They maintained a 
remove between the subject and biographer with their scientific approach, but Boswell balances 
a wealth of observations and recollections against his own first-hand account and records. He 
embraces his subject and uses his own ethos to probe the private, intimate self and, in doing so 
advances biography into its modern form. Even though Boswell’s biographical “task” was 
formally identical to Johnson’s and Goldsmith’s— to organize documented, lived experience 
into a print selfhood that empirical readers can observe sympathetically, like a living person, in 
order to teach themselves right social practice—his arrangement of Johnson’s experience 
required more than the selfhood of a vagrant poet or an affected dandy, whose actual lives had 
been eclipsed by their biographies. Scandal did not define the life of Johnson in the public eye. 
On the contrary, whatever scandal arose, Johnson bested, whether it was James Macpherson’s 
public threats to harm him after Johnson challenged Macpherson’s Ossian or Lord Chesterfield’s 
snub at Johnson’s appeal for patronage (Life ii.289-98, i.261-2).48 
                                                 
48
 Johnson’s letter to Macpherson offered an unyielding response to the possibility of violence: “Any violence 
offered me I shall do my best to repel; and what I cannot do for myself, the law shall do for me . . . What would you 
have me retract? I thought your book an imposture; I think it an imposture still . . . Your rage I defy . . . You may 
print this if you will” (Life ii.298). Johnson’s answer to Chesterfield’s snub and weak attempts to ingratiate himself 
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The biographical form presented particular difficulties and limitations to eighteenth-
century biographers—what documents were available that recorded the life, what every day 
practices characterized it, and what character defined it—but the life of Johnson presented 
Boswell with specific biographical challenges to render a well-documented public life intimate, 
its character personal, and the man himself familiar. Johnson had faced similar challenges in 
developing a didactic rhetoric of self for Richard Savage. He bolstered scanty documentary 
evidence with his own accounts of Savage’s life, using his own experience as documentary 
evidence that he could arrange as a biographer. Johnson’s challenge was Savage’s obscurity; 
Though Boswell himself was a minor public figure, his challenge was Johnson’s publicity and 
finding the intimate self within it: 
To write the Life of him who excelled all mankind writing the lives of others, and 
who, whether we consider his extraordinary endowments, or his various works, 
has been equaled by few in any age, is an arduous, and may be reckoned in me a 
presumptuous task . . . As I had the honour and happiness of enjoying his 
friendship for upwards of twenty years; as I had the scheme of writing his life 
constantly in view . . . and as I have spared no pains in obtaining materials 
concerning him . . . I flatter myself that few biographers have entered upon such a 
work as this, with more advantages; independent of literary abilities, in which I 
am not vain enough to compare myself with some great names who have gone 
before me in this kind of writing. (Life i.25-6) 
That Boswell must addresses his legitimacy as Johnson’s biographer before he can even begin to 
arrange Johnson’s biography underscores the pressure on his biographical ethos. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
are most economically expressed in his revision to the definition of “patron” in his Dictionary: “[o]ne who 
countenances, supports, or protects. Commonly a wretch who supports with insolence, and is paid with flattery.” 
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construction of his opening sentence leaves off explicit mention of those who would “reckon” his 
biography “presumptuous,” the readers themselves. By implying the role of the readers, Boswell 
emphasizes the “task.” His task, at the outset, is to situate himself within the tradition of the 
general ethos developing within the contexts of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century print 
culture, the New Science and its community of scientific participants, and within the emergent 
contexts of eighteenth-century biographers. The task for Boswell is to innovate the inductive 
experiment rather than avoiding presumption. 
In this opening, Boswell indicates his ability to represent Johnson’s life for a readership 
demands an ethos proportional to Johnson’s achievements. Johnson’s “extraordinary 
endowments” as a public, authorial figure earned much of his reputation through the sales of his 
biographical works. He is, as Boswell notes, a man who “excelled all mankind writing the lives 
of others,” which shapes Boswell’s own responsibilities as biographer. Boswell sets this ethos 
against the representational challenges that Johnson’s endowments present, even though his fame 
as an author seems almost entirely eclipsed by Johnson’s. More significantly, Boswell puts his 
ethos at a remove from direct comparison to Johnson’s, choosing to set it in conversation “with 
some great names who have gone before him in this kind of writing.” He sets himself in contrast 
to the generic context of great biographical predecessors, like Johnson, but not in direct 
comparison to them. 
Boswell credentials his experimental method with the claim that it “enlarges upon the 
excellent plan of Mr. Mason, in his Memoirs of Gray” (Life i.29). William Mason’s biographical 
account of the poet Thomas Gray, The Poems of Mr. Gray: to which Are Prefixed Memoirs of his 
Life (1774) presents a rigid structure divided into two parts and subdivided into letters and 
poems. Mason’s memoirs comprise the first part, and although dubs it a memoir, it is strictly 
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biographical, built on extensive epistolary documentation that eschews the biographer’s 
intervention beyond short, connective narratives. Its dependence on correspondence to and from 
Gray borders on autobiography, but achieves an even more objective tone than Johnson’s 
account of Savage, and drier, too. The second part catalogs Gray’s poetry and Mason’s critical 
glosses, which are almost a fourth as long as the initial memoirs. Boswell expressed an 
appreciation for Mason’s biography in his common place book, noting his favorite sayings from 
Gray and, often, his personal response to them as a reader.
49
 Boswell’s comments on Gray’s 
comment to Horace Walpole: “I know not if this be his own or a quotation. But it supports my 
opinion against that of General Paoli, that one does not fall in love with a woman of dignity. 
Perhaps indeed a Hero may. Glory is his metaphorical mistress” (ms. 225.2). Boswell applies the 
sayings of an important poet to his own deeply personal response in his private commonplace 
book. What he appreciates about Mason’s biography is a “plan” arranged around documentation 
that recreates intimate aspects of a life, which can elicit a reader’s personal response. 
To enlarge Mason’s form, Boswell expands its representational capacity for portraying an 
intimate rhetoric of self for Johnson. Boswell combines Johnson’s epistolary and literary output, 
so that neither one structures Johnson’s print alone. Instead, increase the conventions of the 
eighteenth-century biographical form: “instead of melting my materials into one mass, and 
constantly speaking in my own person, by which I might have appeared to have more merit in 
the execution of the work . . . I produce, wherever it is in my power, his [Johnson’s] own 
minutes, letters, or conversations” (Life i.29). He claims that his method de-emphasizes the ethos 
of the biographer like Goldsmith and Johnson established, shifting the interpretive burden onto 
his readers, since it depends on an “accumulation of intelligence from various points.” The 
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 In a letter to his friend Temple, Boswell notes that “Mason’s Life of Gray is excellent, because it is interspersed 
with Letters which shew us the Man. His Life of Whitehead is not a Life at all; for there is neither a letter nor a 
saying from first to last” (Correspondence 208). 
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network of sources yields a depiction of the public, authorial self, presented to the reader out of 
the facts, not made by the author. Boswell thus brilliantly excuses himself of the burden of an 
ethos equal to that of Johnson’s in his opening methodological bid.  
However, Boswell’s inductive approach requires an authoritative ethos as well. Since a 
wider range of information can yield a greater definition of a particular selfhood, Boswell’s 
biographical ethos requires him to first assemble and divide the true Johnsoniana from the 
spurious, gauging the authenticity of other perspectives through the only available means—his 
personal understanding of Samuel Johnson.
50
 Boswell is also responsible for exerting control 
over his materials, ordering the disparate portions of his selections into a print life that coheres 
and matches, again, his personal understanding of Johnson. Each responsibility puts a premium 
on the intimacy Boswell strives to depict. Boswell’s biographical ethos, though he seems to 
downplay it, authorizes him to select the details of Johnson’s life. More importantly, his ethos 
holds these details together.  
  Because Boswell deferred to his intimate understanding of and experience with Johnson 
to establish his legitimacy as biographer, critics often attacked his Life of Johnson by attacking 
Boswell’s biographical ethos. He perceives attacks in Hester Piozzi’s Anecdotes of the Late 
Samuel Johnson and again vents his frustrations and concerns to Malone: “[s]he is a little artful 
impudent malignant Devil . . . It is clear that she means to bite me as much as she can,” and he 
takes particular issue when her perceives that Piozzi misremembers a conversation about 
drunken truth, misrepresents an anecdote Boswell shared with her as her own, and her book 
“describes what the Jade has often seen me do—but with Dr. Johnson’s approbation; for he at all 
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 Boswell’s announcement at the end of his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides likewise stresses the significance of 
his ethos: “Mr. Boswell has been collecting materials for this work for more than twenty years, during which he was 
honoured with the intimate friendship of Dr. Johnson,” and he invites a reading public to engage the intimate 
friendship, noting that “[h]e has already obtained a large collection of Dr. Johnson’s letters to his friends, and shall 
be much obliged for others as yet remain in private hands” (Life v.421). 
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times was flattered by my preserving what fell from his mind when shaken by conversation, so 
there was nothing like treachery” (Correspondence 114). Boswell’s account to Malone 
underscores his fear that Piozzi’s account strikes at his own ethos which is inextricably bound up 
with his method. An attack on Boswell’s ethos discredits his means of collecting “what fell 
from” Johnson’s “mind when shaken by conversation,” as well as his means of representing him 
within a compelling rhetoric of self.
51
  
Contemporary scholars have also questioned Boswell’s ethos as a biographer and its role 
in mediating a rhetoric of self for Johnson. Frederick A. Pottle, editor of the Boswell Papers and 
the release of trade and scholarly editions of Boswell’s journals from 1950 to 1989, aligns his 
treatment of Boswell with stereotypes of the man’s personal character, so that he can casually 
reduce Boswell to the character of Macheath from John Gay’s Beggar’s Opera. Pottle interprets 
Boswell’s description of Paul Lewis, a popular rakish convict, as a signifier for Boswell’s own 
ethos, noting that “[i]n one way or another the figure of Macheath dominates this entire journal” 
(Pottle 252 n.7). The current general editor of the Boswell Papers, Gordon Turnbull, has sought 
to recuperate Boswell’s print ethos, overwriting Pottle’s assessment of Boswell’s personal ethos 
in the journals with a statement that Paul Lewis’s Macheath-type character is “[n]ot just 
Boswell’s perception, but part of Lewis’s self display,” citing an account of Lewis from the 
Gentleman’s Magazine that shaped perceptions of Lewis (463 n.8). The character of Macheath 
could be put on or taken off—self-representation as a choice might be more useful for 
understanding Boswell’s selfhood than self-representation as a brand.  
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 After the Life’s publication, critics were particularly focused on the importance of Boswell’s ethos in playing 
biographer to Johnson. In the 20 May 1791 Morning Post, and Daily Advertiser, for instance, a pundit suggested 
that “Sir  JOHN HAWKINS, it is affirmed by BOZZY, never lived near enough to JOHNSON’s Privacy to know 
his character.—The latter took in the true Haut Gout.—Sir JOHN contented himself with smelling him at a distance” 
(qtd. in Larsen 162). Referring to the biographer as “Bozzy,” the critic attacks this crucial, intimate ethos; Bozzy 
was Johnson’s pet name for Boswell. The critic also suggests Boswell’s Life is in bad taste. Hawkins’s distance 
weakens his ethos, but Boswell’s intimacy puts him close enough to smell the slight odor of decay as Johnson flavor 
seasons, like wild game aging toward a haut gout. 
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While these readings of Boswell’s character grapple with the differences between the 
person and the cultural standards of his time shaping his character, they indicate a disjunction 
between the received perceptions of Boswell and the ways he chooses to represent himself. As 
Samuel Johnson’s biographer, Boswell uses his ethos as a means of developing and arranging an 
intimate rhetoric of self for Johnson, more intimate than earlier precedents, like Johnson’s 
objective treatment of Savage or Mason’s almost entirely documentary construction of Gray’s 
print person.  
The biographical ethos that Boswell brings to bear on the Life of Johnson did not develop 
in a literary vacuum; he did not arrive on the eighteenth-century biographical scene as a literary 
unknown. This chapter will put Boswell’s ethos as the biographer of the Life in the context of his 
earlier writing to examine how the works he authored gave him authority to play Johnson’s 
biographer, a biographer capable of relaying an intimate representation of this towering public 
figure. To generate this biographical shift from a known, recognizable selfhood to a personal 
self, Boswell addresses three challenges with the print ethos he created for himself in his earlier 
manuscripts and published writings. In these contexts, Boswell’s authorial ethos matures into a 
biographer whose print self has the authority to act as an interlocutor for Johnson. Boswell’s 
well-known relationship with Johnson acts as a print fact that establishes a reader’s expectations 
and gives a revelatory context to Johnson’s selfhood. Second, Boswell establishes an ethos as a 
biographer who is competent to represent Johnson’s public prominence, the reputation of his 
print self by counterbalancing his ethos against Johnson’s established print self.  Third, 
Boswell’s ethos destabilizes Johnson’s public, print persona so that he can himself overwrite it. 
Boswell uses his ethos to show that he can innovate how readers might come to understand 
Johnson’s selfhood personally, publicly, and nationally.  
155 
 
I will give particular attention to his ethos as the Scottish persona of a periodical writer 
from Edinburgh in one of his early manuscripts, as the travel writer in his Account of Corsica, 
the essayist of the Hypochondriack, the anonymous author of occasional pieces in the London 
Magazine, or even a proto-biographer travelogue writer in the Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides. 
I argue that the ethos he develops in these writings are a necessary precedent to the Life since 
they provide him with the means for balancing Johnson’s public, authorial persona against the 
private persona that Boswell was later at such pains to arrange rhetorically. Ultimately, 
Boswell’s ethos allows him to establish a relationship with his audience that would allow him to 
translate the national and literary significance of Samuel Johnson at a distance from Boswell’s 
readers into a rhetoric of self that closed this distance, making Johnson a familiar self to whom 
they can relate.  
 
Ethos as a Mediator for Selfhood 
In order to arrange a compelling biography, Boswell must first establish himself as an 
author capable of playing mediator between his audience and his subject. Paula Backsheider 
suggests that the decision to take on the challenges of writing a biography is ultimately a 
decision to explore and interpret a person so closely as to enter into an intimate relationship with 
the life of that person.  The relationship between the biographer and “a subject . . . need not be 
those most commonly assigned—identification or affinity or sympathy. It can be a deep 
understanding of the pressures the time brought to bear on the subject. It can be deep 
engagement with the ‘puzzles’ that remain unsolved about the life. It can be a particular 
engagement with the challenges of the act of writing a particular life or kind of life” 
(Backsheider 59). On a larger scale, and “[i]n the most successful biographies, the writer also has 
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a clear conception of what that life represents and in what ways it was significant and has 
significance for us” (Backscheider 59). Boswell’s ethos as a biographer of the public and 
intimate self depends on the “commonly assigned,” personal reasons, but it especially abstracts 
the significance of Johnson’s life to stress what it “represents” for a public audience beyond 
Boswell’s own “identification or affinity or sympathy.” By positioning himself in a personal 
relationship to a public figure, Boswell creates a print ethos to stand in for his audience’s 
personal knowledge of Johnson that promises the reader an experience of meaning through the 
modern biographical strategies of intimacy and identity. 
Boswell’s attempt to introduce a new biographical rhetoric was a means to realizing an 
earlier, authorial ambition to gain literary repute. Boswell claims to have had Johnson’s 
biography in mind for upwards of twenty years, during which time he began collecting 
information for the later Life. At the same time, though without any indication he was 
consciously establishing himself to write the Life, Boswell was developing credentials that would 
give his later biographical ethos enough literary efficacy to recommend it. His early Account of 
Corsica displays some literary merit that would look toward his later biographical approach.
52
 In 
the Life, for instance, Boswell recalls his anxiety that Johnson might take offense at the 
publication of his private letter to Boswell (Life ii.46-7). This early failure on Boswell’s part 
marks an immature misstep that he would later avoid by negotiating the private and the public 
aspects of literary selfhood.  
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 In the 1768 Preface of his first publication, the Account of Corsica, Boswell gives particular attention to the 
function and the effects of a compelling ethos.  While the Account is a travel narrative, it acts in some ways as a 
timely political manifesto, roughly coinciding with the arrival of the exiled General Pasquale Paoli in Britain after 
the invasion of Corsica by France and Genoa in 1768. Thomas M. Curley describes Boswell’s political edge as 
“artful propaganda transforming personal experience and historical research into a coherent case for British support 
of Corsican independence. It is a fact-based artifact having a romantic libertarian perspective shaped in part by 
Rosseau and the classics but nevertheless containing a reliable British description of the country” (93). 
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In a letter critiquing the Account, Johnson distinguishes between a crucial handling of the 
public and private: “[y]our History is like other histories, but your Journal is in a very high 
degree curious and delightful. There is between the history and the journal that difference which 
there will always be found from notions borrowed from without, and notions generated within . . 
. You express images which operated strongly upon yourself, and . . . have impressed them with 
great force upon your readers” (ii.70). The inward turn for which Johnson praises Boswell defers 
to a display of the private person, the ethos generated through personal of a vaguely empirical 
nature, from which Boswell can draw conclusions that might be “impressed with great force” on 
his audience. Most notably, it achieves this interior turn, as Johnson suggests, through Boswell’s 
journaling. The context for Boswell’s journaling is Corsica’s battle for sovereignty, the sort of 
history from which Hugh Blair and Adam Smith distinguish the biographical form in their 
rhetorical lectures.
53
  Boswell’s autobiographical journaling, though not applied to a biographical 
account, humanizes the history of Corsica’s struggle, much like Johnson’s explanation of how 
biography acts on the reader: “[a]ll or joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is 
produced by an act of the imagination that realises the event however fictitious, or approximates 
it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose fortune we 
contemplate” (Rambler III.318-9). With his account of Corsica, Boswell begin to develop an 
autobiographical ethos that can humanize history and, later, a public selfhood and celebrity in the 
Life that his journaling “places the reader in the condition” of his own ethos as a first-hand 
witness of Samuel Johnson.  
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 As noted in the introduction, Blair classes biography as a historical construction, subject to the common attributes 
of historical rhetoric. He notes that “History is a species of Writing designed for the instruction of mankind, [so] 
sound morality should always reign in it,” and he also argues that the biographical form “or the Writing of Lives, is 
a very useful kind of Composition; less formal and stately than History; but to the bulk of readers, perhaps, no less 
instructive; as it affords them the opportunity of seeing the characters and tempers, the virtues and failings of 
eminent men fully displayed; and admits them into a more thorough and intimate acquaintance than History 
generally allows” (411). Blair’s notion of biography emphasizes the form’s appeal to readers, its familiar human 
closeness set against the historical remove. 
158 
 
The rhetoric of self Boswell would later craft in the Life depends on the “images” of 
Johnson that Boswell chose to record in his journals, those images “which operated strongly 
upon” the biographer, who sought to impress “them with great force.” It is an almost Lockean 
endeavor to give significance to images that every reader could view and interpret collectively. 
His journal accounts of Johnson’s life would become the backbone of the Life. Boswell does not 
explicitly theorize the ethos of the biographer in the public, political context of a Corsican tour, 
yet his discussion of authorship and the authority outlines the interplay between an author’s ethos 
and the audience that shape Boswell as a biographer. His treatment of authorship also points 
toward an attention to the intimate, “curious and delightful” details in Boswell’s journals that 
establish a crucial distinction “between the history and the journal,” which for Boswell develops 
into “that difference which will always be found from notions borrowed from without, and 
notions generated within.” It is an early literary move to situate the intimate and private in the 
view of public readers. 
Through his private journaling, Boswell begins to craft a public, authorial ethos, that he 
explores in the Preface to the Account of Corsica: “[t]he author of an approved book may allow 
his natural disposition an easy play, and yet indulge the pride of a superiour genius when he 
considers that by those who know him only as an authour, he never ceases to be respected” 
(Corsica 14). Thus readers “who know Boswell only as an author” will see his “superior genius” 
in that “natural disposition of easy play” that his journaling reveals and that Johnson 
commended. In the Life, Boswell is able to play dual roles as an author and biographer: he is 
Johnson’s friend, giving his own “natural disposition” free reign and an “easy play” with the 
celebrity of Johnson’s selfhood, which he later arranges with “superior genius” as a public 
biographer. The ethos that “appears in print” and is distributed for a wider audience does not 
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harden “a man’s character” personally, but establishes a print remove between the “character” of 
the author as a public figure and as a private person, a “natural disposition of an easy play” 
privately and in person, that goes unknown to a public, “superior genius” in print. In this 
construction, Boswell grants an author’s ethos the duality that would make his trademark 
intimacy possible in later biographical writing.
54
 
 Boswell is the first of the modern eighteenth-century biographers to capitalize on his role 
as eyewitness to the biographical subject.
55
 There is no record that Oliver Goldsmith played 
eyewitness to the experiences of Richard Nash, so he arranged a rhetoric of self for Nash based 
largely on Nash’s reputation at Bath. Goldsmith necessarily adopted an ethos that could translate 
Nash into character types, matching the public facts of the Nash’s reputation as a publicly 
recognizable selfhood of a man who shaped the public (III.288). Johnson stressed the importance 
of distance between the biographical ethos and the subject, in order to make the biography more 
accurate and reliable (Rambler III.323). Johnson’s personal relationship to Richard Savage, their 
nighttime roving, appears nowhere in the biography Johnson wrote for him.
56
 Johnson adopted 
an objective ethos, structuring these night walks in the biography as Savage’s alone (Lives 
XXII.928). Boswell’s early model for cultivating an authorial ethos sets an approach that allows 
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 The duality of an author’s private life and public output is no revelation to eighteenth-century authors. Johnson, 
too, acknowledges the distinction in an early Rambler essay, No 14. Saturday, 5 May 1750, arguing that readers 
develop expectations for authors based on their writing which are often frustrated by their actual company (III.92-7). 
As a biographer, however, Boswell capitalizes on this distinction in a way that Johnson did not.   
55
 In his life of Addison, however, Johnson does stress that “lives can only be written from personal knowledge, 
which is growing less every day,” but he does not stipulate the knowledge be eye-witness (Lives XXII.637). To the 
contrary, he notes that “more knowledge may be gained of a man’s real character, by a short conversation with one 
of his servants” (Rambler III.322). 
56
 Chapter 2 gives more thorough attention to Johnson and Savage’s roving; Richard Holmes discussed it most 
thoroughly in Dr. Johnson & Mr. Savage. Sir John Hawkins reports in his Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. that 
Johnson recalled “whole nights . . . spent by him and Savage in conversations . . . in a perambulation round the 
squares of Westminster, . . . . when all the money they could both raise was less than sufficient to purchase for them 
the shelter and sordid comforts of a night cellar” (33-4). Boswell, likewise, reinforced the fact of the relationship 
(Life i.163 and 163  n2.) 
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him to mediate Johnson through his own personal account, to be both the objective author in 
control of the biography and an intimate source that is intertwined with the life.  
Boswell began overtly developing his ethos as a biographer with his Journal of a Tour to 
the Hebrides. He organizes the Tour around the journal he kept while traveling through the 
Hebrides with Johnson in the latter half of 1773, and while it has an ostensible focus on the 
Hebrides and Scotland, it is primarily devoted to Johnson. As Ian McGowan observes, the “Tour 
retains its place for the student of biography and literary representation as Boswell’s 
breakthrough in technique” (127). That the Tour was Boswell’s stylistic trying ground for the 
later Life of Johnson has become a commonplace, which reduces the journaling in the Tour to 
little more than a stylistic practice run for the application of journals in the later Life. But the 
published account of Johnson in the Journal Tour was for Boswell a necessary precedent to the 
Life. More than a study in stylistics, Boswell uses the Tour to begin developing an ethos that 
mediates an intimate rhetoric of self in the Life. In the Tour, Boswell’s ethos is a means for 
balancing Johnson’s public, authorial persona against the private persona that he himself had 
taken such pain to record. John Radner notes that “Boswell used the journal to establish his 
authority to narrate this portion of Johnson’s life and his credentials to narrate the rest . . . and to 
demonstrate his ability to appreciate and assess Johnson” (“Narrative Control” 67). More than 
simply refining and innovating Boswell’s biographical style, the Tour allowed Boswell to 
establish his credentials as Johnson’s preeminent biographer in two ways: it exhibits Johnson’s 
approval of Boswell’s biographical project, and it also downplays Boswell’s presumption, 
qualifying him to play the biographer rather than a mere fan. 
 Boswell used the Tour to credential his authority and his mastery of Johnson’s life, so he 
had to show that his ability to represent Johnson biographically had been endorsed by Johnson 
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himself. Boswell portrays Johnson as a collaborator who avidly follows and affirms the journal 
account of the trip, thus endorsing Boswell’s journalistic and, later, biographical ethos. Their trip 
ran just over three months, from 15 August 1773 to 21 November 1773, and Boswell maintained 
his journal 11 November. The last time Johnson perused it was 26 October, where Boswell 
gestures toward Johnson’s collaboration: “[h]aving mentioned, more than once, that my Journal 
was perused by Dr. Johnson, I think it proper to inform my readers that this is the last paragraph 
which he read” of Boswell’s journal, in Scotland or back in London  (Life v.360, n. 4). Radner 
characterizes these perusals not only as collaboration between the two, but especially as research 
for Boswell’s later project, noting that, “[t]hough they collaborate on input, Boswell is primarily 
in charge of the process. He determines what to preserve for Johnson (and others) to read, and 
for Boswell himself perhaps to use later” (“Johnson’s Role” 306). 57 In his constant references, 
“more than once,” to Johnson’s review of the journal, Boswell bolsters his ethos as a researcher 
so thorough he is qualified to mediate Johnson’s selfhood.  
Johnson’s permission, implied through his collaboration, freed Boswell to present a fuller 
picture of his subject, one that included potentially off-putting, but nevertheless Johnsonian 
foibles, peccadillos, and personality ticks. Johnson’s permission distanced Boswell from his own 
personal feelings about Johnson. Thus unchecked, Boswell could cultivate the sort of ethos he 
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 Boswell also had to develop a mature biographical persona with an authoritative ethos that could be a strong voice 
within the wider conversation surrounding Johnson. The public interest in Johnson’s selfhood had been gratified if 
not filled by multiple biographies published shortly after his death: “[t]he lives all had their staple ingredients, 
usually borrowed from one another . . . Despite these similarities, each biography was in its own way different from 
the others . . . Each projected his own image of Johnson, but collectively they conveyed the two main images of 
Johnson as writer and moralist,” aspects of his selfhood that were both public and private, but the early biographers 
presented was of a public “moralist rather than Johnson the writer” (Kelley and Brack 117-8). With so many 
biographies and repetitious facts in circulation about the life of Johnson, Hester Thrale Piozzi could note a month 
before the publication of Boswell’s Life, that “Mr Boswell’s Book is coming out, & the Wits expect me to tremble,” 
since the authority of his ethos promised to challenge the one she established in her Anecdotes of the Late Samuel 
Johnson, but Piozzi wondered, “what will the Fellow say?—that has not been said already?” (Thraliana 807). This 
context gave Boswell the imperative to make Johnson new with an ethos that could mediate Johnson by enriching 
the public narrative of Johnson’s life with new details of his private life, evaluated judiciously and arranged 
logically.  
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projected in his account of Corsica—a necessary component of an ethos that could balance the 
public authority of the biographer against the intimate, first-hand accounting that Boswell sought 
to incorporate into his Life of Johnson. In the Tour entry for 19 September 1773, Boswell records 
that Johnson “came into my room this morning before breakfast, to read my Journal, which he 
has done all along. He often before said, ‘I take great delight in reading it.’ To-day he said, ‘You 
improve: it grows better and better’” (Life v.225). Similarly, Boswell recounts that Johnson “read 
to-night, to himself, as he sat in company, a great deal of my Journal, and said to me, ‘The more 
I read of this, I think the more highly of you’” (Life v.262). Johnson’s praise equates Boswell the 
journalist with Boswell the person, so that Boswell is as much of a literary creation as the 
Johnson that Boswell records in the journal. Boswell appears to delight in this praise and even 
tests Johnson and the reader by describing his own excesses.  
On 25 October 1773, Boswell imagines himself “knight-errant” for the “ladies maids 
tripping about in neat morning dresses” at the Duke of Argyle’s house, women who were more 
polished than the Hebridean “rusticity” he had so often seen to that point (Life v.355). He notes 
that, “[o]n reflection, at the distance of several years, I wonder that my venerable fellow-traveller 
should have read this passage without censuring my levity” (Life v.355, n.3). In one simple 
“reflection” at a significant “distance of several years” from his journaling on tour, Boswell 
establishes Johnson’s approval of both to his personal experience on tour and the later 
publication of the Tour itself. The praise that Boswell recounts in these moments credential his 
ethos as an author eleven years later when he publishes the Tour. By depicting Johnson in 
approbation of Boswell’s Hebrides journalizing, Boswell represents his own ethos as a credible, 
reliable biographer not only of Johnson’s travel through the Hebrides, but of his entire life. Much 
like he had ranked the personal journal over the researched historical portions of Boswell’s 
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Account of Corsica, Johnson also authorizes Boswell’s journal-based approach to relaying 
personal experiences in a public setting or with a public figure. In these important 
representations, Johnson is endorsing Boswell’s intimate approach to biography, which he would 
later claim to have innovated in arranging a rhetoric of self for Johnson. Boswell takes Johnson’s 
approval his journalistic ethos as a confirmation of his ability to mediate Johnson’s selfhood in 
the Life.  
 Johnson’s approval of Boswell’s journalistic complexity, however, was not an 
unqualified sanction of Boswell’s biographical project. Although Johnson took pleasure in 
reading Boswell’s descriptions of his own eccentricity, he tempered his praise of the journal with 
one crucial caveat: “‘Sir, said he, it is not written in a slovenly manner. It might be printed, were 
the subject fit for printing’” (Life v.226-7).58 The question of fitness is a matter of intimacy and 
accuracy. What makes Boswell’s “subject” unfit “for printing” and so fascinating to Johnson as a 
private reader is the intimate details it collects. It displayed peculiarities characteristic of Johnson 
that could only be experienced in a first-hand experience of the self. Boswell, for instance, first 
interprets Johnson’s habit of speaking to himself by noting that “[i]t is in vain to try to find a 
meaning in every one of his particularities, which, I suppose, are mere habits, contracted by 
chance . . . His speaking to himself . . . is a common habit with studious men accustomed to deep 
thinking” (Life v.306). Then gives an example of the curious habit: “Dr. Johnson is often uttering 
pious ejaculations, when he appears to be talking to himself; for sometimes his voice grows 
stronger, and parts of the Lord’s Prayer are heard. I have sat beside him with more than ordinary 
                                                 
58
 John B. Radner argues that Johnson actively sought to keep the intimate unfitness of his peculiarities out of print: 
Johnson’s “working to curb Boswell’s wish to publish Johnsonian material while Johnson was still alive, suggest[s] 
his discomfort at being circumscribed by Boswell’s narrative and losing control of his public image” (“Johnson’s 
Role” 323-4). Boswell’s journal, then, appeared after Johnson’s death, when Johnson’s “public image” could only 
be debated and established by biographers. The image Boswell crafts from his journal account is one of many that 
enter the biographical fray and lay claim to an image of Johnson. 
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reverence on such occasions” (Life v.307). Boswell comments how “remarkable [it is] that Dr. 
Johnson should have read this account of some of his own peculiar habits, without saying any 
thing on the subject” (Life v.307 n.2). This editorial gloss anticipates criticisms of his revelatory, 
eye-witness representations of Johnson. Although Johnson questions whether the journal is “fit 
to be published,” Boswell published it and thus made it fit. Getting Johnson’s ostensible approval 
of Boswell as a good journalist if not auteur is a necessary step in credentialing Boswell’s ethos; 
giving himself permission to go beyond Johnson’s censure establishes the authority of his ethos 
as his own man beyond Johnson. Without both halves of this equation, Boswell would not have 
been fit to mediate Johnson’s selfhood.  
 
Mediating the Private Facts of Selfhood through an Intimate Ethos 
The public, biographical ethos that Boswell establishes distances himself from the 
personal details he includes in his journal of traveling to the Hebrides with Johnson. In the Life, 
later, he would close the distance. His method for establishing an ethos as Johnson’s intimate 
defers to the inductive empiricism that Thomas Sprat assigns the natural philosophers Royal 
Society, to “regard the least, and the plainest things, and those that may appear at first the most 
inconsiderable; as well as the greatest Curiosities” (90). “Every thing relative to so great a man,” 
Boswell asserted, “is worth remembering,” but “remembering” and mediating selfhood through 
those memories required more delicacy than Boswell could muster in this first attempt to 
represent Johnson in the Journal (Life v.19). Many readers found the Tour so indelicate that 
Boswell’s editor, Edmund Malone, suggested that he temper his portrayals of Johnson’s 
appearance and his character: “[w]ith respect to the Character of your Journal, if you retain it, it 
certainly should be amplified, and his uniform piety and virtue enlarged upon. Pray omit your . . . 
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bow wough entirely” (Correspondence 301). His ethos here, however empirical and attentive to 
the plainest and greatest aspects of Johnson, strained his audience’s expectations for biographical 
writing, challenging what Backsheider recognizes as a “contract the biographer has established 
with the reader. More than a bridge, it is the primary signal of the writer’s relationship to readers 
and to content” (10). Boswell develops this “contract” to innovate the biographical form with a 
rhetoric of self that gives his audience more intimate access to the person than ever before. 
  Dr. William Adams, Johnson’s friend and former tutor at Pembroke College 
acknowledges the tension Boswell’s ethos establishes between the distance of the public author 
to the subject and the intimate details that invite readers to “remember” all of the things “relative 
to so great a man” as Johnson: “you have depicted our Friend so perfectly to my Fancy in every 
attitude, every scene and situation, that I have thought myself in the company, and of the party 
almost throughout . . . I wish indeed some few gross expressions had been softened, and a few of 
our Hero’s foibles had been a little more shaded; but it is useful to see the weakness incident to 
great minds” (Correspondence 101). Adams gentle criticism highlights this tension between the 
public Johnson and the private life as he gently criticizes Boswell’s mediation of their mutual 
friend in the Tour. Though Boswell exceeded Adams’ expectations for drafting a rhetoric of self, 
he ultimately recognizes the value of Boswell’s project, to preserve everything relative to 
Johnson’s celebrity, and what Johnson’s “foibles” and “gross expressions” offer readers to 
understand about Johnson and themselves.  
To demonstrate how his personal experience with Johnson enables him to better mediate 
Johnson, Boswell gathers unflattering details alongside those that Johnson might have regard fit 
for printing in the Tour, the “inconsiderable” and the “greatest curiosities.” Such details can only 
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be garnered through intimate experience with the subject.
59
 Boswell relates Johnson’s opinion 
that “we inherit dispositions from our parents,” which in itself is a neutral observation, but 
Boswell adds Johnson’s private disclosure: ‘I inherited, (said he,) a vile melancholy from my 
father, which has made me mad all my life, at least not sober’—Lady M’Leod wondered he 
should tell this” (Life v.214-5). Lady M’Leod’s wonder at Johnson’s admission matches the 
audience’s wonder that Boswell himself “should tell this” and reveal Johnson’s opinion of his 
own mental instability. Boswell introduces Lady M’Leod’s wonder as a proxy for his own. She 
provides cover for the breach of public and private by bringing it to the attention of the reader 
and by laying the fault at Johnson, whose excessive candor (rather than Boswell’s prying) leads 
Lady M’Leod to wonder. Boswell preserves his ethos as the biographer by offering up this proxy 
for audience surprise and their potential to be scandalized by his frankness and intimacy.  
Similarly, Boswell shows Johnson’s fury at being left behind on horseback: “I wished to 
get on, to see how we were to be lodged, and how we were to get a boat; all which I thought I 
could be settle myself, without his having any trouble,” but Boswell reports that Johnson “called 
me back with a tremendous shout, and was really in a passion with me for leaving him . . . His 
extraordinary warmth confounded me” (Life v.145). Boswell is an active participant in Johnson’s 
travel, seeking to mediate Johnson’s own traveling experience in lodging and passage, and in the 
same manner Lady M’Leod’s preserved his ethos, his confession that Johnson’s “extraordinary 
warmth confounded” him rather than his own blame in abandoning Johnson who was, at best, a 
clumsy equestrian. Boswell admits no blame, only confusion, so that the reader must observe the 
exchange, adopt Boswell’s confusion, and evaluate the only established experience the scene 
depicts: Johnson’s abandonment. By depicting Johnson’s private selfhood as depressive and 
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 One of Johnson’s prescriptions for biographer exhorts biographers to look past the sort of information that “might 
be collected from publick papers” in order to write a biography that goes beyond a “chronological series of actions 
or preferments” (Rambler III.322). Boswell moves past develops a model that depends on even closer observation. 
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choleric risks breaking the delicate contract that Backsheider describes between the selfhood the 
biographer represents, the biographer, and the audience.  
 The details of Boswell’s experience with Johnson on the Journal, the intimate aspect of 
his ethos, seemingly threaten his credibility as a biographer. Was his journalistic research simply 
prying that demanded Johnson’s review and revision? Was his participation in Johnson’s lived 
experience less about engaging a selfhood intimately than baiting it, to contrive experimentally 
an set of experiences rather than observing them judiciously? Hester Thrale Piozzi or Peter 
Pindar lambasted Boswell for inserting himself so fully as biographer and proof of Johnson’s 
life. While Boswell’s published, biographical ethos is still developing from the author of the 
Account to the biographer of the Life, Boswell is using his own experiences, however 
unbecoming, to mediate Johnson’s selfhood. Exhibiting his reputation for carousing, Boswell 
describes staying up after Johnson went to bed and drinking with friends until “[w]e were cordial 
and merry to a high degree,” such a high degree Boswell has “no recollection, with any 
accuracy,” of “what passed” (Life v.258). Boswell lists Johnson’s response the next day:  
I awaked at noon, with a severe head-ach. I was much vexed that I should have 
been guilty of such a riot, and afraid of a reproof from Dr. Johnson. I though it 
very inconsistent with the conduction which I ought to maintain, while the 
companion of the Rambler. About one he came into my room, and accosted me, 
“What, drunk yet?”—His tone of voice was not that of severe upbraiding; so I 
was relieved a little.—“Sir, (said I,) they kept me up.”—He answered, “No, you 
kept them up, you drunken dog:”—This he said with good-humoured English 
pleasantry. Soon afterwards . . . [my] friends assembled around my bed . . . and 
insisted I should take a dram.—“Ay, said Dr. Johnson, fill him drunk again. Do it 
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in the morning, that we may laugh at him all day. It is a poor thing for a fellow to 
get drunk at night, and sculk to bed, and let his friends have no sport.”—Finding 
him thus jocular, I became quite easy; and when I offered to get up, he very good-
naturedly said, “You need be in no such hurry now.” (Life v.258-9). 
By depicting himself as a man who gets so drunk that he can have “no recollection” of what 
passed “with any accuracy,” Boswell seems to undermine the competence of the professional 
author or biographer’s ethos: a biographer with no memories is useless. But even his blackout 
drinking becomes the occasion for recollecting a story in the morning about Johnson’s teasing 
kindness, which redeems the episode. Such intimate details about the biographer rather than the 
subject alone also close the gap between the objective, distant role of the biographical ethos and 
its intimate, private side that Boswell projected in his Corsican account. Boswell’s foibles help to 
offset Johnson’s and create an occasion to show a sympathetic Johnson where Boswell feared he 
would find a judgmental one. 
 Given Boswell’s almost scandalous self-representation in this anecdote, it is easy to miss 
his development of Johnson’s character. Boswell makes no attempt, after all, to recall or relate 
the happenings of the previous night’s drunkenness, but rather gives a precise account of the next 
morning, when Johnson has again become the focal point of the narrative. Boswell uses this 
unflinching depiction of a single, embarrassing event to mediate Johnson’s pontificating on 
social practices, particularly in the “Rambler.” Boswell’s fear of judgment stands in for reader 
expectations as Boswell expects a “reproof” and “severe upbraiding” as a consequence of his 
faux pas. Boswell has applied the mistake he recognizes to most readers’ expectations, who 
expect the author “to be sealed by an irrevocable sentence as soon as any work of his hath 
passed” public scrutiny, thereby conflating the selfhood of the author with the author’s writing 
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(Hypochondriack II.22.313). Adopting this mistaken approach, however, positions Boswell to 
meet readers on the terms of their common expectations and to revise them. Acknowledging and 
evoking such expectations in his fear of a reproof, Boswell sets himself up to invert the 
moralizing that readers anticipate. Rather than the Rambler’s heavy-handed severity, Boswell’s 
private experience reveals a Johnson who defies expectations. Instead of the familiar, public 
austerity of the Rambler, Johnson answers Boswell with “pleasantry,” joking with his companion 
at bedside as an intimate friend. The severity of Johnson’s own public ethos as the Rambler gives 
way to Boswell’s ethos as a hungover journal writer. Without Boswell’s descriptions of 
Johnson’s “jocular” tone and its “good-humoured English pleasantry,” however, Johnson’s 
words might, on their own, convey the sort of moralistic “upbraiding” Boswell feared. It is the 
combination of Johnson’s action and Boswell’s mediation that produces the rhetoric of self. 
With the Tour, Boswell has not yet achieved the ethos of a biographer who can 
simultaneously mediate selfhood at a remove from it while citing personal experiences that 
define it. In the last edition of the Tour that Boswell revised, the third edition 1786, the fledging 
biographer added an explanation for the inclusion of this anecdote. While its primary function 
was to address the censure of his literary and personal critics, it clarified how his role as a 
mediator for Johnson had functioned in the Hebrides and the later publication: 
My ingenuously relating this occasional instance of intemperance has I 
find been made the subject both of serious criticism and ludicrous banter. With 
the banterers I shall not trouble myself, but I wonder that those who pretend to the 
appellation of serious criticks should not have had sagacity enough to perceive 
that here, as in every other part of the present work, my principal object was to 
delineate Dr. Johnson’s manners and character. In justice to him, I would not omit 
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an anecdote, which, though in some degree to my disadvantage, exhibits in so 
strong a light the indulgence and good humour with which he could treat those 
excesses of his friends, of which he highly disapproved.  
In some other instances, the criticks have been equally wrong as to the true 
motive of my recording particulars, the objections to which I saw as clearly as 
they. (Life v.259, n.1)  
Beyond downplaying the severity of his hangover, “an occasional instance of intemperance,” 
Boswell does not seek to defend or justify it. Rather than focus on himself, he focuses on his 
choice to include this candid anecdote in his representation of Johnson. Boswell stresses his 
purposefulness in choosing to admit the incident into the Tour, despite the obvious “objections” 
to it, which Boswell “saw as clearly” as his “criticks.”60 The anecdote Boswell presents depicts a 
symbiotic relationship between Boswell and Johnson in which Boswell’s ethos as a lush 
becomes a fact of Johnson’s biographical representation, which Boswell uses to express the 
“indulgence and good humour with which Johnson could treat those excesses of his friends, of 
which he highly disapproved.”  
  While Boswell’s ethos is second to Johnson’s selfhood, the “principle object” of the 
Tour, they cohere in the symbiotic relationship Boswell designs for them, each becoming clearer 
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 As a public mediator of Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell grudgingly claims that his approach has been misunderstood. 
His representation of Johnson in the Tour and his revelations about Johnson’s private life were misunderstood as 
scandalous rather than edifying: “[b]ut it seems I judged to well of the world; for though I could scarcely believe it, I 
have undoubtedly been informed, that many persons, especially in distant quarters, not penetrating enough into 
Johnson’s character, so as to understand his mode of treating his friends, have arraigned my judgement, instead 
seeing that I was sensible of all that they could observe” (Life i.3). The problem in Boswell’s judgment is that he 
expected a more intimate knowledge of Johnson to provide a baseline for understanding the personal selfhood 
Boswell represents. Since his audience’s understanding is “not penetrating enough into Johnson’s character” and 
certainly not so penetrating “as to understand his mode in treating his friends,” Boswell has to negotiate the contract 
between his audience, his ethos, and the rhetoric of self that his ethos helps to arrange. What rankles Boswell in 
particular is that in some criticisms, the audience of his Tour has implied he is not as “sensible of all that they could 
observe,” even though he has selected and arranged details to represent Johnson as plainly as possible. Boswell has 
broaches these concerns at the outset of the Life to prepare readers for the more expansive degree of intimacy his 
public ethos will use in supplying private details from his own experiences and from others in order to provide a 
“penetrating” rhetoric of self for Johnson. 
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through their exchanges with the other. Boswell is hardly a supernumerary figure in the Tour. He 
is not silent in representing Johnson, nor does he act as a passive background for Johnson’s 
selfhood. Since a print representation of Johnson is Boswell’s principle object and his ethos is as 
much a print construction as Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell applies his ethos as a print fact. He is 
not simply playing the foil to Johnson. The open, candid facts of Boswell’s ethos in the Tour 
provide a context that engages Johnson and provides a practical rationale for the exercise of 
Johnson’s character including his foibles. In the anecdote of Boswell’s hangover, Boswell’s 
public ethos uses the intimate facts of his private self like an experiment through which an 
audience can induce Johnson’s character.  
 As the first of three considerations in which Boswell had to situate his ethos to be 
Johnson’s biographer in the Life, he maintained an ethos that could act as a public, print fact, 
particularly after the publication of his Account of Corsica and the Journal of a Tour to the 
Hebrides. He structured his ethos in response to his audience’s needs to maintain his contractual 
relationship between the expectations he established for them as biographer and their reaction to 
how well he gratified those expectations. In his Dedication to Sir Joshua Reynolds in the Life of 
Johnson, Boswell admits, “In my ‘Tour,’ I was almost unboundedly open in my 
communications; and from my eagerness to display the wonderful fertility and readiness of 
Johnson’s wit, freely shewed to the world its dexterity, even when I was myself the object of it. I 
trusted that I should be liberally understood” (Life i.3). The language of his observation gestures 
to the symbiotic relationship between Boswell’s two print constructions in the Tour, his public 
ethos as biographer and the mediating function of Boswell’s private ethos. 
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Authorizing Boswell’s Public Ethos through Periodical Print 
 That Boswell could render the private experiences of Samuel Johnson public was not 
enough to prove his ethos as a biographer who could arrange Samuel Johnson, the acclaimed 
author, into a compelling rhetoric of self. He needed to be a great writer himself to be able to 
deliver another great writer in print. In his Account of Corsica, Boswell makes plain his desire 
for literary fame: “[h]e who publishes a book, affecting not to be an authour, and professing an 
indifference for literary fame, may possibly impose upon many people such an idea of his 
consequences as he wishes may be received. For my part, I should be proud to be known as an 
authour; and I have an ardent ambition for literary fame; for of all possessions I should imagine 
literary fame to be the most valuable” (Corsica 14). The value of the “literary fame” that 
Boswell seeks rests largely on the author’s self-portrayal and willingness “to be known,” to 
establish his authority. Johnson had obtained this distinction with the publication and successful 
reception of his poetry, his periodical pieces, his biographies, as well as his Dictionary of the 
English Language. His public self and its literary fame presented particular challenges to 
Boswell’s projection of his own public, authorial ethos. Boswell had to counterbalance the 
authority of his ethos against Johnson’s in print to authorize himself as a valid mediator 
Johnson’s selfhood, rather than unknown taking up a presumptuous task. Whereas the whole of 
Boswell’s written works could not outweigh Johnson’s in volume or public esteem, his 
periodical Hypochondriak essays in the London Journal and especially his Journal of a Tour to 
the Hebrides demonstrate an aptitude within certain genres where Johnson excelled, his Rambler, 
Idler, and Adventurer periodicals and his own narrative of his travels with Boswell, A Journey to 
the Western Island of Scotland. The display of a literary ethos with an analogous understanding 
to aspects of Johnson’s own would credential Boswell’s inclusion of potentially embarrassing, 
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yet revelatory private details of Johnson’s life, but it would also authorize Boswell’s print ethos 
as a reliable biographer for the public, literary Johnson.  
 In his Hypochondriak, Boswell shows himself operating within the conventions of the 
periodical essay that Johnson helped to develop with the prominence of his Rambler. For 
Boswell, developing a biographical ethos through a periodical persona was less directly the 
development of the biographer and more the development of a reputation that worthy of playing 
biographer. Boswell acknowledges that the sort of Johnsonian periodical ethos he seeks to don 
demonstrated regard for the audience, its pleasure, and its ability to judge whether “the writer has 
broke his promise” as a journalist and moralist (Rambler III.7). The promise Johnson’s Rambler 
makes is “to endeavour the entertainment of my countrymen by a short essay . . . that I hope not 
much to tire those whom I shall not please; and if I am not commended for the beauty of my 
works, to be at least pardoned for their brevity. But whether my expectations are most fixed on 
pardon or praise, I think it not necessary to discover; for . . . I find them . . . nearly 
equiponderant” (Rambler III.7). The attention Johnson pays his audience acknowledges the 
repetitiousness of any periodical performance, illustrating one of the important traits of the 
periodical ethos that Richmond P. Bond outlined: the ethos of the periodical “sheet is, first, the 
creature of periodicity . . . The periodic persona must not neglect the situation of . . . [the] reader 
either individual or corporate . . . [who] will suffer frequent or occasional interruption in . . . 
attendance on the experiences and observations” of that particular periodical ethos (113). The 
focus of Johnson’s Ramblerian ethos on the care a writer must take in addressing an audience 
instills periodical reflection with an exigence and relevance that engages readers. 
Johnson excelled so far as an author in the periodical tradition as to become a benchmark 
for eighteenth-century essayists. Boswell does not aspire to surpass Johnson’s accomplishments. 
174 
 
He does, however, operate within the periodical genre to demonstrate a facility with the form 
that qualifies his ethos to address the public, print aspects of Johnson’s selfhood biographically. 
Johnson’s Rambler shows an initial concern for addressing readers in a manner befitting the 
periodical form within the context of other, more established contexts, the epic, poetic, historical, 
and biographical (Rambler III.4-5). In the first paper of the Hypochondriack, on the other hand, 
Boswell’s periodical ethos recounts a brief history of the periodical form itself, noting its 
“British origin . . . in London . . . in Queen Anne’s reign” and its continental popularity, in which 
“the most celebrated English periodical papers have been translated into foreign languages . . . 
[and] several nations on the continent have produced original works of that species” 
(Hypochondriack I.106). Rather than frame the periodical within broader, topical contexts, 
Boswell chooses to outline of the periodical’s history, a move that illustrates he is conversant 
with the form and with Johnson’s place in its development. Unlike Johnson, Boswell explicitly 
addresses the situation of his reading audience, noting that the form lends itself both to the “most 
studious who can at times run over only a few pages; and it is better if they can have in that 
space something entire and unbroken” and to the “great proportion of readers [who] can never 
fix their attention on any thing more than short essays” (Hypochondriak I.105).  Nevertheless, 
Boswell’s understanding of a periodical audience recalls Johnson’s own attention to the form’s 
direct responsiveness to its audience. While both seem like the general attention to ethos that 
Boswell commits to in his Account of Corsica, the periodicity of the genre puts very specific 
restraints on the each author and the ethos he adopts for the essayist. Boswell shows his ethos to 
be as familiar with the limitations of the genre as Johnson. 
The most recognizable periodical convention is the effect of the periodical namesake, its 
ethos as a character, on the topics and judgment illustrated in each issue. It makes Boswell’s 
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emulation of Johnson’s periodical precedent even more important for demonstrating the 
appropriate literary aptitude for taking up a biographical subject like Johnson.
61
 One of the 
earliest precedents, Richard Steele’s Tatler, sought to comment on coffee-house gossip, manners, 
and taste. He and Joseph Addison created the Spectator and used that ethos to apply a scientific 
mode of objective observation to comment upon taste and character. Even Edward Cave’s ethos, 
the Sylvanus Urbanus of the Gentleman’s Magazine, conveys the breadth of the magazine’s 
coverage, its capacity to encompass and disperse the news from the suburban, “sylvan” 
provinces as ably as the urban environs of London. Bond notes that the ethos of a periodical 
persona must present a likeable continuity in order to be convincing: a periodical persona “must 
be an interesting individual . . . with enough personality to attract and to preserve . . . [a] band of 
followers,” in order to “have a long and good life” (114). In order for Boswell to balance his 
ethos as a biographer of Johnson, he had to create a periodical ethos that, while different from 
Johnson’s, maintained the same consistent, regular likeability to gain the fixity of a “long and 
good life.” The ethos was itself to be observed by the audience and also, by association, the 
topics raised by the periodical ethos.  
 Following the precedent of the Tatler and the Spectator, Johnson establishes an ethos and 
a plan in the first essay of his periodical, the Rambler. Johnson’s Rambler philosophizes about 
wide-ranging social and aesthetic topics, with a moralistic tone. In introducing the periodical and 
its figurehead, Johnson’s Rambler only adopts a first person voice six times in the entire essay, in 
a single paragraph near the end (III.1.7). The Rambler that Johnson creates does “not aspire to 
the status of a hero, for he is not the leading character of the piece, which may contain no such 
figure at all . . . Though he must be in a credible position to report or remark, he must not 
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Coming to evince this sort literary aptitude would also set Boswell up to apply himself and his intimate details as 
facts in the Tour that would define Johnson.    
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oppressively call attention to his person or his situation” (Bond 114). By putting on the 
Rambler’s ethos and adopting a third person voice that reflects on the relationship between 
writers and readers, Johnson foregrounds the social and moral reasoning he broaches in the 
Rambler. The ethos of the Rambler that Johnson adopts commentates with a removed, 
deliberative register that considers universal maxims and reasons through philosophical 
observations; it “maintain[s] the center road between the definite and the indefinite” so that he 
can “wear his character mask to speak his lines with fictive sincerity and reasonable authority, . . 
. [and] promote his purpose, be it literary, social, political, philosophical” (Bond 114). This 
register has a moralistic distancing effect that presents abstract issues objectively for the 
audience’s reflection. 
 Boswell was not ignorant of these constraints to purpose and tone, even before donning 
the periodical ethos of the Hypochondriack. In an undated proposal for a periodical paper, 
transcribed and translated by James H. Caudle, Boswell weighs what title to give the periodical 
he proposed but never pursued:  
I wanted to have a title which was perfectly Scots[.] Several such occurred to me. 
First, The Town Guard Soldier, but I am a man of a quiet disposition, and their 
Lochaber Axes make me shiver all over with fear, and my plan of moral 
reformation is more gentle than harrying bawdy houses, or arresting drunken 
people off the street in the night time. Secondly The Cadie. And indeed they are a 
group of as sharp and clever fallows as you will find any where, and a short paper 
is the only sort that a Cadie would write. Bur after all the thought I could take, I 
determined that The Chimney-Sweep was the best title, for a periodical Paper to be 
published in Auld Reekie.” (Yale MS M 214, Caudle’s emendations) 
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Each title is a character that would bring a distinct but Scottish ethos to the project. In the first 
instance, the character of a town guard soldier shapes the tenor of the “moral reformation” 
Boswell wants his periodical to effect, moving from “gentle” to publicly violent. In the second, 
the ethos of the cadie, which the OED defines as “a lad or man who waits about on the lookout 
for chance employment as a messenger, errand boy, errand-porter, chair-man, odd-job-man,” 
would lend brevity to the periodical that would be characteristic of an errand boy’s message, 
presumably too brief to convey the moral reform Boswell projects. His final decision, the 
chimney-sweep, evokes an ethos that could clean the chimneys which gave Edinburgh the 
nickname Auld Reekie and, by analogy, cleanse and reform the morals of the Scottish 
readership. Boswell’s musings on the title and character of a proposed periodical, like his 
reflection upon the predicament of an author and the author’s ethos at the head of his account of 
Corsica indicates a private consideration of how his ethos might engage the conventions of the 
periodical tradition in which Addison’s, Steele’s, and Johnson’s own periodicals flourished.  The 
directness of a speaker choosing a self to adopt as an ethos, however, lacks the subtlety of 
Johnson’s Rambler, an ethos that rarely makes any statement in the first person at the outset of 
the journal and demonstrates a clear preference for reasoning through implication.  
In his Hypochondriack, Boswell shows that he has a more developed mastery of 
Johnson’s periodical technique, which puts off the clumsy straightforwardness of his private 
manuscript projects. Boswell’s cavalier, manuscript consideration of different voices for the 
Scottish periodical he proposes is much more limited and provincial and, on the whole, less 
sophisticated than the ethos of Hypochondriack he adopts. His Hypochondriack maintains the 
first person speaker. Boswell merges the title, the ethos, and the function of his periodical when 
he states “I flatter myself that the Hypochondriack may be agreeably received as a periodical 
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essayist in England, where the malady known by the denomination of melancholy, 
hypochondria, spleen or vapours, has been long supposed almost universal” (Hypochondriack 
I.106). Boswell acknowledges that his topic is shaped to the needs of his readers who are 
stereotypically known for their melancholy because his “general purpose will be to divert 
Hypochondriacks of every degree, from dwelling on their uneasiness” (Hypochondriack I.109). 
At the same time, Boswell’s periodical persona does not want readers “who upon hearing that a 
professed Hypochondriack is coming out, will wish to join company with me, merely from a 
prospect of dismal sociality” (Hypochondriack I.110). Boswell’s plan in his first paper uses 
conversational tone to speak singly and directly to hypochondriaks, so that he might “divert” 
them from their “uneasiness,” much like Johnson’s Rambler assumes a tone that encourages 
readers to reflect and meditate on the topics his ethos expounds. Boswell’s technical facility with 
this aspect of the periodical form shows him to be on footing with Johnson and, thus, better able 
to write Johnson’s public life. 
Boswell also uses his Hypochondriack’s ethos to situate his literary authority within the 
periodical tradition of Johnson’s periodicals. He has, as Allan Ingram notes, “the considerable 
advantage of writing within a highly developed tradition of periodical literature” (111). 
Boswell’s Hypochondriack explains that “I have suffered much of the fretfulness, the gloom, and 
the despair that can torment a thinking being; and the time has been that I could no more have 
believed it possible for me to write even such a paper as this, than I can now believe it possible 
for me to write a Spectator or a Rambler,” even though he is “now attained to tranquility and 
cheerfulness in the general tenor of my existence” (Hypochondriack I.108-9). While Boswell’s 
Hypochondriack concedes a lower position in a hierarchy of periodical publications he outlines, 
he situates himself squarely within that tradition, even to the point of citing the “Spectator[’s] 
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remarks” in an explanation of the “first appearance” of the his own periodical (Hypochondriack 
I.109). Nevertheless, Ingram points out that “Boswell takes something from both branches by 
addressing the private individual upon a very personal subject, but concentrating upon the 
practical aspect of how that subject relates to society. And voice of the club-man of the 
Spectator, and of the preacher in The Rambler, becomes familiarised into the open-hearted tones 
of a friend and a confidant” (111). While Boswell applies some of Johnson’s periodical 
techniques obliquely to his own newspaper publication, he also directly aligns his periodical 
within the print practices of the eighteenth century.  
His deployment of hypochondria’s popularity in eighteenth-century public discourse is a 
precedent for his treatment of Johnson’s popularity, which allows him to evoke a biographical 
ethos capable of representing Johnson’s publicity in the Life. Boswell also creates an apt persona 
for his periodical, one with a timely, literary charge that evinces a greater degree of fluency with 
the periodical than the tone of his ethos or the periodical’s position within its larger generic 
context. Clark Lawlor has explored the relationship between Boswell and Johnson and 
melancholy or hypochondria, and Lawlor points out that, in the eighteenth century, “[l]iterary 
men might . . . find melancholy fashionable, but this was by no means a universal attitude, and 
by no means unambiguously expressed” (42). Johnson perceived the melancholic malady a 
source of social and literary “dysfunction,” but for Boswell, hypochondria often correlated to 
“extraordinary abilities, especially creative genius” (Lawlor 42). By deploying hypochondria as 
the defining attribute of his periodical ethos, Boswell directly associates his persona and his 
periodical writing with contemporary trends surrounding the “fashionable” disorder. Boswell, 
however, is careful to negotiate the potential. 
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What is most at stake for Boswell in displaying a generic competence in the periodical is 
the literary reputation he sought for himself and the opportunity it affords. He closes the first 
paper of his own periodical by stating, “I acknowledge I cannot help feeling a satisfaction 
compounded between vanity and benevolence (Hypochondriack I.110). The literary authority 
that the Hypochondriack grants Boswell puts him in league with Johnson as a periodical writer.
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Being in Johnson’s league partially qualifies Boswell’s ethos as a biographer in the Life: he is an 
author whose understanding of Johnson’s public experience extends throughout personal 
interactions with Johnson and personal competence with the forms of Johnson’s print authority. 
While Boswell’s periodical writing does develop the form in the long wake of Steele, Addison, 
and Johnson, it does not compete with its formal precedents, but Boswell’s stake in the Journal 
of a Tour to the Hebrides, however, is much more equally competitive. While Boswell is 
establishing his ability to mediate Johnson personally in the Tour, he is also challenging the 
authority of Johnson’s authorial persona in A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland. Their 
divergent accounts of a shared trip to the Hebrides matched them as companions in both 
experiences and in print.  
The collaborative nature of their travels gave their writing a competitive focal point. 
Radner notes that their records on their journey through the Hebrides were so collaborative that 
each would regularly share his notes with the other (“Narrative Control” 68-9). The nature of this 
collaboration proved to be more beneficial to Johnson than to Boswell: “[e]ven when he 
[Johnson] was not writing against Boswell by constructing versions of what had happened that 
were at odds with Boswell’s . . . he was consciously writing apart from Boswell, though always 
aware of what had been written in Boswell’s journal and his own notebook” (Radner, “Narrative 
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 Moreover, Boswell’s literary Hypochondriak connects his periodical obliquely to Johnson’s own struggles with 
hypochondria and melancholy. 
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Control” 70). Once he would have returned to London and was in the process of drafting his 
Journey, Johnson would have drawn on Boswell’s account even more, since “Boswell supplied 
key materials” (Radner, “Narrative Control” 60). Johnson published his Journey to the Western 
Islands of Scotland in 1775; Boswell would not be able to publish his Tour to the Hebrides until 
1785, the year after Johnson’s death. 
Boswell’s inability to publish before Johnson’s death was a direct result of Johnson’s 
interventions. He explicitly discouraged Boswell from publishing his journal, offering instead to 
help Boswell edit what might be fit for the public, even though Boswell sought to print his 
journal account as a companion piece to Johnson’s travelogue (Radner, “Narrative Control” 75-
6). Boswell challenged Johnson’s authority in small, private ways, showing his journal account 
to members of Johnson’s circle, Hester Thrale and Joshua Reynold. Ultimately Boswell decided 
not to publish, “realizing that printing his collaboratively produced account of the trip—a text 
that combined admiration with occasional disapproval and partially established Boswell’s 
authority by noting Johnson’s limitations—would risk aborting the larger biographical project” 
(Radner, “Narrative Control” 76). In the case of the periodical form, Boswell knew that he could 
not fully challenge Johnson’s print authority, only gesture to an understanding of it. Only 
through representations of a single, shared, extended experience in his own home country (and 
following the death of Johnson) could Boswell match his own print authority and observations of 
Scotland against Johnson’s. Boswell’s stake in matching Johnson’s print authority is the 
development of an ethos with a print output that would credential it to understand Johnson’s own 
and, thus, take up the challenge of representing author biographically. Through the Tour, 
Boswell developed the print credentials to arrange a rhetoric of self for Johnson in the “larger 
biographical project.”  
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In this light, Boswell’s decision to publish his Tour does not challenge Johnson’s living 
authority as a friend or mentor, but rather Johnson’s print authority, however belated. It moves 
his defiance from Johnson’s private circle of friends to the larger, public audience. In publishing, 
Boswell demonstrates his ability to edit his work and determine what “might be printed” and 
what was “fit for printing,” like Johnson in publishing his own account, without any editorial 
advice from Boswell (Life v.227). Boswell’s fitness for situating Johnson in Scotland in the Tour 
was answerable as a later publication to Johnson’s account of the Scottish situation.  Johnson’s 
ethos is empirical, relaying the observations of a detached traveler in a foreign place. His account 
of the Hebrides is spatial: he arranges the sections of his travelogue under twenty-nine headings, 
and place names that mark the significant stops on the trip he and Boswell made. But a spatial 
arrangement effaces his role as an observer, privileging the observations instead. Within this 
spatial framework, Johnson remarks on the state of Scotland and particularly the Highlanders, 
pointing out that “[e]difices, either standing or ruined, are the chief records of an illiterate 
nation” (Journey 73). Johnson pulled the observer out to so that a viewer could see the full scope 
of Scottish space at a distance, but Boswell’s account of their trip returned the observer to 
Johnson’s side, viewing Johnson even more than the place.  
Likewise, Johnson considers stereotypes about the idylls of country living and the 
realities of poverty associated with Scotland: “It is generally supposed, that life is longer in 
places where there are few opportunities of luxury; but I found no instance here of extraordinary 
longevity. A cottager grows old over his oaten cakes, like a citizen over a turtle feast. He is 
indeed seldom incommoded by corpulence. Poverty preserves him from sinking under the 
burden of himself, but he escapes no other injury of time” (Journey 84). The authority of 
Johnson’s observations rests on his characteristic mode of generalizing, of applying universal 
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frames—illiteracy, poverty, and the pastoral—to specific people or places in order render their 
particularity applicable to all readers. Boswell’s Tour, on the other hand, is a public re-mastering 
of the experience provided by their travel. 
While Boswell’s Tour complements Johnson’s account in many ways, Boswell 
overwrites the terms for understanding the trip from a decade earlier, which consequently shapes 
Boswell’s print ethos in relation to Johnson’s. While Boswell’s account also accounts for travel 
through the physical space of the Hebrides, his table of contents, for instance, outlines a move 
through social space: “August 28. Fort George. Sir Adolphus Oughton. Contest between 
Warburton and Lowth. Dinner at Sir Eyre Coote’s. Arabs and English soldiers compared. The 
Stage. Mr. Garrick, Mrs. Cibber, Mrs. Pritchard, Mrs. Clive. Inverness” (Life v.7).  Boswell’s 
travelogue focuses its direction on encounters with the specific people that he and Johnson meet 
in those places and their topics of conversation. Thus, Boswell appeals to a more biographical 
mode that filters the trip through interpersonal interaction rather than the singular interpretations 
of an individual observer like Johnson. The shared experience of the Hebrides allows Boswell to 
offer a print perspective on terms that are equal to those which frame Johnson’s interpretation of 
the trip. It allows him to put his ethos on par with Johnson’s in order to qualify himself to play 
biographer in the Life. 
While Boswell and Johnson are in Ostig in Sky, Johnson expounds on the responsible 
rule of a group of people. While he notes that some social and legal curbs were necessary to 
avoid future uprisings after the Jacobite Rebellion, his treatment of the political subjugation of 
Scotland attacks the broad goals English policy and its general, public effects on the Scottish. He 
reasons that the subjection of the Scottish Highlanders following the Rebellion obligates the 
English to maintain and support their subjects, arguing:  
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The supreme power in any community has the right of debarring every individual, 
and every subordinate society from self-defence, only because the supreme power 
is able to defend them; and therefore where the governor cannot act, he must trust 
the subject to act for himself . . . Laws that place the subjects in such a state, 
contravene the first principles of the compact of authority: they exact obedience, 
and yield no protect. (Journey 90-1) 
Johnson reads the waste and poverty that he witnesses on his trip as the logical consequences of 
heavy-handed political and legal practices. His “opinionated reflections inspire an open-ended 
discussion about the merits of Scotland” that, Kathleen Haldane Grenier asserts, drew attention 
to Scotland that eventually increased tourism there: his insights, organized spatially, yielded 
interest into Scotland as a place (17).
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Boswell gives an account that is at once complementary to and divergent from Johnson’s 
interpretation of the Highlander’s condition: he balances his authority against Johnson’s with an 
anecdote of Prince Charles Edward’s flight after the Battle of Culloden, which ended Edward’s 
short-lived Jacobite Rebellion. Just as Johnson drew his expertise for critiquing the political state 
of Scotland from his brief observations with Boswell, so Boswell derived his expertise to filter 
the political turmoil of the Jacobite uprising and Rebellion from the first-hand accounts of the 
people he and Johnson met on their trip. He claims his account is derived from what Flora 
McDonald “told us, and from what I was told by others personally concerned, and from a paper 
of information which Rasay [who they visited] was so good as to send me” (Life v.187). His 
expertise comes from his personal interaction with other people, as well as, he seems to suggest, 
his own Scottish rearing.  
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 Pat Rogers gives credit to Boswell as well as Johnson, but notes that Boswell’s project, to examine Johnson more 
clearly, is different from Johnson’s project, to understand Scotland thoroughly (216-9, 225). 
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Rather than generalize about the state of English policy and its effects on the Highlands 
at large, Boswell translates the plight of Scotland and its Highlanders alongside the consequences 
of the Rebellion into Charles Edwards’s flight from English troops. His flight creates a network 
between his supporters and, rather than representing Scotland as a generalized populace, Boswell 
traces the connections Charles Edwards’s flight makes between lairds and lowly soldiers, giving 
faces and personalities to the populace (Life v.187-205). Boswell derives opinions from this 
human network that echo Johnson’s own analysis of the policies applied to subjugate the 
Scottish: “[h]owever convinced I am of the justice of that principle, which holds allegiance and 
protection to be reciprocal . . . I am not satisfied with the cold sentiment which would confine the 
exertions of the subject within the strict line of duty. I would have every breast animated with 
fervour of loyalty; with that generous attachment which delights in doing somewhat more than is 
required, and makes ‘service perfect freedom’” (Life v.204). Whereas Johnson’s analysis of the 
post-Rebellion Highlands allows him to abstract an understanding about reciprocity in 
governance, protection, and obedience, Boswell’s reading of the Highlanders in relation to a 
person allows him to focus on loyalty from an embodied perspective, which he emphasizes with 
tropes that situate loyalty in the person, in an “animated,” warm “breast” and within the larger, 
reciprocal context of authority. The different means through which they draw similar conclusions 
from a single, shared, three month experience in their corresponding publications balances 
Boswell’s authority against Johnson’s: Johnson focused the on physical place, but Boswell 
emphasized their personal relationship within that place, two halves of a whole like the historical 
and personal split Boswell had applied to his account of Corsica. Their shared vision of one trip, 
one set of lived experience, sanctions the public authority of Boswell’s ethos to comment on a 
public author of Johnson’s prominence. Boswell’s understanding of the periodical form within 
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the context that Johnson’s own periodical prowess had established, as well as Boswell’s 
authoritative account of a trip the two men shared demonstrate Boswell’s ability to address the 
public aspect of Johnson’s authorial selfhood.  
 
“Scottifying” Johnson  
To show that he could adopt an ethos capable of taking on the “presumptuous task” of 
writing taking on the life of Johnson, Boswell first had to show himself capable of mediating the 
personal life of Johnson against the fact of the ethos he created; second, Boswell had to 
credential an ethos that could claim the authority to understand Johnson’s public selfhood (Life 
i.25). Having established an ethos that could claim a distinctive understanding of Johnson’s 
public and private self, Boswell had to establish his ethos as a biographer that could capitalize on 
his intimate understanding of Johnson as a person and a public figure. In the advertisement to the 
first edition of the Life, Boswell expresses his “satisfaction in the consciousness, that by 
recording so considerable a portion of the wisdom and wit of ‘the brightest ornament of the 
eighteenth century,’. . . [he had] largely provided for the instruction and entertainment of 
mankind” (Life i.9). Boswell’s goal was to translate the life of Johnson into “instruction and 
entertainment” for his readers. He conceived a life of Johnson for a readership beyond small 
reading communities in London or in Edinburgh; he sought a national audience.  
Boswell’s lofty goal requires an ethos that would go beyond the public and private 
authority he cultivated through twenty years of acquaintance with Johnson. Before he can 
translate Johnson fully for his readers, Boswell must reconcile Johnson to a smaller audience 
during their trip to the Hebrides: their mutual trip through Scotland allowed Boswell to take up 
these challenges by targeting a smaller audience, a trial run for the rhetoric of self he would 
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arrange. Thus, the lairds and common people of Scotland become a test case for Boswell’s ethos 
and its ability to present his Johnson’s selfhood to a contained audience. It is a test that Boswell 
records in the Tour, and its success became a precedent for the Life. Though Boswell’s writing 
positioned him to play Johnson’s biographer, his Tour is the ultimate trying ground for proving 
the efficacy of his ethos at representing Johnson’s intimate self. In addition to the challenges he 
faced in the account of Corsica and periodical, Boswell faces three challenges in the Tour to 
qualify his biographical attempts as a task not presumptuous, but instead befitting his ethos: first, 
his ethos must show itself capable of engaging Johnson’s private selfhood; it must balance 
Johnson’s private selfhood against an extant, public understanding of that selfhood; most 
importantly, Boswell must also demonstrate his ability to make Johnson’s selfhood new. 
In the Tour, Boswell demonstrates his ability to reconcile the public Johnson to Scotland. 
At the outset, Boswell concedes Johnson’s well-known, public aversion to the Scottish, even 
though it threatens viability of the Scottish ethos he creates for himself: how could an object of 
Johnson’s public and published derision presume to mediate Johnson reliably? Likewise, 
Boswell cites Johnson’s poem “London” as an instance of Johnson’s “prejudice against Scotland 
[which] was announced almost as soon as he began to appear in the world of letters” (Life v.19). 
In his Dictionary of the English Language, Johnson defines oats scathingly as a “grain, which in 
England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports the people.” The various uses of 
oats, for Johnson, imply that Scottish people are bestial, on par with British animals. The 
popularity of the Dictionary with the eighteenth-century reading public had firmly associated the 
notion with opinions of Johnson. Boswell’s explanation recasts Johnson’s “prejudice” as being 
characteristically classical and result of a man who deeply identifies with an ideal of 
Englishness: “like the ancient Greeks and Romans, he allowed himself to look upon all nations 
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but his own as barbarians . . . he thought their [Scottish] success in England rather exceeded the 
due proportion of their real merit; and because he could not but see in them that nationality . . . 
He was indeed, if I may be allowed the phrase, at bottom much of a John Bull; much of a blunt 
true-born Englishman” (Life v.20). In this interpretation, Boswell’s Johnson marks a nation and 
its prejudices more than the man himself, so that Boswell’s ethos must address the challenge of 
mediating public celebrity. 
Rather than allowing Johnson simply to pass through Scotland, Boswell puts the “John 
Bull, blunt true-born Englishman” in direct conversation with it. In order for Boswell to depict a 
biographical ethos that could manage Johnson, he had to dislocate Johnson from London: 
Boswell confessed that “[t]o see Dr. Johnson in any new situation is always an interesting object 
to me” (Life v.132). In Scotland, Boswell “insisted on scottifying his [Johnson’s] palate” (179) 
by introducing to Johnson’s “true-born English” tastes to Scottish culture, its food, language, and 
history. Boswell sought to change, quite literally, Johnson’s tastes and, in turn, his opinion of the 
Scottish. Ultimately, “scottifying” Johnson lent authority to Boswell’s ability to rearrange 
Johnson, to make him a fit biographical subject, a didactic rhetoric of self. Pierre Bourdieu has 
theorized that taste, as the ability to draw distinctions, is the “source of the system of distinctive 
features which cannot fail to be perceived as a systematic expression of a particular class of 
conditions of existence, i.e. as a distinctive lifestyle” by people who themselves bear an 
internalized understanding of the relational properties of the “classification system” (175). Eating 
oats, for instance, marks the Scottish lifestyle as distinctly un-English and, therefore, classifiably 
inferior to a true-born Englishman like the public Johnson: “[t]aste classifies, and it classifies the 
classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the 
distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in 
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which their position to the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed” (Bourdieu 5-6). 
Boswell’s scottification of Johnson is an attempt to adjust Johnson’s “classification system” so 
that Johnson no longer regards Scotland as the “vulgar” and the “ugly.” The unfamiliar details 
that appear as Boswell’s ethos situate Johnson’s selfhood within a new context grow increasingly 
more Scottish, leading to a selfhood for a Johnson that can accommodate English and Scottish 
sympathies and that makes the rhetoric of self that Boswell arranges much less presumptuous. 
At the beginning of the Tour, Boswell establishes a baseline for understanding the 
Johnson that his ethos will recast in course of the trip: “Dr. Samuel Johnson’s character, 
religious, moral, political, and literary, nay his figure and manner, are, I believe, more generally 
known than those of almost any man; yet it may not be superfluous here to attempt a sketch of 
him” (Life v.16-7). Boswell’s “sketch” adds on what is known by presenting several unflattering 
details: Johnson’s size was “approaching to the gigantic, and grown unwieldy from corpulency”; 
that his “countenance was . . . somewhat disfigured by the scars of” scrofula; that “[h]is head, 
and sometimes also his body, shook with a kind of motion like the effect of a palsy . . . [as if] 
frequently disturbed by cramps, or convulsive contractions” (Life v.18). By making these aspects 
of Johnson’s physique so distinct, Boswell drew attention away from what was commonly 
known about Johnson’s “figure and manner.” His restructuring of Johnson’s appearance is 
completed by his description of Johnson’s attire: he was clad in boots and a heavy brown 
overcoat and carried a staff of English oak (Life v.19). Johnson’s uncharacteristic outfit in the 
Tour, at attire better suited to the elements and exploration than the streets of London, reflects his 
remove from the nation’s center to its wild fringes. This remove enables Boswell not only to 
represent Johnson in a manner contrary to the expectations many had for the public author, but it 
also sets Boswell up to restructure Johnson’s selfhood. 
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Such a remove was necessary for Boswell to rewrite Johnson. He had to separate 
Johnson’s public self from its “elevated state of philosophical dignity” (Life v.14). Dislocating 
Johnson from “the felicity of a London life” (Life v.14) allowed Boswell to throw unprecedented 
aspects of Johnson’s character into stark contrast with the familiar, austere, melancholic moralist 
his writings portrayed. Public expectations for Johnson were derived from his print persona, an 
authorial ethos that readers applied to Johnson’s person. Boswell refers to Johnson alternately in 
the Tour as a poet or dictionary-writer (Life v.47), “our Socrates” (Life v.21), “the Rambler” 
(Life v.146), “Dr. Samuel Johnson!” (Life v.144). It was only in Scotland that Boswell could 
reorganize these public character markers so that Johnson, the social philosopher, might be seen 
dandling a young, married Scottish lass on his knee—“toying with a Highland beauty!”—or 
throwing a glass of lemonade out the window, after a “bad specimen of Scottish cleanliness” 
(Life v.261, 21). Only in Scotland could Boswell catch the great lexicographer making up words 
in conversation like “peregrinity” or “depeditation” and laughingly admitting “that he had not 
made [up] above three or four in his Dictionary” (Life v.130). The spatial remove from urbane 
London to wild Scotland decontextualized and magnified Johnson’s eccentricities so that 
Boswell would rewrite them in the Life. Thus magnified, Johnson’s eccentricities present 
Boswell with a wealth of additional details that he can arrange as Johnson’s selfhood. 
Boswell’s ethos within this context exerts a control over Johnson’s selfhood that Johnson 
initially resists. Boswell reports Johnson’s unwillingness to taste “speldings,” which are “fish 
(generally whitings) salted and dried in a particular manner, being dipped in the sea and dried in 
the Sun, and eaten by the Scots by way of relish . . . With difficulty, I prevailed with him 
[Johnson] to let a bit of one of them lie in his mouth. He did not like it” (Life v.55). Boswell 
represents Johnson’s tastes growing more sympathetic to Scottish culture. In one instance, 
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Boswell shows Johnson drawing from the Scottish lexicon for his critical metaphors: “[h]e 
became merry, and observed how little we had either heard or said at Aberdeen: That the 
Aberdonians had not started a single mawkin (the Scottish word for hare) for us to pursue” (Life 
v.96). Likewise, Johnson’s fascination with the Scottish language leads him, shortly after hearing 
a song in Erse, to suggest that he and Boswell buy the “rugged island” they see “off the coast of 
Scalpa” to “found a good school, and an episcopal church, . . . and have a printing-press, where 
he [Johnson] would print all the Erse that could be found” (Life v.162). The Johnson that would 
try speldings or draw on a Scottish vocabulary for critical analysis is a Johnson made possible by 
Boswell’s ethos and the setting that separated Johnson from the familiar. The Johnson that 
Boswell mediates in the Tour can increasingly accommodate Scottish sympathies alongside his 
John Bull character. 
Boswell most clearly depicts Johnson’s increasingly sympathetic taste for Scottish culture 
in his increasing willingness to try on different modes of Highland dress and behavior. In his 
record of their stay with Flora Mcdonald, Boswell establishes the historical and social 
significance of “celebrated” space he and Johnson share:  
Dr. Johnson’s bed was the very bed in which the grandson of the unfortunate 
King James the Second lay, on one of the nights after the failure of his rash 
attempt in 1745-6, while he was eluding the pursuit of the emissaries of the 
government, which offered thirty thousand pounds as a reward for apprehending 
him. To see Dr. Samuel Johnson lying in that bed, in the isle of Sky, in the house 
of Miss Flora Mcdonald, struck me with such a group of ideas as it is not easy for 
words to describe, as they passed through the mind. (Life v.185-6) 
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Boswell represents himself as dumbstruck with the “group of ideas” that “passed through the 
mind,” mediating Johnson’s actions as a first-hand observer for the reader. By offering no words, 
he offers readers the chance to imagine them for themselves. His ethos invites speculation on the 
significance of Johnson lying in the bed of the Young Pretender, but Johnson himself provides an 
answer that acknowledges the larger cultural situation in which he participates: “[h]e smiled, and 
said, ‘I have no ambitious thoughts in it’” (Life v.186). Johnson’s joke is an oblique nod to the 
cultural and historical significance of his physical situation, yet he has “no ambitious thoughts in 
it,” neither the bed nor the role of Charles Edward. The image itself, as Boswell’s ethos 
witnesses it, resituates Johnson from the authority of London as a major metropolitan center of 
authority to the cultural and historical authority of Scotland. Boswell’s wordless ethos interprets 
breaks Johnson down and reconfigures him as subject to Scottish history. 
Boswell shows Johnson’s increasing sympathy for the Scottish, when he playfully dons 
the role of a Highlander: “Dr. Johnson . . . shewed . . . the spirit of a Highland . . . indeed, he has 
shewn it during the whole of our Tour.—One night, in Col, he strutted about the room with a 
broad-sword and target and made a formidable appearance” (Life v.324). Johnson’s performance 
of a martial, Highland pride is as striking as Boswell’s direct attempts to “scottify” the English 
poet into “the image of a venerable Senachi” (Life v.324). This “venerable” image recalls a lost 
role among the Highlanders that, Johnson explains in his Journey had not “existed in some 
centuries” (Journey 112). The Highlanders esteemed the role nonetheless. Johnson’s definition 
explains that the term “signified ‘the man of talk,’ or of conversation . . . a historian, whose 
office was to tell truth, or a story-teller” (112). In this way, Boswell casts Johnson in the role of a 
historian, a preserver of history and culture. To render Johnson as a senachi is to make Johnson 
responsible for all of Scottish history and culture. Boswell admits that at one point in their 
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travels, he “took the liberty to put a large blue bonnet on his [Johnson’s] head . . . he seemed 
much pleased to assume the appearance of an ancient Caledonian” (Life v.324-5). Boswell’s 
ethos “took the liberty” to force a Scottish role on Johnson much more forcibly than he had when 
he coaxed Johnson into almost tasting spelding. His rewriting of Johnson in this instance, 
however, was much more successful. While he did not like his taste earlier taste of Scottish 
culture, Johnson gradually warmed to it through contact and was “pleased to assume the 
appearance of an ancient Caledonian.”  
Boswell’s direct attempts to reconcile Johnson’s English self to Scotland could not be 
completely successful, yet as he made Johnson more sympathetic to Scotland, he helped 
Scotland grow more familiar with Johnson, and in the process, Boswell demonstrates an ethos 
that could make Johnson sympathetic in its ability to structure a compelling rhetoric of self. 
Boswell reports that Johnson was ceremonially welcomed to Aberdeen and “present[ed] with the 
freedom of the town” by the “magistrates in the town-hall,” where the people cheered “‘Doctor 
Johnson! Doctor Johnson!’” (Life v.90). In observing what Boswell calls “the usual custom,” 
Johnson kept the “burgess-ticket . . . in his hat, which he wore as he walked along the street” 
(Life v.90-1). Displaying his burgess-ticket, the “freedom of the town,” announced Johnson as a 
citizen of Aberdeen. The formality of this encounter gives way to a much more socially engaging 
encounter after a month in Scotland. On the Isle of Skye, Boswell reports that, not only was 
Johnson “quite social and easy amongst” the people, but despite not drinking “fermented liquor . 
. . [h]is conviviality engaged them so much, that they seemed eager to show their attention to 
him, and vied with each other in crying out, with a strong Celtick pronunciation, ‘Toctor 
Shonson, Toctor Shonson, your health!” (Life v.261). Picturing the increasing sympathies the 
Scottish and Johnson shared, as Katherine Haldane Grenier argues, ultimately “mapped 
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Scotland” in way that introduced it to a world of travelers and tourists (39). In essence, Boswell 
has bridged a cultural gap—he has proven himself ambassador to both Scotland and, especially, 
to Johnson in Scotland.   
The significance of this cultural work for establishing Boswell’s own ethos is the 
personal work it does to redress Boswell and Johnson’s infamous first meeting in Tom Davies’ 
bookshop. It is a context that clarifies the questions of nationality, literary celebrity, and selfhood 
that Boswell seeks to address with his own ethos: 
Mr. Davies having perceived him through the glass-door in the room in which we 
were sitting, advancing towards us,—he announced his aweful approach to me, 
somewhat in the manner of an actor in the part of Horatio, when he addresses 
Hamlet on the appearance of his father’s ghost, “Look, my Lord, it comes” . . . 
Mr. Davies mentioned my name, and respectfully introduced me to him. I was 
much agitated; and recollecting his prejudices against the Scotch, of which I had 
heard so much, I said to Davies, “Don’t tell him where I come from.”—“From 
Scotland,” cried Davies, roguishly. “Mr. Johnson, (said I) I do indeed come from 
Scotland, but I cannot help it.” I am willing to flatter myself that I meant this as 
light pleasantry to sooth and conciliate him, and not as an humiliating abasement 
at the expence of my country. But however that might be, this speech was 
somewhat unlucky; for with that quickness of wit for which he was so 
remarkable, he . . . retorted, “That, Sir, I find, is what a great many of your 
countrymen cannon help.” This stroke stunned me a good deal. (Life i.392). 
Johnson skewers Boswell so tidily that their first encounter might seem to render Boswell’s 
biographical task presumptuous. But the contrast between the Johnson of 1763 versus that of 
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1773 shows reconciling British history through the figure of the great John Bull “English” 
writer—who Boswell links to the greatest of English writers through Hamlet—now loves 
Scotland and its languages, too.  It is an literary act of union that proves that Boswell is up to the 
biographical task, mediating Johnson’s national proclivities, literary celebrity, and selfhood, 
“that quickness of wit for which he was so remarkable.” The final test of how useful Boswell’s 
Tour was in establishing an ethos that could sort Johnsoniana from ephemera into an enduring 
rhetoric of self was how frequently he cannabalizes choice moments from the Tour. Topically, 
they naturally suit the Life. At the very outset of the Life, Boswell cites Johnson’s comment 
about his melancholic disposition as a character marker that would run throughout Johnson’s life, 
out of its chronological context (Life v.214-5). But it recalls Boswell’s ethos and the contrasts it 
has allowed him to draw between Johnson’s lived experience and his own interventions in it. 
Boswell was a friend who lacked the literary repute to contain the detail of Johnson’s 
public and private selfhood. In his Account of Corsica, Boswell established the fixed role an 
ethos could play for an author. In arranging Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell wielded his ethos as a 
fact that engaged Johnson’s private character and made it increasingly evident. Likewise, 
Boswell showed his ethos to be proficient in attempting to interpret and represent Johnson’s 
public reputation and authority In his Hypochondriack, Boswell made plain his ability to operate 
within periodical conventions Johnson had established through his own publications; in his 
representation of the trip to Scotland he shared with Johnson, Boswell matched his own print 
ethos against Johnson’s. The authority of Boswell’s ethos for is most evident in his handling of 
Johnson in the Tour to the Hebrides: “Boswell retained the structure of the journal, writing under 
date lines, with introduction and conclusion added to give a narrative frame which emphasizes 
the potential conflict between the Scots and the ‘John Bull . . . true-born Englishman’ and finally 
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stresses the success of the venture, thus throwing into relief Boswell’s social skill in ‘handling’ 
Johnson and his literary skill in writing him up” (McGowan 136).By establishing an ethos whose 
biographical undertaking was not presumptuous, but rather apropos, Boswell situated himself to 
arrange Johnson’s selfhood rhetorically within it history and character, but most importantly, 
Boswell’s ethos made possible his most unique contribution to the canon of eighteenth-century 
biography: an approach that put the audience directly in conversation with the rhetoric of self 
and established a more intimate relationship. Boswell’s ethos would come to arrange a rhetoric 
of self that would locate Johnson in print and experience, but which would bend these 
eighteenth-century biographical patterns to deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic 
reader to view Johnson’s print life ethically, spectating a rhetorical selfhood that invited all 
readers (the Caledonian and John-Bull English in particular, perhaps) to learn about sociability 
and values from the Life of Johnson. 
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Chapter 4—Arranging and Innovating Biography:  
The Rhetoric of Self and Conversation 
 
Whatever public anticipation had followed James Boswell’s initial advertisement of a 
forthcoming biography of Samuel Johnson in 1785 was in danger of flagging by the time he 
finally published it in 1791. Out of fear that he might have missed his literary moment, Boswell 
defended his slow progress by appealing to the comprehensiveness of his biographical endeavor. 
New material for the Life kept presenting itself, which he felt obliged to incorporate.
64
 Six years 
later, he delivered on the promise of his advertisement voluminously. Boswell’s Life of Johnson 
sprawled on the late eighteenth-century literary scene: its ostensible messiness—a collection of 
facts, letters, poetry, prose, first-hand accounts, anecdotes, excerpts, and conversation—barely 
achieves coherence under the running header that groups the clutter diachronically under each 
passing Aetat. to Aetat. of Samuel Johnson’s life. The contemporary reader must come to terms 
with Boswell’s organizational scheme: “I do it chronologically,” he reported in a letter to 
William Percy, “giving year by year his publications if there were any, his letters, his 
conversations, and every thing else that I can collect,” so that “[r]eaders will as near as may be 
accompany Johnson in his progress, and as it were see each scene as it happened” 
(Correspondence 206). Paradoxically, the wait that Boswell forced on his readers was, in fact, 
for the sake of his readers, whose understanding of Johnson would ultimately benefit from his 
biographical exhaustiveness. 
Faced with the breadth of detail that had stalled the Life, eighteenth-century readers 
cultivated a personal connection with Boswell’s Johnson in the accumulated bulk. Capel Lofft 
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 Early in his project, for instance, Boswell explains his delay to Hugh Blair by noting that he sought to check 
materials against Hawkin’s biography of Johnson and, especially, in order to allow “time for the accession of 
materials of which I have received a great addition” (Correspondence 180). 
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acknowledges that, upon first seeing Boswell’s biography, the “eye may be startled . . . at the 
first glance of what appears to be two heavy volumes: but beyond this nothing heavy will be 
found, in any sense in which the Fancy of the Understanding complain of heaviness. I should 
have seen a third, fourth, fifth or as many more . . . with impressions very distant from those of 
discouragement or the prospect of fatigue” (Correspondence 316). The benefit of this 
“heaviness” for the eighteenth-century reader was that it offered an array of points to access 
Johnson or to censure Boswell’s representation. The Reverend Samuel Parr notes that, “[a]midst 
such a multiplicity of facts, and such a variety of subjects, different readers will contend for 
different rules of selection . . . But, in my opinion, the best rule is the most comprehensive” 
(Correspondence 348). However, the abundance of details, which invite a personal knowledge of 
Johnson’s selfhood, could prove to be a double-edged sword. The Johnson that Hester Piozzi 
recognized in the glut of Boswell’s biographical detail left her “laughing & crying by turns for 
two Days . . . if Johnson was to me the back Friend he [Boswell] has represented—let it cure me 
of ever making Friendship more with any human Being” (Thraliana 809-811). Hester Thrale 
Piozzi, who knew Johnson intimately and suffered greatly when their friendship ruptured over 
her remarriage, finds herself restored to Johnson with such affective intensity through Boswell’s 
Life that it surpasses any actual friendship she might yet have. It is in the expansive degree of 
detail, carefully collected and curated, that readers find a relationship to Johnson in Boswell’s 
Life. 
This emphasis on biographical detail does not assign preeminence to narrative or its 
chronology, but instead the effect of Boswell’s accumulating details on the reader. The tradition 
of inductive empiricism depends on the observations of discreet details that related, repeated 
experimentation comprise; observing them as a set, the scientist induces patterns that become 
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scientific principles. In the context Boswell develops his biography through “an accumulation of 
intelligence from various points, by which his character is more fully understood and illustrated” 
(Life i.29-30).  In a letter dated Sunday, February 24, 1788—the second year he was earnestly 
composing the Life—Boswell explains to William Temple “I am absolutely certain that my mode 
of Biography which gives not only a History of Johnson’s visible progress through the World, 
and of his Publications, but a View of his mind, in his Letters, and Conversations is the most 
perfect that can be conceived, and will be more of a Life than any Work that has ever yet 
appeared” (Correspondence 208). His letter follows the general pattern of the justification he 
makes for his method in the biography (Life i.29-30): Boswell here regards his method as “the 
most perfect that can be conceived” for relaying “Johnson’s visible progress through the world.” 
In the tradition of eighteenth-century biography, he locates the visible Johnson in the breadth of 
Johnson’s “publications” and “letters,” just as Johnson had distilled the character of Savage from 
his poetry and Goldsmith invited the reader to construct the character of Nash through his 
correspondence. But Boswell’s innovation is an extreme shift toward an intimate, internal model 
of selfhood that does not translate experience into selfhood through the objective mode of earlier 
biographers. Rather than objective translation, Boswell method mediates lived experience 
through his own and his formal responsibilities as a biographer.  As “more of a Life than any 
work” prior, Boswell’s biography evinces a liveliness derived from a drifting accumulation of 
detail rather than a regular, chronological, narrative-centric approach.  
Boswell intimates that his own means for biographical arrangement will surpass the 
expectations eighteenth-century readers had of the biographical tradition, even as he deploys the 
strategies of Johnson and Goldsmith. Boswell is as possessive of the method, “my mode” he 
stresses to William Temple, as he is of the life it will depict. Boswell sought to develop an 
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innovative method that would situate Johnson’s selfhood within social networks of personal 
acquaintance, credentialed by documentation, and in so doing would recast readers’ expectations 
and their approach to understanding selfhood. Readers come to know Johnson more intimately 
than previous biographies had made possible; the Johnson that Boswell delivered might be a 
personal, print friend. In this chapter, I will argue that Boswell presented a Johnson who was 
more sympathetic to readers than earlier biographical selfhoods, not only through cumulative 
research and compositional strategies, but also by inviting the reader to play a role as a tacit 
participant in Johnson’s private conversations, staging their presentation so that the reader 
experiences the moment of the conversation. Whereas Johnson and Goldsmith engaged readers 
in the documentation of experience, Boswell invites them to live it. Such participation signifies a 
more intimate understanding of Johnson, of a print selfhood that Boswell has fashioned to stand 
in for Johnson. Through Boswell’s rhetoric of self, the reader comes to engage the biographical 
selfhood as if it were the man himself. 
In order to create an intimate rhetoric of self that can engage the reader’s sympathies so 
personally, Boswell relies first on a research methodology that draws both on the inductive 
epistemology advocated by the Royal Society and the variable practices for credentialing 
knowledge in eighteenth-century print culture. Boswell distinguishes himself by locating 
Johnson’s history beyond publications or his own personal journal account, accumulating instead 
the anecdotes and information he locates from Johnson’s own familiar acquaintance. The public, 
authorial Samuel Johnson familiar to a community of readers becomes, almost literally, every 
reader’s personal Johnson, a selfhood which they can engage as an acquaintance through the 
recollections of his lived acquaintance. Second, Boswell composes an intimate rhetoric of self in 
the Life by arranging the voluminous facts of Johnson’s history within a rhetorical framework 
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that establishes what he regards as authentic, Johnsonian character in order to facilitate the 
readers’ sympathy as spectators of Johnson. A more complete representation of selfhood teaches 
Boswell’s audience how to read Johnson’s selfhood anew. Finally and most innovatively, 
Boswell acts as an interlocutor who encourages Johnson’s conversation, and his ethos as 
Johnson’s friend and biographer ultimately invites readers to view Johnson’s conversations in 
print and participate in them sympathetically, thus engaging Boswell’s Johnson more intimately. 
A print representation of selfhood predicated on the documentation of public and private 
experience which deploys a new ethics of reading: structuring the discrete details, intimate 
recollections, and documentary proof of Johnson’s lived experience into a persona from which 
readers can draw conclusions sympathetically based on their own observations and which, 
finally, they can apply to their own experience.  
 Long after 20
th
-century scholars stopped arguing it in general, the literary tussle between 
the Boswellians and Johnsonians for scholarly ownership of Johnson has directed discussions of 
the Life, Boswell, and Johnson. The primary context for academic attention to the Life has been 
framed and reframed by the questions of Boswell’s factuality in representing Johnson and the 
degree of fictionality that impinges on the print persona. Since Frederick A. Pottle edited and 
introduced the London Journal 1762-1763 of Boswell’s private papers, scholars have sought to 
reconcile the “historical solidity” that Boswell “succeeded in achieving” against, on the other 
hand, his “unusual powers or imagination” (14). In this academic context, questions of what is 
biographically true versus what is fictitious spurred Donald Greene to attack the accuracy, 
veracity, and overall reliability of Boswell’s representation—his attempts to exonerate the lived 
life of Johnson against Boswell’s biographical Life argued that Boswell’s journals demonstrated 
what he regarded as a damning distance between the life and Life of Johnson, a fiction of the 
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facts that Pottle finds in the journals. In distinguishing between fact and fiction, Greene is 
essentially distinguishing genres. Autobiography is more factual, while biography, or at least just 
Boswell’s, is more fictional: “for all that Johnson’s words are supposed to remain central to it, 
the work is dominated by Boswell—naturally enough, when so much of it comes from Boswell’s 
journals, which after all were intended to record Boswell’s life, not Johnson’s” 
(“Autobiography” 58). He notes further that “it is hard to find passages in the Life, often ones 
which have been influential in creating the modern image of Johnson, which have been 
drastically altered from the text of the journal, presumably as the result of such extraneous 
motives as fondness for an opinion or fidelity to a party” (“Autobiography” 56). Greene offers 
“A Reading Course in Autobiography” as an antidote to the potentially fallacious practices of 
biographers, a logic that assumes the representation of a life by a biographer is much more 
suspect than people’s representations of themselves.  This is an old schism in eighteenth-century 
studies, but the context it has created perpetuates critical approaches to Boswell’s fictitiousness 
or historicity. 
Within this academic setting, the two general lines of inquiry have developed various 
approaches to Boswell’s surplus of detail. Greg Clingham outlines the rift between scholarship 
framed by questions of Boswell’s representational art versus his biographical factuality: 
“Boswell scholars can be divided into two main groups,” one that “takes Boswell’s dramatic 
artifice and fictional techniques for granted, and discusses the Life as self-contained, self-
consistent, and self-reflexive” and another that “shares the first group’s admiration for Boswell’s 
dramatizing powers, but also claims that he is factually accurate and authentic,” invoking this 
“‘supreme gift of dramatization’ in order to defend him [Boswell] against questions of his factual 
accuracy” (212). Setting these two approaches aside, Clingham opts to read Boswell a self-
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fashioning biography and “unbroken circle of psychological striving for realization and the 
constant threat of dissolution” (226). Boswell as the biographer, in this reading, is a Boswell 
becoming, at the same time he knows Johnson and fashions Johnson into a biographical entity: 
“in making his portrait of Johnson, and playing himself off against this man whom Boswell had 
invested with all his own ideals, the biographer is trying to articular himself, to make real a life 
too often given to fictionalizing” (222). Clingham’s stake is in the relational aspects between the 
biographer and his subject and the act of writing that the Life reveals, rather than the biographical 
writing itself and how fictional or factual it might be.  
The former group of scholars has downplayed Boswell’s historicity in favor of his 
artistry, privileging the literary and psychological merits of the Life. They generally set it aside to 
look at the literary effects Boswell creates. William Siebenschuh argues that Boswell deploys 
literary techniques to present the facts of Johnson’s life out of necessity, since “Boswell clearly 
did not understand and therefore could not categorize what he was seeing” when he observed and 
recorded his Johnson (Techniques 93). His literary presentation of Johnson is compensatory, an 
artistry to fill in representational gaps. Likewise, many scholars have taken a cue from Boswell’s 
reference to Johnson as a Homeric hero in the advertisement to the second edition and have 
sought to locate the pattern of a literary hero in the Life.  Boswell himself alludes to the Homeric 
hero as a justification for “this extensive biographical work, however inferior in its nature, may 
in one respect be assimilated to the ODYSSEY. Amidst a thousand entertaining and instructive 
episodes the HERO is never long out of sight; for they are all in some degree connected to him” 
(Life i.12). William Dowling reads Boswell’s Johnson as a literary creation, an eighteenth-
century original like Tobias Smollet’s Matthew Bramble (Hero 127). This literary character is “a 
hero in an unheroic world” whose burden is to carry and reconcile the high traditions of an 
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earlier age to uninspired, contemporary practice (Hero 2). Donna Heiland takes Dowling’s 
interpretation further, so that Johnson’s status as literature is his status as a god of the times, 
ritualistically pulled apart to reinvigorate the culture (202). In this reading, the facts Boswell 
presents as Johnson’s life are, rather, facts that define the eighteenth century.  
My contention is that biographical fact cannot be purely isolated as the fact of a life, but 
rather can only be understood as the fact of the tradition that the life represents. Boswell, then, is 
implicitly unaccountable for problems with accuracy in the details specific to Johnson’s life. 
With a similar attention to Boswell’s artistry rather than his factuality, Ralph W. Rader takes a 
different tack, arguing that the Life is a biography of something more evanescent than 
documentable lived experience: it is a biographical record of Johnson’s character and, thus, not 
accountable to the strict rules of historical writing (8). Some scholars have posited psychological 
approaches, with particular attention to the role biography played in bolstering Boswell’s own 
psychological distress following the death of his sometimes mentor and friend.
65
 In this critical 
conversation, the relationship between Boswell and Johnson feeds the connection between 
factuality and fictionality, reinvigorating both with a combined psychological purpose. 
The claims about biography that these approaches advance are all warranted by attempts 
to reconcile Boswell’s biographical facts and representation artistry, brushing aside the research 
and facts in favor of the organizational patterns. This methodology raises productive questions of 
the effects Boswell’s representation might create—what comes of reading Johnson as a hero? As 
a map of character? Or as a bulwark to Boswell’s own bouts with profound sadness or, even, the 
reader’s? Yet all of these approaches, either to factuality or artistry, focused on points prior to the  
publication of the Life—the relationship between Boswell and Johnson or Johnson and the 
                                                 
65
 Allan Ingram focuses on its effect on Boswell, suggesting that “contemplation of Johnson’s image may be seen as 
an antidote to the nothingness of the increasingly melancholy world of Boswell’s imagination,” which he tried to 
master by creating an image of his mentor that allowed him to create an image of himself (190). 
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biography—end squarely in the sprawl of the Life’s details, facts, opinions, anecdotes, letters, 
and general biographical accumulation. These sorts of modern critical approaches derive from 
modern standards of biography, which themselves developed from historically from the 
eighteenth-century onward. Although it remains the most recognizable, eighteenth-century point 
on the genre’s trajectory, Boswell’s Life of Johnson is most remarkable for its enduring 
modernity.  For instance, Boswell’s attention to research, unparalleled by earlier biographers, is a 
given, a requirement for modern biographical credibility, his bulk of detail notwithstanding. 
Likewise, Boswell’s attempt to picture Johnson honestly, alternately gruff or kind and 
opinionated or rational, is a representational starting point in current biography. A modern 
biography seeks to crack the veneer of selfhood that assumption creates and delve into what is 
admirable or repellent, but ultimately most telling about a person. And Boswell’s drive to 
incorporate character as a fact among the mass of biographical detail he presents is an attempt to 
balance personality and lived experience.
66
 The Life does not strike a perfect balance, nor does it 
provide an entirely authentic depiction, despite Boswell’s comprehensive research. Rather, it is 
emergent, developmental and, more importantly, squarely situated in an eighteenth-century 
republic of letters.  
To approach Boswell’s Johnson as an eighteenth-century rhetoric of self is to begin from 
the other end of the biographical enterprise, privileging the reader rather than the form, 
biographer, or even the biographical persona that concentrates most modern biographical study. 
Instead, it is a focus on the reader and how the reader is affected by the rhetoric of Johnson’s 
                                                 
66
 Donald Greene once critiqued Boswell’s Life on generic standards he had culled from contemporary biographies. 
He leveled a “damaging charge” against Boswell, finding him guilty of the “gross misfeasance or nonfeasance, of a 
biographer’s first duty, to try to provide a reasonably complete and continuous narrative of his subject’s life” 
(“Pretty” 118). While narrative continuity is an expectation for modern biography, Boswell de-emphasizes such 
continuity in order to create a rhetoric of self for Johnson that readers can know intimately. Seeking to reconcile 
Boswell’s Life against modern instantiations of biography neglects its influential role as one of the historical 
interstices in the development of the biographical form. 
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self, a person cast in print who engages readers and invites them to draw ethical conclusions 
about the self sympathetically based on their own observations. This educational ethic of reading 
allows readers of the Life to apply the lessons they learn from Boswell’s Johnson to their own 
experience and, as a result, to engage a larger discussion of social and ethical truths.  
 
Arranging the Accumulations of Johnson’s Selfhood 
In the Advertisement to the First Edition of the Life, Boswell again stresses the challenge 
of managing the rhetorical complexity of arranging the life of Johnson: “the nature of the work . . 
. as it consists of innumerable detached particulars, all which, even the most minute, I have 
spared no pains to ascertain with a scrupulous authenticity, has occasioned a degree of trouble 
far beyond that of other species of composition” (Life i.6-7). In these assertions, Boswell makes 
two claims about the composition of the biography. First, he has composed it of “innumerable 
detached particulars.” Second, Boswell’s method of arranging these innumerable, detached 
particulars so that they cohere in a representation of selfhood “has occasioned a degree of trouble 
far beyond that of other species of composition.” Arranging the facts he had compiled into an 
accurate rhetoric of self that would delineate Johnson’s life distinguishes his methodology from 
other popular biographies of Johnson by deemphasizing the overt, organizational control of the 
biographer and, in its place, presenting himself as a partial but meticulous observer who has 
scientifically researched, tested, and recorded the facts. Historically, Boswell’s assertion 
highlights his effort to outmatch his contemporaries’ attempts to present a definitive 
representation of Johnson.  
In particular, he chose to set his biographical arrangement of Johnson’s life most directly 
in conversation with Sir John Hawkins’ dry, comprehensive biographical account, his Life of 
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Samuel Johnson, and especially Hester Thrale Piozzi’s more personal account of Johnson, the 
Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson. The former he criticized for the “dark uncharitable cast” 
it gave to Johnson’s “conduct,” noting that “Hawky is no doubt very malignant”; the latter, for 
evincing “no affection for our great friend [Johnson], but merely the attachment of vanity,” a 
biographer who “proved herself to be a wicked, false, ungrateful little vixen” (Correspondence 
223, 114, 117). Boswell’s accumulation of particulars legitimated his biographical account. In 
the process, he presents a life of Johnson that is comprehensive, documented, and in full 
empirical view of the reader, who will take part in the experiment as an observer. 
Boswell’s compositional maneuvers for arranging his vast accumulation of Johnsoniana 
into a representative rhetoric of self derive from larger rhetorical contexts of the period, contexts 
which give primacy to a reader’s response. Boswell is part of a relatively young tradition in 
eighteenth-century letters that shaped rhetorical study in the eighteenth century, particularly the 
latter half. Two key figures of the period, Adam Smith and Hugh Blair, delivered popular 
lectures in rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh. Both lecturers espoused a belletristic 
approach to rhetoric that emphasized two of the five classical canons of rhetoric: stylistics and 
arrangement. For rhetoricians like Adam Smith, belletristic considerations of style held great 
significance for Scottish rhetorical theory because they carried a nationalized charge. In their 
teaching, rhetoric was the measure of the person, an observable marker of selfhood. For Smith 
and Blair (and many Scottish authors of the period), this was at its most basic a distinction 
between Scottish and English, rusticity and urbanity. Thomas P. Miller stresses the importance of 
rhetorically constructed character when he notes that Scottish rhetoricians sought, in part, to ease 
their students’ assimilation into English culture through active engagement with English 
discourses, such as rhetoric and commerce (204). Establishing an English print ethos would 
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require a concept of Scottish character rhetorically indistinguishable from the English character. 
Part of emulating good English character is good English diction and good pronunciation.
67
 For 
Smith, demonstrating “[p]erspicuity requires” language “free from all ambiguity” and, more 
importantly, “that the words should be natives (if I may [say] so) of the language we speak in” 
(Lectures 1). Smith implies that usage is not native but systematic: a Scottish speaker, then, can 
adopt the systems of English usage despite lacking the perceived fluency afforded by English 
rearing. Smith’s “common sense” approach trains students to affect a rhetorical character 
appropriate to English discourse, “in the manner which best conveys the sentiment, passion, or 
affection with which it affects—or he pretends it does affect—him” (Lectures 51). The corollary 
is that selfhood, too, could be observed, taught, and adopted. The stylistic concerns like 
composition and arrangement that grew out of Smith’s and Blair’s rhetorical concerns were 
crucial to Boswell’s representation of Johnson as well—a rhetoric of representation could 
separate the bucolic from the cosmopolitan, the province from the country’s center, and the 
Scottish from the English. And it could especially mark selfhood. Boswell’s task was to translate 
the great Anglican and English icon into fully humane proportions and, in so doing, authorize his 
own Scottish identity as capable of comprising and composing the great English writer. 
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 In a period content to brand provincial, Scottish English with nationalized epithets, lists of so-called Scotticisms 
circulated among the Scottish universities and literati, as well as in London. James Beattie’s short, published 
dictionary Scotticisms (1779) and Boswell’s shorter, undated, manuscript list of Scotticisms (ms. 260) evidence a 
sensibility concerned primarily with adaptability, cultivated by a practical understanding of language and usage. In 
his journals, the young Boswell notes his displeasure at seeing familiar Scottish faces in the London crowd: “[t]o tell 
the plain truth, I was vexed at their coming[,] for to see just the plain hamely fife family hurt my grand ideas of 
London” (Turnbull 21-2). Gordon Turnbull notes that “hamely” is Scots for “‘homely’, in the sense of ‘familiar’, 
‘ordinary’, shading slightly over into ‘rough, coarse, blunt’” (351 n.15). Boswell’s diction indicates his own social 
distinctions between “grand” idea of cosmopolitan London and his “hamely” Scotland. At this time, too, Irish 
Thomas Sheridan moved from acting on the London to educating students in proper English elocution as a means of 
correcting flaws in usage, particularly provincial usage. In the Life, Boswell cites the example of one of Sheridan’s 
students, Alex Wedderburne, because “it affords animating encouragement to other gentlemen of North-Britian to 
try their fortunes in the southern part of the Island, where they may hope to gratify their utmost ambition . . . now 
that we are one people by the Union” (i.387). 
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Much like Smith, Blair’s emphasis on style, likewise, probed what was definitively 
English about Englishness through his attention to English literature like Addison and Steele’s 
Spectator. For Blair, the best style is so precise and perspicuous that it does not hamper 
understanding. It guides it fluidly, naturally. The degree to which a composition maintains both 
traits determines the level of propriety it demonstrates: style “is a picture of the ideas which rise 
in the mind . . . [it] is nothing else, than that sort of expression which our thoughts most readily 
assume” (Blair 99). Since the writing style is, for Blair, definitive of the character of the writer, 
Blair concludes that “different countries have been noted for their peculiarities of Style, suited 
their different temper and genius” and provides example of those correlations between style and 
national identity (99). Tellingly, the Scottish are not among the nations or cultures he mentions 
in this lecture to Scottish students at the University of Edinburgh, but they must have been aware 
of the lens turned on their national character and writing by British or cosmopolitan London 
culture. As a consequence, Barbara Warnick explains, stylistic decisions in Blair’s theorizing 
“should be adjusted to the taste and habits of the host culture; what suited ancient society was no 
longer appropriate in the eloquence of the modern period,” and she characterizes this model as a 
“global view of propriety” (71). For Boswell, writing about Johnson in English, arrangement in 
composition would have proven a delicate, crucial task.   
Within the context of a belletristic approach to English that sought to remove traces of 
native Scottish from the discourse, Boswell would have been acutely aware of rhetorical modes 
of arrangement and their importance in mediating his relationship with Johnson. In the Journal 
Tour to the Hebrides, Boswell seeks to depict himself man of English civility and also a Scottish 
laird; indeed, the whole trip through Scotland, passing largely from Scottish man to Scottish man 
who exhibits an Anglicized sensibility sets a larger context for Boswell’s attempt to reconcile his 
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Scottish origins to his English aspiration. He delights in relaying Johnson’s observation that 
“[t]he Irish mix better with the English than the Scotch do; their language is nearer to English . . . 
[and] they have not that extreme nationality which we find in the Scotch” blends the national and 
linguistic to the point he can compliment Boswell for being the “most unscottified of your 
countrymen. You are almost the only instance of a Scotchman that I have known, who did not at 
every other sentence bring in some other Scotchman” (Life ii.242). Echoes of Blair and Smith’s 
impetus for inculcating a belletristic rhetoric to their Scottish students can be heard in Johnson’s 
assumptions: language, but mostly dialect, signify “nationality” and national identity, such that 
language can determine character. Boswell himself began a list of Scotticisms and Scottish 
words (Boswell Collection ms. 260). Johnson even encouraged him to continue compiling words 
so that they might form the basis for a book (Boswell, Life ii.91-2). Boswell could hardly have 
failed to recognize his place in the contemporary context of rhetorical theory and the role it much 
place in arranging facts into Johnson’s selfhood. More to the point, Boswell acted in this 
politicized and nationalized rhetorical field in the composition of the Life. 
In an undated, manuscript essay, Boswell articulates an approach to composition and 
arrangement that expresses similar sentiments to the belletristic rhetoric advocated by 
eighteenth-century Scottish universities, emphasizing style and arrangement. One of Blair’s 
assumptions, for instance, is that “[k]nowledge and science must furnish the materials that form 
the body and substance of any valuable composition. Rhetoric serves to add the polish; and we 
know that none but firm and solid bodies can be polished well” (4). In this configuration, the 
sources of biographical selfhood come from empirical “knowledge” and scientific fact. 
Boswell’s process for locating the facts of Johnson’s self evidences an empirical methodology—
facts obtained from Johnson’s publications, the observations of Johnson’s acquaintance, as well 
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as Boswell’s own personal observations and journal record. Similar to Blair, Boswell stresses 
that  
Writing or Composition in an age of learning or knowledge must be in a great 
measure arranging and colouring & shaping & polishing in various ways other 
peoples [sic] thoughts[.] So it is called Composition condo et compono quea mox 
depromere possim.
68
 Some original thoughts will be intermixed sometimes; 
sometimes not. I doubt if there be a single original thought in all Dr. Hugh Blair's 
Sermons yet they are beautiful compositions. (ms. 69.3) 
Boswell’s emphasis is less on scientific knowledge or originality, but rather how material can be 
arranged to “beautiful” effect. For Boswell, the excess of facts and information “in an age of 
learning or knowledge” requires rhetorical arrangement to give them order. Arrangement is even 
more important than the originality of fact. His emphasis on arrangement is another instance 
where his Scottish origins, paradoxically, trump the questions of authority that his Life posed. By 
making arrangement (a key article in the Scottish Enlightenment school of rhetoric) his priority, 
he de-emphasizes the questions of fact surrounding the great Dr. Johnson and thus the questions 
of Boswell’s fitness. Blair and Boswell both regard rhetoric and arrangement as refining source 
material. For Blair, belletristic “composition serves to add the polish” (4). Boswell, too, holds 
belletristic arrangement makes the “colouring & shaping & polishing” (ms. 69.3). Essentially, 
they both advocate a careful rhetorical treatment of facts to improve them by improving their 
presentation.  
In their constructions, belletristic rhetoric metaphorically becomes a rhetoric of the body. 
They anchor the observable, verbal self onto rhetoric. Blair asserts that rhetoric can only improve 
                                                 
68
 The transcribers note to manuscript 69.3 correct Boswell’s citation to “condo et compono quea quod mox 
depromere possim” (emphasis and strikethrough, mine). Boswell is citing Horace’s Epistles I.1.12, translated by H. 
Rushton Fairclough thus: “I am putting by and setting in order the stores on which I may someday draw” (251). 
212 
 
a sound body of ideas or facts: “none but firm and solid bodies can be polished well” (4). Only a 
sound body can be improved rhetorically.  
“Would it not be ridiculous squeamish affectation to say I will no more use 
thoughts which have been in other peoples [sic] minds than eat meat which has 
been in other peoples [sic] mouths. We cannot help receiving other peoples [sic] 
thoughts with whom we are brought near enough to communicate either in 
conversation or by reading what they write no more than we can help inhaling 
breath which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company [,] a 
disgusting idea no doubt. We must receive other peoples [sic] thoughts both crude 
& well digested. Impertinent rude people will belch vile thoughts in our face. (ms. 
69.3) 
Receiving “other people’s thoughts” through “conversation or by reading what they write” 
strengthens a body of facts or ideas. Metaphorically, Boswell compares this process of 
strengthening a composition to ingestion or inhalation, an involuntary incorporation of 
additional, diverse ideas, both “crude and well digested,” to arrange, color, shape, and polish. In 
Boswell’s formulation, a composition is a body that rhetoric orders, arranging and shaping it and 
giving it color and definition. His comparison is particularly apt in light of his biographical 
methodology, which digests source accounts of Johnson to arrange as a life of Johnson into a 
“beautiful composition” (ms. 69.3), a rhetoric of self that collects lived experiences and character 
traits within the body of the biography as life.  
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Composing Johnson’s Selfhood Textually  
In order to render palatable the extensive documentation of Johnson’s life he had 
amassed, Boswell had to shape and polish his research by giving the details a continuity that 
would make it possible for them to cohere as a single print self. The perception of a natural 
regularity conveyed through Boswell’s formal organization of Johnson’s contradictory qualities 
has such a regularizing effect on the variety of material he collected. Divergent points of view 
and inconsistent accounts of Johnson are unified as a singular life, setting fixed boundaries for 
what will be considered Johnsonian, so that Johnson could be observed objectively and 
empirically by the sympathetic reader. The most obvious boundary that Boswell establishes for 
Johnson’s selfhood is the extensive correspondence that connects Johnson to the larger society 
that framed his life. Unlike the ways Johnson had used Savage’s correspondence to fill in gaps 
for Savage’s experience or to give testament to his character, Boswell uses Johnson’s 
connections to establish the man in a larger social context. His social circle included the political 
theorists, painters, poets of the Literary Club, populated by the likes of Edmund Burke, Sir 
Joshua Reynolds, and Dr. Oliver Goldsmith. Beyond that, Johnson’s acquaintance included 
Hester Thrale Piozzi and the Scottish philosopher James Beattie, and he was an avowed, lifelong 
fan of his friend, the novel Charlotte Lennox, as well as the playwright Hannah More. This is by 
no means a comprehensive list; rather, it is evidence of the challenge Boswell faced in 
structuring Johnson’s network as a comprehensive print person. Likewise, Boswell situates 
Johnson’s experiences paratextually, unifying the accumulated details of Johnson’s life 
chronologically under headings that mark each year in the life of Johnson, but also 
asynchronously with footnotes that make connections across time in the span of Johnson’s life.   
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Boswell’s arrangement depends on textual and paratextual strategies that definitively 
mark the Johnsonian boundaries so that readers can observe him objectively in order to read his 
selfhood sympathetically. Epistemologically, the move from empirical objectivity to affective 
sympathy is Lockean. It requires widespread facts that allow for empirical observation of 
experience. More than a simple list of facts, this move also requires a recognizable humanity, an 
arrangement that shifts the readers’ focus from mere fact to observations of a selfhood made up 
facts. A reader’s perceptions allowed for an empirical appraisal of self that would allow and 
sympathetic fellow-feeling, an accurate exchange of sentiments. For the eighteenth-century 
reader, sympathy is socially and philosophically charged: in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Adam Smith posits sympathy as model for morality and sociability based on observing and 
sympathetically responding to others (17). This scientific approach allows sympathy to be seated 
in the body and in the imagination of spectators who witnesses another person and 
sympathetically imagine themselves in that person’s position (Theory 27-9, 31-4). Boswell 
encourages this response by rhetorical procedures, but it is up to the reader to respond. Letters 
with a definite addressee and author provide points of social contact that situate Johnson and, to 
a large degree, dramatize his opinions over time, as letter sequences between Johnson and 
Boswell, Hester Thrale Piozzi, and Boswell’s wife demonstrate.  Readers of The Life enter into 
that play of social relations as spectators, but Boswell also wants them to become part of the 
experiment. His thorough though hardly exhaustive table of contents and footnotes move a 
reader’s attention across the text outside of the linear narrative of the Life to provide a frame of 
scientific mastery over Johnson’s selfhood, while letters provide more gentle and rhetorically 
approachable opportunities for sympathy with Johnson, a sympathy that will in turn shape the 
reader. To inductively apprehend Johnson’s selfhood from Boswell’s massive accumulation, his 
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biographical ordering notwithstanding, readers must have choices within the various points of 
view evident in each anecdote, recollection, publication, letter or other material that Boswell 
incorporated into the biography. Letters constitute one of the more significant and rhetorically 
consistent strategies for inviting readers to participate in The Life and the life of Johnson. 
Including letters was a normative practice in eighteenth-century biography, growing out 
of seventeenth-century life writing and appearing most notably in Johnson’s recounting of 
Richard Savage’s life. In the latter part of the William Mason’s Memoirs of the Life and Writings 
of Thomas Gray alternated short prose sections narrating life events against much longer 
epistolary sequences. Boswell claims that he has chosen “to adopt and enlarge upon the excellent 
plan of Mr. Mason” in structuring his own biographical representation of Johnson (Life i.29). In 
analyzing Boswell’s letter placement, Bruce Redford emphasizes “the care that went into 
positioning the letters so as to gloss, punctuate, or advance the narrative” and argues that 
Boswell uses the letters to three ends: to present the letters with a “disposition” sympathetic to 
Johnson, to vary the forms of letter to represent various attributes of Johnson’s self, and to 
manage multiple “epistolary sequence[s]” that “can include as many as ten to fifteen letters” 
(Designing 124). The self-consciousness with which Boswell includes and edits epistolary 
sequences in the Life emphasizes the methodology of Boswell’s didactic Johnson, a biographical 
self who engages and, when read properly, transforms readers. 
Protocols of civility demanded letters on a variety of occasions and at frequencies that 
confirmed the social bond between writers.
69
 Although civility has a basis in extemporaneous, 
interpersonal interaction, it exerts a clear influence on eighteenth-century conversation and letter 
                                                 
69
 Johnson’s letters typically bear the marks of civility common to the art of letter writing in the eighteenth century, 
since “[l]etter-writers satisfied decorum by sending letters on ‘proper’ occasions, [and] using ‘correct’ forms of 
address and . . . they also regulated politeness by testing its compatibility with negligence, warmth and zeal” (Brant 
4). 
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writing with clear protocols. These forms of civility set the boundaries for social interaction, and 
Boswell uses them to show the boundaries Johnson variously respected and broke. Toward that 
end, Boswell situates collections of letters at irregular intervals in the Life which balance 
Johnson’s notorious incivility. Speaking of a previous night’s conversation, Boswell once 
confirmed for Johnson that he “tossed and gored several persons” (Life ii.66). Boswell himself 
complained of being “tossed . . . sometimes,” which he regarded as particularly uncivil in the 
company of “enemies” (Life iii.338). Boswell used Johnson’s letters as a means of balancing and 
arranging Johnson’s social self as sociable yet curiously aggressive or negligent at times. When 
he makes his compliments, for instance, he often apologizes for his negligence in writing to the 
addressee, gesturing toward apology so that he can simultaneously stress his high regard, 
ameliorate his inattention to the addressee, and segue smoothly into news of himself. It is an 
epistolary commonplace characterized by self-interest, but also civility. 
A clear example of this strategy occurs in a letter to his friend and long-time personal 
physician, Dr. Thomas Lawrence Johnson writes: “At a time when all your friends ought to show 
their kindness, and with a character which ought to make all that know you your friends, you 
may wonder that you have yet heard nothing from me. I have been hindered by a vexatious and 
incessant cough, for which within these ten days I have been bled once, fasted four or five times, 
taken physick five times, and opiates, I think, six. This day it seems to remit” (Life iii.419). The 
“time when all . . . friends ought to show their kindness” that Johnson discreetly references here 
is the death of Lawrence’s wife. In this extreme instance, Johnson authenticates his inability to 
write with the specific details of his own suffering, whereby he apprises his physician of his own 
sickness, demonstrating the sociable, civil means of conveying sympathy. As a personal doctor, 
Lawrence would have been particularly reconciled to Johnson’s inattention by his own 
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familiarity with Johnson’s medical history. While Johnson seems to give primacy to the 
sufferings of Lawrence over his own and emphasize his civil regard for his friend, he also gives 
attention to his own suffering. Such letter structures overwrite Johnson’s reputation for being ill-
mannered with civil practices common to any writer. 
Similarly, Johnson is bound to the epistolary form through the social network it 
establishes and maintains. Johnson often communicates with his acquaintance indirectly through 
an addressee. Such second-hand communication evokes the social practices associated with what 
Clare Brant labels “personal” rather than “private” letters: “‘personal’ . . . recognizes the 
significance of letters to individuals and to relationships . . . [since] eighteenth-century familiar 
letters, which were . . . voluntarily circulated beyond the addressee” (5).70 Relaying this strategy 
in the letters he selects for the Life allows Boswell to contextualize Johnson within a civil, social 
network among his acquaintances. But it also depicts Johnson’s negotiation of the social 
obligations necessary for maintaining this network particularly in the manner he manages 
personal correspondence with the members of his circle. Boswell includes a letter to Johnson’s 
servant, Francis Barber, in which Johnson instructs Barber to “[m]ake my compliments to Mr. 
Ellis, and Mrs. Clapp, and Mr. Smith” (Life ii.116). Thus Johnson maintains his social network 
with three people by virtue of his communication with a single addressee. But the more 
interesting dimension of this sociality is that Barber is black, and Johnson is extending his 
sociability/authority through him, which means Ellis, Clapp, and Smith have to accept Barber as 
well as Johnson. 
Johnson reflected on the popular practice of publishing private letters, telling Boswell 
that “[i]t is now become so much the fashion to publish letters, that in order to avoid it, I put as 
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 Brant also notes that, quite often, “many correspondents did not want or expect their exchanges to be disclosed to 
others, but ‘personal’ should be understood to anticipate discretion” (5). 
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little into mine as I can” (Life iv.102). Johnson’s aversion to the publicity of the public letter 
stresses the availability of the self in personal correspondence, hence he “put as little into mine 
as I can” by resorting to brief letters. Yet Boswell’s choice to include Johnson’s documented 
words makes a private Johnson available outside of his circle, one that will counter the “goring” 
doctor with a more gentle portrait of civil and even kind exchanges, however brief. Boswell 
organizes the letters to shape a Johnson who can interpret civility but also to be held accountable 
to it.  
In ordering Johnson through epistolary text, Boswell gains control over his formidable 
subject through letter sequences, which allow him to frame events through relaying a variety of 
stories intended to reflect Johnson’s character. His careful placement of letter sequences 
bookends diverse topical sections, ranging from accounts of Johnson’s publications to his 
conversation and commentary, and it gives them a distinct, forward motion. A famous example 
of a letter narrative in the Life is the interaction between Johnson and Boswell’s wife. A subtle, 
somewhat jocular conflict between the two arises when Boswell and Johnson make their tour of 
the Hebrides. At Boswell’s house, the peculiarities that often characterize Johnson prove, as 
Boswell explains in a footnote, disagreeable to Boswell’s wife. Johnson kept “irregular hours” 
and displayed “uncouth habits, such as turning the heads of candles downwards, when they did 
not burn bright enough, and letting the wax drop upon the carpet”; coupled with the extreme 
attention her husband always devotes to Johnson, Johnson’s strange habits leave her ill at ease 
(Life ii.269). In a letter dated 27 November 1773, Johnson notes: “I know Mrs. Boswell wished 
me well to go; her wishes have not been disappointed” (Life ii.268-9). The next letter that 
Boswell includes in this sequence is a reply from Johnson to Mrs. Boswell, dated 16 May 1776, 
in which he tells her that “[t]he only thing in which I have the honor to agree with you is, in 
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loving him; and while we are so much of a mind in a matter of so much importance, our other 
quarrels will, I hope, produce no great bitterness” (Life iii.86). In subsequent letters to Boswell, 
Johnson asks his friend always to pay his regards to Mrs. Boswell, so that by 24 February 1777, 
Boswell tells Johnson “my wife is much honored by what you say of her. She begs you may 
accept of her best compliments . . . [and] is to send you some marmalade of oranges of her own 
making,” noting tongue-in-cheek, that it is important to “[b]eware . . . of a reconciled enemy” 
(Life iii.108-9). Johnson writes asking that Boswell “[t]ell Mrs. Boswell that I shall taste her 
marmalade cautiously at first,” and when it proves harmless he will take it “as a pledge of firm . . 
. unalterable kindness,” so he can definitely conclude that “[s]he is, after all, a dear, dear lady” 
(Life iii.109). Eventually, the letters reveal that Johnson and Boswell’s wife are reconciled 
enough that they occasionally correspond.  
As much as she is incorporated into Johnson’s social circle through correspondence, this 
epistolary sequence documents and makes observable a social Johnson, situated in the context of 
his social obligations and acquaintance. The narrative thread these letter sequences picture gives 
consistency to disparate details Boswell accumulates as a life. Their rhetorical structure also 
offers the advantage of picturing a Johnson constantly capable of change, responsive to social 
situations, and able to reconcile himself to a social “enemy” like Mrs. Boswell. Boswell’s use of 
Johnson’s correspondence makes Johnson more observable and, thus, more sympathetic to the 
spectating reader. Rhetorically, Boswell’s arrangement of epistolary sequences allows for a more 
intimate Johnson with more didactic potential for the ethical reader. 
Epistolary time gives the narrative direction, which sometimes plays against the 
chronological ordering of the annual divisions of Boswell’s material with marginal glosses that 
frame Johnson’s experiences with the year and his age. Boswell’s method of applying a narrative 
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linearity to Johnson’s experiences is distinctive from other biographies of the period, which 
embed the dates and ages within the biographical narrative, rather than glossing them. Johnson’s 
and Goldsmith’s biographies embed the dates, as do other biographies of Johnson, like 
Hawkins’s or Piozzi’s collection of anecdotes. While it might be a concession to utility—shorter 
biographies would not have required a means of managing Boswell’s surplus—Boswell’s 
marginal glosses mark the passage of Johnson’s life and stabilize the experimental framework of 
the Life with clear temporal markers. The 1791 edition of Boswell’s Life follows a dedication 
and an advertisement with an alphabetical table of contents that is fourteen pages long. What 
Boswell terms a table of contents is actually a topical index. That it opens the biography 
foregrounds the rhetorical structuring of Johnson’s life, connecting in the same table Johnson’s 
acquaintance, travels, opinions, and publications. Likewise, the footnote establishes continuity 
within the text outside of the chronological ordering of events, so that it represents a balanced, 
consistent Johnson. Unlike the sequential, chronological progression of the letters, the marginal 
glosses, or the forward-looking table of contents, the narrative movement of Boswell’s footnotes 
is alternately forward or backward. By reaching in multiple directions across the text, Boswell 
gives more continuity to the people and social contacts that drift in and out of the Life around 
Johnson. In contrast to the dizzying context of conversations and scenes, of participants and 
settings, such nominal structuring cannot entirely contain Johnson’s character, but can give it 
temporal form and scientific precision.  
Edward Gibbon’s presence, for instance, is emphasized by a discussion between Boswell 
and Johnson regarding how history should be relayed and reported. Though Gibbon is present 
and has presumably been working on his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
he offers no comment because, as Boswell suggests, “[h]e probably did not trust himself with 
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JOHNSON” (Life ii.366). The italicized word “trust” and its footnote, “See p. 348,” point back to 
a previous segment of the Life in which Gibbon makes a quiet riposte to Johnson’s comment that 
he would not trust himself in the presence of a black bear:. Johnson said “We are told, that the 
black bear is innocent; but I should not like to trust myself with him.” What Gibbon whispers to 
the side, Boswell glosses later in the life: Gibbon says, “I should not like to trust myself with 
you” (Life ii.348). Such paratextual arrangements situate Johnson referentially within the 
boundaries that Boswell establishes. In the former instance, he becomes a critic of the historical 
writing Gibbon chooses not to defend. In the latter, his character is associated with the purported 
innocence of the “black bear” (Life ii.348). Boswell’s footnotes connect dissimilar aspects of 
Johnson’s character but also draw connections over the course of the Life. By binding Johnson in 
footnotes, Boswell creates a boundary for containing Johnson’s experience that runs against the 
ostensibly chronological structure of the biography, projecting Johnson’s selfhood backward 
across the course of the Life. 
Likewise, Boswell situates Johnson within social networks that also cycle through 
Johnson’s lived experience. Boswell notes, “[o]n Sunday, April 1, I dined with him [Johnson] at 
Mr. Thrale’s, with Sir Phillip Jennings Clerk and Mr. Perkins, who had the superintendence of 
Mr. Thrale’s brewery, with a salary of five hundred pounds a year” (Life iv.80). His reference to 
Perkins is connected to an earlier letter in the Life from Johnson to Perkins, which is itself 
footnoted with an additional anecdote of an interaction between Johnson, Perkins and Mrs. 
Thrale. The latter footnote focuses on Perkins’s maintenance of Henry Thrales’s brewery, his 
hospitality, and Johnson’s regard for the man (Life ii.286). Not only does this footnote connect 
Johnson to a social network, as in his epistolary greetings to various friends, but it gives 
continuity to the network that fixes Johnson within the social formation of friends, acquaintances 
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and rivals interweaving throughout and networked by the text, like the epistolary sequences. This 
footnote connects the social formations most characteristic of the Life, “the quantity it contains 
of Johnson’s conversation; which is universally acknowledged to have been eminently 
instructive and entertaining . . . [and] will best display his character” (Life i.31). Boswell’s 
footnotes undergird the Life and provide a standard for gauging how characteristically 
Johnsonian any action Johnson performs might be.  
The selfhood, which Boswell can link at various points in the biography, makes a 
behavioral continuity possible while rendering others improbable or uncharacteristic. In this 
accumulation and arrangement of details, then, Boswell gives us a scientifically verifiable 
Johnson, shaped by rhetorical practices to unfold as a series of experiments from which the 
reader can gather useful and edifying evidence. This rhetorical context for sympathy provides a 
scientific, physiological, and ethical means to gauge whether the Johnson experiment is working. 
Once they, like Boswell, are “impregnated with the Johnsonian æther,” the truth of this 
Johnsonian self will be evident in even more intimate and personal effects on the reader (Life 
i.421). The efficacy of the experiment is that it draws in the reader to the experiment itself. 
While Boswell does fix Johnson’s experience implicitly through textual organization, he 
also explicitly arranges Johnson’s selfhood by exerting the ethos of a biographer and friend. 
Boswell’s authorial control in arranging letter sequences, chronological markers, footnotes does 
not foreground his role as a biographer, but his self-definition as an autobiographical witness to 
Johnson’s life does. As in his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides, Boswell acts an interlocutor for 
the reader, though much less obviously obtrusive. Boswell’s personal commentary and first-hand 
experience asserts a different role than Johnson’s familiarity played in his representation of his 
friend, Richard Savage. Johnson used Savage’s biography to render his own personal 
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recollections of Savage into documentation, represented objectively so that it could be 
documented as fact by other readers or researchers. He sought to document his opinion into 
public record. Boswell, on the other hand, takes his long-standing, personal familiarity with 
Johnson’s opinions to authorize his own interpretations of Johnson’s preferences as fact. These 
facts become part of the mass of details Boswell accumulates. 
In one instance, Boswell reads Johnson’s opinions on contemporary novels, noting that 
Johnson “always appeared” to have an “unreasonable prejudice,” for the prose aesthetic of 
Samuel Richardson to that of Henry Fielding (Life ii.49). Johnson’s prejudice has become so 
familiar as to be axiomatic to Boswell, who recalls that  “[i]n comparing those two writers, he 
used this expression; ‘that there was as great a difference between them as between a man who 
knew how a watch was made, and a man who could tell the hour by looking on the dial-plate’” 
(Life ii.49). Boswell contains Johnson’s self by reducing Johnson’s aesthetic to a single, 
manageable assertion that he can overwrite on its own analogical terms: “I cannot help being of 
the opinion, that the neat watches of Fielding are as well constructed as the large clocks of 
Richardson, and that his dial-plates are brighter” (Life ii.49). Boswell’s intrusive commentary 
seems at odds with the original purview of his project. His response to and interpretation of 
Johnson, however, serve to further define what should be considered Johnsonian.  
First, the contrast between Boswell’s answer and the “Johnsonian” one highlights the 
schema Boswell has established: Boswell, as autobiographical counterpoint, clarifies the 
biographical Johnson, who remains the locus of scientific truth, a pattern Watson and Holmes 
will re-enact some 100 years later. Second, Boswell’s answer repeats Johnson’s opinion for 
interpretation by a larger reading audience. Boswell not only articulates his own tastes against 
Johnson’s, but he sets public taste in contrast with “Johnson’s excessive and unaccountable 
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depreciation of one of the best writers that England has produced,” since “‘Tom Jones’ has stood 
the test of publick opinion” (Life ii.175). Such personal, interpretive commentary on the part of 
the biographer often follows a dialog or anecdote. Boswell, an intimate interlocutor for Johnson, 
moves the personal Johnson back into the public realm, subject to public observation and 
consideration.  
The premise of Boswell’s biographical approach, “that minute particulars are frequently 
characteristick,” obligates him not only to organize Johnson for interpretation, but also to train 
the public in how it should interpret the man, as he set out to do in the biographical experiment 
of his Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides (Life i.33).
71
 Boswell is most directly instructive about 
how Johnson should be read when he inserts his autobiographical accounts into the Life. Boswell 
critiques Tom Davies’ attempt “in a bald manner” at a bon mot he himself witnessed in Davies’ 
shop: Boswell recalls that Davies “made . . . [him] say, ‘I was born in Scotland,’ instead of ‘I 
come from Scotland;’ so that Johnson saying, ‘That, Sir, is what a great many of your 
countrymen cannot help,’ had no point, or even meaning: and that upon this being mentioned to 
Mr. Fitzherbert, he observed, ‘It is not every man that can carry a bon mot” (Life ii.350-1). The 
contrast Boswell carefully emphasizes between Davies’ and Johnson’s delivery of the bon mot 
demonstrates the linguistic and sarcastic facility Johnson makes plain in his first encounter with 
Boswell.
72
 The vagueness of Boswell’s demonstrative “this” suggests two possible antecedents: 
in the immediate context of the anecdote, “this” refers to the contrast between Davies’ and 
Johnson’s ability to carry a bon mot; in the larger context of biography, “this” refers to Boswell’s 
and Davie’s retellings of Boswell’s first encounter with Johnson, which puts each man in the 
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 At the outset of the biography, Boswell positions his interpretation of Johnson as corrective to the “literary 
gossiping” of Sir John Hawkins’ and Hester Piozzi’s earlier interpretations (Life i.26-8). 
72
 To emphasize his own credibility as Johnson’s biographer, Boswell cites, Mr. Fitzherbert, who “observed, ‘It is 
not every man that can carry a bon mot’” (Life ii.350). 
225 
 
position to deliver Johnson’s bon mot convincingly. Thus the comment serves both to stress 
Johnson’s selfhood, particularly as Boswell’s schema represents it, and to show that Boswell’s 
capacity for recollection on this autobiographical matter authorizes him to organize Johnson’s 
self. His interventions as an interlocutor are not merely a retelling, but rather an arrangement of 
Johnson that makes him more observable and more sympathetic.   
 
Composing Johnson’s Selfhood Intimately  
 Coming as it did at the end of the century, Boswell’s biography directly inherited the 
criteria for biographical arrangement shaped by the emergence of the form earlier in the 
eighteenth century with precedents like Johnson’s life of Savage or Goldsmith’s biography of 
Nash, but it went further. Boswell’s epistolary, paratextual, and interpretive rhetorical 
arrangement develops a fuller, more accurate, view of Johnson that Boswell promises from the 
outset. The selfhood he portrays allows “readers to become better acquainted with him than even 
most of those were who actually knew him” from a sympathetic perspective of Johnson’s 
experience (Life i.29). Boswell’s longtime friend, the Reverend William Johnson Temple, 
congratulated the biographer on his accomplishment: “[p]erhaps no man was ever so perfectly 
painted as you have painted your hero. You have given us him in every point of view and 
exhibited him under every shade and under every colour. We think we see him and hear him and 
are equally entertained whether he contend for Truth or for Victory” (Correspondence 328). 
Temple’s compliment takes for granted or, at least, makes no mention of Boswell’s table of 
contents, marginal glosses, or footnotes, but rather focuses on the depth and fullness of “every 
shade” and “every colour” with which Boswell “perfectly painted” his representation of Johnson.  
226 
 
To fashion Johnson’s experience into a life that readers can observe and engage with as 
though they “think they see Johnson and hear him,” Boswell adopts a proto-psychological 
approach. His more empirically-scientific, documentary record supports this illusion of 
psychological depth that seeks to explore Johnson’s selfhood more intimately. In order to create 
the “points of view” that Temple praises for making the Johnson of the Life visible and audible 
for readers, however, Boswell cannot depend simply on his variety of source material or the 
paratextual methods. Instead, Boswell must employ two additional, structural interventions that 
allow the reader to better observe Johnson’s character. First, Boswell also creates a matrix of 
character traits in order to connect different points of Johnson’s character across the Life. Second 
and more famously, Boswell includes Johnson’s conversation, relaying it like a script that invites 
the reader to view Johnson’s talk as an intimate performance with Johnson’s personal 
acquaintance.  
Since it informs the memorable events and anecdotes that comprise much of Johnson’s 
life, this character matrix blends in to the narrative trajectory of the Life. It organically bridges 
disparate events and seemingly irreconcilable comments than the superimposed textual and 
paratextual apparatus of Boswell’s biographical arrangement.  The character matrix consists of a 
set of ten psychological traits—Boswell refers to them in the Life with proto-psychological terms 
such as “qualities” (iv.426), “spirit,” “temper,” “powers of the mind” (i.39)—that manifest 
themselves to varying strengths depending on their context, in relation to each other or to the 
events of Johnson’s life. These set of ten traits give an empirical orientation to Boswell’s 
unquantifiable notions of “spirit,” “temper,” and “powers.” The character matrix has a scientific 
sense of accuracy.  
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For Boswell’s readers, it also conveys a slight, fleeting sense of familiarity. Boswell’s 
systemization of his subject’s character is novel. In the biographical tradition of the eighteenth-
century, the standard for systemizing treatments of the author’s life was Johnson’s. Boswell 
situated his system of establishing a character matrix in Johnson’s childhood and adolescence. 
Jack Lynch argues that, prior to Boswell, Johnson’s biography evinced a system focused on the 
early years of an author’s life, characterized by its treatment of childhood, education and its 
specific circumstances, and proof of future literary promise (137-8). Lynch argues that this 
system of self is the “‘signature’ of Johnsonian biography” and evident in the majors 
biographical treatments of Johnson’s own life by Piozzi, Hawkins, and Boswell (140). He points 
out that Johnson’s “contribution has gone largely unremarked . . . because we . . . are heirs to 
Johnson’s conception about what is important in an early life . . . [and] in some of the ways in 
which lives formed characters” (141). Modern biography’s debt to Johnson’s biographical 
methodology is the degree to which it can be taken for granted. Lynch argues, however, that 
Boswell recognized the predominance of the Johnsonian biographical standard:  “Boswell would 
have felt the originality of . . . more acutely than we do today.” (141). The crucial difference 
between the categories Lynch attributes to Johnson’s biographies and that Boswell structured in 
the Life is Johnson’s focus on external circumstances that can be objectively observed. Boswell, 
well aware of Johnson’s innovations to the form, departs from this focus by putting Johnson’s 
interiority into objective view for sympathetic engagement.   
The interiority that Boswell arranges into a character matrix is made up of ten traits 
begin, first, with Johnson’s melancholic “general sensation of gloomy wretchedness” (Life i.35); 
his devotion to Christianity and general piety (38); his famous, “jealous independence of spirit 
and impetuosity of temper” (39); “the power of his memory” (39); his literary ambition and 
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precocity (40); his definitive physical attributes that threatened to deform his powers of 
observation (41-3);
73
 his love of learning (43-6); his intellectual “superiority” (47-8); his “great 
ambition to excel” (48), and an alienation that would drive him to be sociable with a younger set 
throughout his life (48-9). Boswell uses these traits to create a matrix within which he can situate 
and interpret the facts of Johnson’s life.  To complement the character matrix, the intimacy of 
observing such conversations puts readers in conversation (often through Boswell’s eyes) with 
the major cultural topics of the day inundating them with Johnson’s opinion, which has the effect 
of having “Johnsonised the land” as Boswell exults in the second edition of the biography (Life 
i.13). This character matrix and the depiction of private conversation develop a more intimate 
print selfhood through which readers like Temple can feel like they know Johnson personally 
and find themselves “equally entertained whether Johnson contends for truth or victory” and 
equally instructed. 
Near the close of the Life, Boswell acknowledges the biographer’s burden, the task of 
connecting experiences and reconciling the many facets of the self. The challenge that Boswell 
faces is reconciling oppositions: “[m]an is, in general, made up of contradictory qualities; and 
these will ever shew themselves in strange succession, where a consistency in appearance at 
least, if not in reality, has not been attained by long habits of philosophical discipline. In 
proportion to the native vigour of the mind, the contradictory qualities will be the more 
prominent, and more difficult to be adjusted” (Life iv.426). The strong “native vigor” of 
Johnson’s mind resulted in stronger “contradictions” that could more contradictory for their 
inability to “adjust” to each other. Quite unlike the figures in character writing from the 
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 Johnson’s ungainly figure and tendency to mutter to himself led William Hogarth, who “perceived a person 
standing at a window in the room, shaking his head, and rolling himself in a strange ridiculous manner” in response 
to a conversation in the main part of the room and consequently “concluded that he was an ideot” (Life i.146-7). 
Hogarth misjudged Johnson’s character, when the person he supposed to be an “ideot” “stalked forwards . . . [and] 
displayed such a power of eloquence, that Hogarth looked at him with astonishment” (Life i.147). 
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Spectator, Rambler, or even Goldsmith’s Nash who exhibit at most a few unique, overriding 
character traits manifest in all of other their actions and sayings, Johnson was full of 
“contradictory qualities.” His departure from early models of life writing, Boswell claims, more 
accurately reflects the tendency in “human nature” to embody contradiction (Life iv.426). The 
character matrix Boswell establishes provides a complex, Lockean framework that gives 
Johnson’s selfhood continuity over time and throughout different places, even though the mass 
of materials he collected for the Life show disparate aspects of Johnson’s character. Johnson, at 
“different times, . . . seemed to be a different man, in some respects; not, however, in any great 
or essential article upon which he had fully employed his mind, and settled certain principles of 
duty, but only in his manners, and in the display of argument and fancy in his talk” (iv.426). 
Although Boswell downplays the degree of inconsistency evident in Johnson’s character at the 
end of the Life, he takes pains throughout to distinguish between moments that are distinctly 
Johnsonian and moments that, though aberrant, are becoming of Johnson’s print person.  
The matrix of character traits establishes the traits that are characteristically Johnsonian 
so that occasional incongruities add depth to Johnson’s representation and balance Johnson’s 
selfhood as a more organic, entire life. By arranging the dominant attributes of Johnson’s 
character and giving attention to their incongruity, Boswell puts his readers in a position to read 
Johnson’s life more sympathetically than would be possible through epistolary evidence or 
paratextual apparatus alone. It is a representational move from the disparate, public character 
toward the more intimate qualities of Johnson. Rhetorically, it invites Boswell’s readers to make 
didactic reconciliations of the contradictions in Johnson’s character at “different times” in the 
Life, when he “seemed to be a different man.”  
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Boswell’s specific, proto-psychological traits also create a matrix outside of the 
chronological structure of the biography. Boswell first gives an account of his empirical 
methodology to justify his inclusion of the personal and private details of Johnson’s life he 
relates. In the section of the Life spanning the sixteen years from Johnson’s birth in 1709 to 
1725, Boswell locates ten specific traits that he traces throughout the events of Johnson’s life and 
conversation. These traits reveal the perpetuity of a recognizable self-consciousness, which 
readers come to identify as characteristically Johnsonian as the Life progressed. In establishing 
the matrix of traits from the outset, Boswell creates a baseline to which he can return throughout 
the course of the biography to lend continuity to Johnson’s varied actions, sayings, and 
behaviors. The most productive traits to examine in context are the three that predominate the 
Life: Johnson’s melancholic tendency, his fervent religiosity, and his love of learning. In the 
context of each other, these character traits demonstrate how Boswell arranges a consistent self 
for Johnson, even though he is not always consistently religious, melancholic, or studious.   
The first foundational character trait Boswell locates as a marker of Johnson’s later life is 
the melancholic disposition Johnson acquired from his father, Michael Johnson (Life i.35). It 
would make an appearance in as the “constitutional indolence” that halted his work on 
translating A Voyage to Abyssinia and in his account of his lifelong madness to the Lady McLeod 
when traveling to the Hebrides with Boswell (Life i.87, v.215). Evident in Boswell’s choice to 
prioritize Johnson’s melancholy is an indication of a normative cultural value, one of the 
predominant character types of the day: the melancholic genius. Boswell associates Johnson with 
a popular contemporary text on melancholy by Dr. George Cheyne, The English Malady, which 
Johnson twice recommended Boswell read in order to treat his own melancholic tendencies (Life 
i.65). Clark Lawlor’s anachronistic examination of melancholy’s cultural implications 
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throughout the eighteenth century notes that Johnson “had a clear sense of himself as more 
grievously affected than the majority of depressives,” which gave him a literary and artistic 
advantage in the culture” (41). In attaching this character trait to Johnson foremost, Boswell 
locates a dominant characteristic of Johnson to which all of the character traits were subject to 
varying degrees: “To Boswell . . . Johnson’s malady was not a threat to his overall sanity, and 
possibly part of his genius . . . Depressives are often credited with extraordinary abilities, 
especially creative genius” (Lawlor 42). By foregrounding this trait and its implications for 
Johnson’s selfhood, Boswell establishes a frame for Johnson, the sort of genius embodied by and 
evident in the actions of a social philosopher, critic, and author. The “grievous affect,” likewise, 
casts Johnson’s selfhood in more recognizable and ready sympathetic relationship to the reader.  
A characteristic melancholy is fundamental to any representation of Johnson’s character 
in Boswell’s arrangement. At the end of the Life, Boswell blames Johnson’s melancholy for his 
“sallies of impatience and passion at any time . . . and allowance must be made for his uttering 
hasty and satirical sallies, even against his best friends” (Life iv.427). Throughout the Life, 
however, Johnson’s melancholy plays different roles. In 1729 when he was twenty, Johnson’s 
melancholy drew toward a Lockean reflexivity: “upon the first violent attack of this disorder, 
strove to overcome it by forcible exertions. He frequently walked . . . and tried many other 
expedients, but all in vain,” and Boswell notes that “[h]is expression concerning it to me was, ‘I 
did not then know how to manage it’” (Life i.64). For Johnson, melancholy requires a degree of 
introspective self-management that defines selfhood. Boswell describes Johnson’s treatment as a 
means of self-management. He drafted a diagnosis of his mental state in Latin so thorough that it 
impressed a doctor of his acquaintance (Life i.65). Not only does Johnson’s melancholy shape 
the man, but it also allows the man to shape himself: scientifically, through self-observation, 
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experimentation, and self-diagnosis, Johnson’s selfhood is given definition by the melancholic 
character Boswell assigns. 
The melancholy that Boswell attributes to Johnson did not only direct his attention 
inward, as a means of self-definition, but also directed his attention outward, as Johnson makes 
plain in his advice to Boswell, advice that he cites from Robert Burton.
74
 In letter dated October 
27, 1779, Johnson enjoins Boswell to follow the “great direction which Burton has left to men 
disordered like you . . . Be not solitary; be not idle: which I would thus modify;—If you are idle, 
be not solitary; if you are solitary, be not idle” in order to “keep away the black dog that worries 
you at home” (Life iii.414). Likewise, he advises Boswell to “[f]ix your thoughts upon your 
business, fill your intervals with company, and sunshine will again break on your mind” (Life 
ii.423). Each piece of advice assumes that melancholy is a trait that does not bind Johnson in the 
static, deterministic manner that Theophrastan characters are bound by a single trait. The 
expectations readers had for Theophrastan character or their contemporary, periodical essays, 
assigned a particular character trait to a persona, not to psychologize a character trait, but rather 
to humanize it, as Oliver Goldsmith humanizes the public reputation of Richard Nash in his 
biography, turning his characteristic affectation into the character of the king. J. W. Smeed 
explains that, in these constructions, the external attribute the traditional character type exhibits 
gives indication of and insight into what it means to be driven by a singular character attribute 
(4). Unlike character writing that assigns a single, definitive characteristic to a particular 
character, biographical writing depends on a complex arrangement of the characteristics most 
definitive of a self. For the biographer, a singular character trait can lend definition and 
continuity to a rhetoric of self, in part like the Lockean definition of the self—the perpetuation of 
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 Johnson once acknowledged to Boswell that “Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy . . . was the only book that ever 
took him out of bed two hours sooner than he wished to rise” (Life ii.121). 
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self-consciousness. But Locke’s definition requires a self-consciousness and the characteristics 
that mark it to persist over time, whereas the character of Theophrastan character writing of the 
short, eighteenth-century periodical piece exists situationally. In the matrix that Boswell 
establishes, a set of character traits create a context that lasts over the course of Johnson’s life. 
Johnson’s melancholy, by contrast, is a trait that is part of a matrix, which invites a 
dynamic response from Johnson’s selfhood. He is not definitively melancholic, but he has been 
melancholic; he is affected by his melancholy, but he knows how to counter it and ultimately to 
balance it. The advice Johnson offers Boswell reveals the intervention of another of the ten traits, 
Johnson’s love to study (Life i.43-6). By showing Johnson applying studiousness to resolve 
melancholy, Boswell creates a context that invites a reader to draw conclusions about Johnson 
that inform their own understanding of themselves, their own characteristics in flux in relation to 
each other and the larger context of the Life. Rhetorically, Boswell’s arrangement juxtaposes 
traits that frame Johnson’s selfhood, even though their juxtaposition is not chronological. In 
Boswell’s Johnson, the reader sees the “human nature” that Boswell ascribes to the fundamental 
contradiction in selfhood. A view of the contradictions marks an increasingly modern, 
psychological sense of self that sets Boswell’s apart from the eighteenth-century precedents.  
Johnson’s suggestion for treating melancholy gives his characteristic melancholy a 
different context in relation to the other ten traits Boswell establishes at the outset of the 
biography, Johnson’s impulse toward education and learning (Life i.43-6). This attribute 
becomes evident in Johnson’s love of study even as a young man, ranging from teachers like 
Dame Oliver, who once gave Johnson “a present of gingerbread” and told him that he “was the 
best scholar she ever had” to teachers like Mr. Hawkins, “a man . . . very skillful in his little 
way,” or Mr. Hunter, the headmaster who, as Johnson later recalls, “beat us unmercifully; and he 
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did not distinguish between ignorance and negligence” (Life i.42, 43). As a contrast to Johnson’s 
later love of learning, these recollections might seem unremarkable, but their import lies in the 
significance Boswell assigns them in order to establish the character trait in Johnson. The value 
Johnson places on learning endures the range of contexts in which it occurs early in his life, such 
that he later asserts that the overly-strict discipline of Mr. Hunter made his great learning 
possible: he comments “[m]y master whipt me very well. Without that, Sir, I should have done 
nothing” (Life i.45-6). This combination of study and adversity lends itself as a natural check to 
Johnson’s melancholy, revealing his selfhood as something located between both.  
Within this character matrix between melancholy and study, melancholy becomes an 
adversity that can be addressed by study, since “a boy at school was the happiest of human 
beings” (Life i.451). The study itself, he suggests, is less important than the quality of being 
studious: a person troubled by “constitutional melancholy” should, according to Johnson, “take a 
course of chymistry, or a course of rope-dancing, or a course of any thing to which he is inclined 
at the time. Let him contrive to have as many retreats for his mind as he can, as many things to 
which it can fly from itself” (Life ii.440). Two qualities of the ten Boswell establishes set in 
context with one another rings of Goldsmith’s Nash—is Beau Nash to be remembered or 
understood as the leading fop of Bath or as its feckless, foolish monarch? Does Boswell mean for 
Johnson to be a glowering depressive or a distracted scholar or simply a bit of both? The 
character matrix Boswell sets up at the outset of the life, however, introduces other 
considerations that complicate a reader’s understanding of Johnson’s selfhood, which challenge 
the reader to draw hard conclusions from indeterminate facts. Boswell shows Johnson’s 
constitutional melancholy as trait checked but, ironically, complemented by Johnson’s 
religiosity, a quality that Boswell ascribes to Johnson’s mother, to whom “must be ascribed those 
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early impressions of religion . . . from which the world afterwards derived so much benefit” (Life 
i.38). The public benefit of Johnson’s religious character for the “world” is evident in his 
writings—Boswell, after all, reads the Rambler as work of great moral and religious acumen—
but is especially evident in Johnson’s personal meditations and prayers, documents in which 
Boswell situates Johnson’s piety.  
Boswell cites almost twenty prayers that Johnson recorded in his personal Prayers and 
Meditations throughout the Life. He notes that at the outset of 1777, for instance, “Johnson 
suffered much from a state of mind ‘unsettled and perplexed,’ and from that constitutional 
gloom,” even though Boswell suggests that “Johnson . . . at this time suffered less than usual 
from despondency” (Life v.98 and n. 1). He cites a prayer Johnson composed on Easter that year:  
“Defend me from the violent incursion of evil thoughts, and enable me to form and keep 
resolutions as may conduce to the discharge of duties which Providence shall appoint me, and so 
help me by thy Holy Spirit, that my heart may sure there be fixed where true joys are to be 
found, and that I may serve Thee with pure affection and a cheerful mind” (Johnson, Diaries 
265). Boswell cites this prayer to demonstrate an instance of Johnson’s piety: Johnson’s prayer 
indicates a religious character that is both humble and dutiful. But it also indicates his selfhood 
most clearly within the matrix created by the conflict between two different character traits that 
Boswell has established to frame Johnson. The humility and duty that mark Johnson’s piety 
provide a check to melancholy and its “violent incursion of evil thoughts.” The character that 
Boswell ascribes to his Johnson is not merely the speculative, but rather the practical moralist, 
who applies belief to the challenges his life and selfhood present. 
As a check to his melancholy, Johnson’s religiosity paradoxically exacerbates it. Boswell 
locates Johnson’s print character in the tension between these traits. Boswell lumps together a 
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list of Johnson’s religious meditations in December 1784 of the Life, a month before Johnson’s 
death, to illustrate the dual roles that religiosity played in defining Johnson’s character, both the 
“distress of mind” and the “penitence of Johnson . . . in his devout approaches to his Maker” 
(Life iv.398). At various points in his life, Johnson had prayed “that I may not have been created 
to be finally destroyed” and that God “[g]ive me such a sense of my own wickedness as may 
produce true contrition and effectual repentance” (Life iv.397). Johnson’s prayers illustrate a 
cycle in which he abrades his conscience with a heightened sense of his own wrongdoing 
towards a particular notion of Christian repentance that requires a sincere and often severe self-
examination in order to beg forgiveness for all of the sins he observed. Johnson invests this 
anxiety over a “true contrition and effectual repentance” during life “so that when I shall be 
called into another state, I may be received among the sinners to whom sorrow and reformation 
have obtained pardon” (Life iv.397-8). The fear of death and the hope of “pardon” drive this 
cycle of religious thinking which offers a sense of solace, particularly to melancholic reflections, 
balanced by a constant anxiety that, paradoxically, drives melancholic reflection. Katherine 
Kickel examines the formulaic practices that Johnson evokes in his prayers and mediations, 
noting how his prayer and meditation evolves from stricter Catholic and Anglican meditative 
models to practices more suited to his selfhood: “[f]or Johnson, meditation is a self-sustaining, 
self-consolatory tool as much as it is a rigorous, discursive self-examination . . . [that] allows him 
to take leave of himself by reminding him of the unknowableness of God’s plan and by 
subsuming him in the notion of Providence.” (53). Johnson must dwell intensely on his 
shortcomings and failures in order take leave of itself and find consolation in religiosity. It is a 
“meditative method” that depends on “sympathetic and psychological models” which are 
“extemporaneous, intimate, and consolatory” (Kickle 54). The meditative process situates 
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Johnson’s selfhood at the intersection of what must be a melancholic self-examination and its 
religious check. Such intersections typify the selfhood that Boswell situates in the complex 
matrix of ten character traits that he establishes for Johnson and indicate a Lockean self-
reflexiveness mediated through documented reflections, to which Johnson can return for future 
self-reflection.   
While he does locate Johnson’s selfhood within the matrix of character attributes he 
assigns to Johnson at the outset of the Life, Boswell qualifies their expression. Johnson’s 
melancholy and religiosity play against each other, given to a variable, flexible exertion rather 
than the deterministic treatment of character in older forms of life writing. While Boswell often 
locates instances of Johnson’s religiosity, he is quick to note when Johnson’s strict practice 
failed. He cites a list Johnson proposed in his Prayers and Meditations in order to improve 
himself and “form a scheme of life” that might correct his mistake in “[h]aving lived hitherto in 
perpetual neglect of publick worship & though for some years past not without a habitual 
reverence for the Sabbath yet without that attention to its religious duties which Christianity 
requires” (Diaries 56). Yet Boswell heads Johnson’s list for religious improvement with 
Johnson’s last comment following the list: “[t]his study was not pursued” (Life i.303). Somewhat 
later in the life, Boswell also notes that Johnson sought to make a “change of outward things” 
and prayed, “[g]rant me the grace of thy Holy Spirit, that the course which I am not beginning 
may proceed according to thy laws, and end in the enjoyment of thy favor,” but in the end, “did 
not, in fact, make any external or visible change” (Life i.350).75 Boswell locates Johnson’s 
selfhood within these instances of his piety, and also demonstrates that Johnson’s selfhood is not 
                                                 
75
 Editor George Birkbeck Hill traces what Boswell could not discern, concluding that the change Johnson sought 
was in his economy—Johnson had incurred some debt that required him to move and write in order to cover his 
expenses (Life i.350 n.3). Though Johnson’s problem might seem more secular than religious, it is more significant 
that Johnson appealed to his faith in helping to resolve his financial complications. Boswell’s observation prioritizes 
this impulse over its application to finances.   
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rigidly attached or defined by a unique character trait. Johnson’s selfhood is clarified by his 
religiosity not because of his perfect piety but in his ultimate failure to adhere to the goals he 
established for himself and his practice of religion. He is capable of containing the religious 
character without being determined by it, as he would have been in the Theophrastan model that 
Goldsmith had adopted in relaying the life of Nash.  
The depiction of variability rather than firm resolve in Johnson’s religious character 
makes Boswell’s Johnson vulnerable to damning interpretation. Inconstancy in faith and 
religious practice would, for instance, render Johnson a hypocritical moralist, a hollow Mr. 
Rambler. Boswell is quick to acknowledge the importance of resolving this tension by the end of 
the Life, and he is “conscious that this is the most difficult and dangerous part of my work, and I 
cannot but be very anxious concerning it. I trust that I have got through it, preserving at once my 
regard to truth,—to my friend—, and to the interests of virtue and religion. Nor can I apprehend 
that more harm can ensue from the knowledge of the irregularity of Johnson, guarded as I have 
stated it” (Life iv.398). To reconcile Johnson’s “irregularity” against the “interests of virtue and 
religion,” Boswell implies the character matrix that allows different character traits to coexist 
and contradict each other to deepen and clarify Johnson’s selfhood, and he reminds the reader 
that “[i]t is of essential consequence to keep in view, that there was in this excellent man’s 
conduct no false principle of commutation, no deliberate indulgence in sin, in consideration of a 
counterbalance of duty. His offending, and his repenting, were distinct and separate” (Life 
iv.398). The tension between “offending” and “repenting” evidences an intersection between an 
“indulgence in sin” that comes naturally to Johnson rather than deliberately, as well as a self-
conscious habit of repentance that is “distinct and separate” but equally as characteristic of 
Johnson’s self. 
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The impetus to defend his Johnson against charges of inconstancy or immorality derives 
from two reasons crucial to Boswell’s biographical project. First, Boswell promises a 
methodology from the outset that will present the ten character traits at play so that Johnson’s 
selfhood is variable but also coherent, evident “from various points, by which his character is 
more fully understood and illustrated” (Life i.30). Inconstancy would undermine the productive 
tension between an authentically Johnsonian selfhood that can accommodate conflicting 
character traits, and it would suggest a singularity of character as if Boswell had reduced Johnson 
to caricature. Boswell’s defense, then, reaffirms his model and protects his Johnson against 
misreading and misattributions, so that the “character of SAMUEL JOHNSONS has, I trust, been 
so developed in the course of this work, that they who have honoured it with a perusal, may be 
considered as well acquainted with him” (Life iv.424-5). The terms Boswell sets for 
acquaintance depend on a distinct variability in character traits which readers can recognize as 
Johnsonsian, even when they are at odds with each other in Johnson’s behaviors and actions. 
Second, Boswell’s impulse to defend his method against inconstancy and immorality 
highlights how Boswell’s model fosters the reader’s intimate “acquaintance” with Johnson’s 
selfhood. It is a defense of the tension between contradictory character traits, which results in a 
didactic productivity, a Johnsonizing capability. Charges of inconstancy or immorality would 
imply an inaccuracy that would undermine the Johnsonian quality of Boswell’s rhetoric of self 
and, in turn, its didactic potential: a reader cannot locate a Johnsonian character to emulate 
without an accurate model of Johnson. In fact, the charge of inaccuracy is Boswell’s most 
damning criticism of John Hawkins and Hester Piozzi’s biographical accounts of Johnson. He 
recalls Johnson’s censure of outright falsehood, though it might seem to be harmless inaccuracy, 
in a review of the “Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope,” and he notes that if Johnson 
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“[h]ad . . . lived to read what Sir John Hawkins and Mrs. Piozzi have related concerning himself, 
how much would he have found his observation illustrated” (Life iii.229-30). The inaccuracy he 
finds in their account is tantamount to a lie, contrary to the in inconstancy and immorality, which 
threatens to mislead a reader and marks the biographers as utterly ignorant of Johnson’s 
conversation. Boswell notes that Johnson “inculcated upon all his friends the importance of 
perpetual vigilance against the slightest degrees of falsehood; the effect of which . . . has been, 
that all who were of his school are distinguished for a love of truth and accuracy” (Life iii.229-
30). As a member of Johnson’s conversational “school,” Boswell arranges a rhetoric of self more 
accurate than others, immune to charges of inconstancy and immorality. Boswell justifies the 
importance of accuracy by citing what Johnson censures outright as falsehood or inaccuracy.  
What Boswell deems Johnson’s school, the conversations among like-minded friends and 
followers with Johnson, demands that the didactic quality of Johnson’s public works meet the 
diversity of character traits that try his principles and engage the reader more intimately than 
older life writing or the biographical approaches from earlier in the eighteenth century. The 
matrix of character traits makes the morally towering, public icon Johnson a fallible human on 
whom the trials and difficulties of his constitution could nonetheless provide an arena in which 
to prove his credibility and the success of Boswell’s task of making Johnson whole. Moreover, 
Boswell’s depiction of contradictory quality of Johnson’s personal traits and flaws gives an 
intimate continuity past the simple paratextual or epistolary apparatus within which Boswell 
situates Johnson’s selfhood. Like the epistolary points of engagement, the character matrix 
invites readerly sympathy that involves them in the Johnson project, potentially “Johnsonizing” 
them. Boswell’s defense of the character matrix he presents is a defense of the distinctly 
sympathetic turn in his representation of selfhood, which invites readers to explore what could be 
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known about Johnson in order to determine what they could understand about his character and, 
sympathetically, about themselves. The didactic upshot of Boswell’s intimate representation of 
Johnson’s conversation is that readers are connected together in a larger discussion of social 
truths, the larger goal of the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self. 
 
Johnson’s School: Truth and Victory in a Conversational Locus 
The most didactic aspect of the selfhood that Boswell arranges for Johnson in the Life is 
the conversational record. It might be easy to take Boswell’s biographical approach to task for 
the disparity between his records of Johnson’s lived experience and his recounting of his own 
experiences with Johnson’s conversation, but that would be to miss the masterful dialectic he 
created. Boswell, after all, evokes the “Johnsonian æther” rather than a Johnsonian exactitude 
which “strongly impregnated” his “mind” as a biographer to shape how he would represent 
Johnson’s conversation and selfhood (Life i.421). Boswell’s biography is undeniably meticulous 
in its fact finding according to the scientific standards of observation and publication instituted 
by the Royal Society, but Boswell’s great affective accomplishment was to connect readers to 
Johnson’s character through his conversation in order to Johnsonise them. Boswell probes 
beyond the careful architecture of fact, timeframe, and proof in detail to bring readers the chance 
to commune with Johnson. Where Hawkins was too distanced and Piozzi too problematically 
chatty, Boswell surpasses these problems in a work of magisterial research to earn for himself 
and to give to his readers the right to “meet” Johnson.  
The latter twenty-one years of the Life are based more directly on Boswell’s own 
interactions with Johnson after their first encounter. In this section, chronological distinctions 
become almost irrelevant, giving way to Johnson’s conversational and literary performances. 
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After the dated precision, the conversational flow provides the rhetorical effect of arriving, 
finally, at the “real” Johnson. Boswell met Johnson in 1763 and visited him and corresponded 
with him intermittently until his death in 1784 at age 75: the bulk of Johnson’s life comprises 
roughly a fifth of Boswell’s Life. Boswell’s explanation of his method, however, balances such 
criticism against the sympathetic exchange that his biography allows between the reader and 
Johnson’s selfhood. Boswell recognizes the “the objections which may be made to the 
minuteness on some occasions of . . . [his] detail of Johnson’s conversation, and how happily it is 
adapted for the petty exercise of ridicule, by men of superficial understanding and ludicrous 
fancy” (Life i.33, 31). As a biographical method, recording “the conversation of a celebrated 
man, if his talents have been exerted in conversation, will best display his character” is empirical, 
allowing the reader to construct a character from the matrix of traits revealed through “minute 
particulars” of his speech and life (Life i. 31, 33). For this reason, Boswell occasionally 
apologizes to his audience for an imperfect recollection of Johnson’s conversation (Life iii.39).76 
But even that apology is a gesture to something more real than fact, to the experimental, 
sympathetic encounter with Johnson the man. The tension between empirical fact and affective, 
sympathetic exchange fundamentally shapes the Life.  
Given how prominent and definitive of the Life conversation proves to be, an easy 
criticism is to argue that the Life depends too much on recollection and interpretation rather than 
precise transcription that might insure accuracy and veracity.
 
From a practical perspective, John 
J. Burke, Jr. reminds that such challenges to Boswell’s precision essentially hold him 
                                                 
76
 In this instance of Boswell’s apology, he notes that since his “record upon this occasion does great injust to 
Johnson’s expression, which was forcible and brilliant, that Mr. Cradock [a participant in the conversation] 
whispered me, ‘O that his words were written in a book!’” (Life iii.39). Though Mr. Cradock is hardly a presence in 
the Life, Boswell cites his comment as a tacit endorsement of his biographical project: if a man who would be little-
remembered save for Boswell’s recollection can recognize the value of Johnson’s conversation, any reader of any 
consequence might be expected to do the same.   
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accountable to an impossible task, since perfect transcription of conversation and communicative 
gestures would be impossible (70). Likewise, Paul J. Korshin suggests as well that a strict 
attention of transcriptional accuracy did not concern early readers or the speakers who Boswell 
includes: “few if any of the people whose conversations Boswell created for the Life are known 
to have complained about their accuracy” (186). He finds a corollary in the “speeches that 
Johnson wrote for members of Parliament and which the Gentleman’s Magazine published as 
‘Debates in the Senate of Magna Lilliputia’ [which] actually happened, too, just not the way 
Johnson invented them. No members or the Lords or Commons were ever recorded as objecting 
to the invention of their speeches” (186). Korshin’s reading points to the significance of an 
appreciation for the conversation outside the pale of strict (and impossible) precision.  
Boswell subjected the Johnsonian æther to other, more didactic rules of authenticity that 
precise transcripts of conversation. William R. Siebenschuh answers such criticisms with the 
rhetorical outcome that guides Boswell’s technique. Johnson’s conversations, he demonstrates, 
“are always important in some greater context, and because their importance lies outside 
themselves in the truth about Johnson they represent. In the Life, it is Boswell’s interpretation of 
Johnson’s character that we are seeing . . . it is what he stands for, not just what he looked or 
sounded like” (Fictional 83). Korshin’s and Siebenschuh’s defenses of Boswell’s conversational 
record privilege the role of the reader in determining Boswell’s accuracy at recreating 
conversation in Johnson’s school. For the reader, the conversational practices and topics that 
become evident in Boswell’s portrayal hold more significance than a spoken exactitude in the 
ways they invite the reader to participate. 
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The school of Johnson that Boswell depicts is a discursive school, and the didactic effect 
of spectating and judging Johnson’s selfhood depends on a reader’s personal participation with 
the conversational Johnson: 
I am justified in preserving rather too many of Johnson’s sayings, than too few; 
especially as from the diversity of dispositions it cannot be known with certainty 
beforehand, whether what may seem trifling to some, and perhaps to the collector 
himself, may not be most agreeable to many; and the greater number that an 
authour can please in any degree, the more pleasure does there arise to a 
benevolent mind. (Life i.33-4) 
The “diversity of dispositions” that leads readers to take pleasure in different aspects of 
Johnson’s character, even from seemingly “trifling” sayings, emphasizes the importance that 
Boswell places on a sympathetic exchange that occurs when the reader is in the presence of 
Johnson at a conversational locus. In this sympathetic exchange between readers and Johnson’s 
character in this experience, Boswell achieves a didactic effect that William Johnson Temple 
recognizes: “We think we see him and hear him and are equally entertained whether he contend 
for Truth or for Victory” (Correspondence 328).  In these two manners of contention, for “truth” 
and for “victory,” Johnson educates the reader, who enters the intimate circle of Johnson’s 
conversational acquaintance. First, in talking for victory, Johnson exhibits a conversational 
model that emphasizes victory as, most important, thinking, reasoning, and arguing for oneself. 
The model depends on a specific set of values that Boswell records in the conversation:  it is 
intimate, so that spectating readers can engage Johnson’s print person; it is substantive, ripe for 
inquiry and contention, developing the strength of argument necessary for participation; it is 
open to different perspectives, which invites voices to participate; and it depends on civility. 
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Second, in speaking for truth, he invites them to apply the lessons they learn in arguing for 
victory to evaluate Johnson’s own evaluations as a member of the larger public. The intimate 
conversation that frames talking for victory builds toward participation in larger public 
discourses surrounding truth. The conversational model works like the reading habits of private 
reader who, through reading, becomes part of a larger, discursive community of readers. Thus 
Boswell advances the eighteenth-century biographical process established by Johnson and 
Goldsmith, developing their spectatorial model and didactic impetus into a more intimate, more 
engaging, and more truthful representation of selfhood in print. Simply put, Boswell makes the 
process of biographical didacticism more intimate by portraying a talking Johnson who speaks 
with and to the reader. 
The effectiveness of Boswell’s didacticism depends on the degree that his biography can 
close the distance between this observing audience and the Johnson of the Life. Boswell’s 
obligation to this methodological imperative is evident in a manuscript
77
 where he notes that 
“[w]e cannot help receiving other peoples [sic] thoughts with whom we are brought near enough 
to communicate either in conversation or by reading what they write no more than we can help 
inhaling breath which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company . . . We must 
receive other peoples [sic] thoughts both crude & well digested” (Boswell ms. 69.3). His 
representation must put readers “near enough” to Johnson to incorporate Johnson’s character into 
their own, by “inhaling” his character, “receiving” it, “digesting” it and ultimately, coming to 
think it for themselves. Boswell’s composition of his Johnson and its arrangement allow readers 
not only to spectate the selfhood, but especially to internalize it and be “Johnsonised” by it (Life 
i.13). Boswell closes the distance between the spectating reader and the biographical character 
matrix in which Johnson’s selfhood can be discovered by setting the reader in Johnson’s 
                                                 
77
 I have cited manuscript ms. M 69:3 previously on page 204 of this dissertation. 
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presence, a position that has to be earned and that only takes on its power through the empirical 
scaffolding of the Life.  
Methodologically, Boswell faces a biographical paradox of maintaining continuity 
through diverse conversational contexts: over drinks and dinner at Johnson’s favorite pub, the 
Mitre, or in Johnson’s sitting room at his home, and in the sitting room at Tom Davies’ shop, or 
in Henry Thrale’s drawing room, as well as other locations. Siebenschuh has linked Boswell’s 
recollection of these physical sites as memory markers, tricks he used to make a mental note of 
what he would add to his journals and, in revision, to the Life, noting that “Johnsonian episodes” 
are framed by “Boswell’s habitual method of minimally anchoring . . . substantial conversations . 
. . in space and time,” but also by associating “familiar small group[s of] particular people . . . 
with points of view and conversational topics habitual to them” (“Crop” 101, 102). Boswell’s 
scanty attention to location and his translation of speakers into conversational topics emphasizes 
the conversational focus of the episodes and gives them a continuity that is more accessible for 
readers who could only participate in the conversations biographically, slipping in and out of the 
exchanges, since they cannot meet Johnson face-to-face through print. More significant is the 
“illusion. . . throughout the biographical story” which William C. Dowling recognizes: “that the 
Life includes its imaginary audience in the conversational scenes, that the audience is present . . . 
[n]ot physically present . . . but present within the sphere of consciousness registering and 
responding to Johnson’s conversation” (Logos 101). By reading the drama of Johnson’s 
conversation rather than simply witnessing it, readers can imagine themselves as part of the 
conversation, inserting themselves somewhat voyeuristically, “enabled as it were to see him live, 
and to ‘live o’er each scene’ with him, as he actually advanced through the several stages of life” 
(Life i.30). The role Boswell casts for his readers is participatory, albeit imagined. 
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Not only does Boswell’s task lead him to present a Johnson who can engage the reader in 
conversation, but also to fictionalize a reader who can participate through observation and 
conversation with that biographical Johnson. Walter Ong has suggested that “[i]f the writer 
succeeds in writing, it is generally because he can fictionalize in his imagination an audience that 
he has learned to know not from daily life but from earlier writers who were fictionalizing in 
their imagination audiences they had learned to know in still earlier writers” (Interfaces 60). The 
reader’s role that Boswell scripts through conversations with Johnson is the role of actor, and he 
outlines an actor’s role or profession in three essays he published anonymously in the London 
Magazine fourteen years before Johnson’s death in 1784. In the second essay of this series, 
Boswell interrogates the way in which actors can be the characters they play while still being 
themselves, noting that  “[i]t is sure not only an object of taste to study theatrical representations, 
but it may be a matter of very curious philosophical enquiry. What is the nature of that peculiar 
faculty which makes one a good player? It is something more than an imitative art” 
(“Profession” 468). Boswell is taking up the questions that John Locke poses in Book II of An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, whether the integrity of the self, a consciousness 
aware of itself over time, persists in sleep when it is unconscious of its waking self (2.1.12-25). 
Boswell’s focus, however, is on a theatrical self-awareness which can adopt another self while 
simultaneously keeping actual selfhood in reserve. This “peculiar faculty” is much “more than an 
imitative art.”  
In theorizing the role of the player, Boswell imagines the reader in a much more intimate 
role than the distant spectating of earlier biography and older print selves. He suggests that “the 
nature of that mysterious power by which a player really is the character which he represents,” 
even though the player maintains the true self, is “a kind of double feeling. He must assume in a 
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strong degree the character which he represents, while at the same time retains the consciousness 
of his own character” (“Profession” 469). In order for this “double feeling” to function, the 
player “must take full possession as it were of the antichamber of his mind, while his own 
character remains in the innermost recess” (“Profession” 470). While Boswell locates this 
function in the profession of a player, he is quick to note that it is a regular part of everyday life, 
manifesting itself anytime a person must take part in a birthday celebration, tour a person’s 
home, or attend a funeral (“Profession” 470). This double feeling then, like Smith’s sympathetic 
exchange, hinges on some sense of social obligation and of shaping selfhood to match social 
situations. Boswell’s biographical conversation casts the reader in the role of a participant, and 
the reader, in turn, acts out the role, while maintaining self-awareness through this “double 
feeling.” The reader observes Johnson’s print selfhood, following the expectations of earlier 
eighteenth-century biographers, but Boswell makes them participants in the episodic drama of 
Johnson’s conversation. Dialogue is crucial to this process, in which the reader imagines him or 
herself in conversation with Johnson through Boswell, theatrical double-agent. 
The intimacy of conversation positions the reader didactically to follow Johnson in his 
reasoning, like a friend or a member of the Literary Club.
78
 Johnson’s conversation allows 
intimate access to the selfhood Boswell presents. When Johnson talks for truth and for victory, 
he impresses his selfhood upon the reader, a fictionalized acquaintance and spectator, who is 
“brought near enough to communicate either in conversation or by reading” and, through the 
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 Boswell’s contemporary, William Elford praised Boswell’s conversational  representation: “instead of describing 
Your characters, You exhibit them to the Reader. He finds himself in their Company, and becomes an Auditor of 
Conversations, which have all the dignity of the best moral writings, softn’d by the ease, the wit and the familiarity 
of Colloloquial manners” (Correspondence 367). To be a reader is be an auditor, a participant who engages the ideas 
that Johnson expresses with the easy “familiarity of colloquial manners.: Paul J. Korshin has suggested that 
instances of “true Johnsonian conversation . . . represent a minority, a very small minority of Johnson’s talk” in the 
Life, noting that he has “counted about fifty of them in all” (177). John J. Burke has divided Boswell’s records of 
conversation into three types, talk, dialog, and conversation, delineating each by how much they invite discourse and 
by how many they invite to participate (66). Each type allows readers varying degrees of intimate access to Johnson. 
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force, eloquence, and reasonableness of Johnson’s conversation, cannot “help inhaling breath 
which has been in the lungs of those with whom we are in company” (Boswell ms. 69.3). 
Johnson’s intimate conversational “breath,” which the reader “inhales” by participation, is least 
“crude” and most “well digested” when Johnson talks for victory or for truth. Johnson models a 
thought process that teaches readers to reason socially and morally and introduces social and 
moral issues into the conversational discourse that moves beyond the pale of personal, around-
the-table dispute into a larger social discourse. By engaging his Johnson and his readers through 
conversation, Boswell effects a larger social and ethical training; he Johnsonizes the land.  
  The conversational locus around which Boswell places his readers and in which Johnson 
can talk for victory has several telling features. Johnson famously draws a distinction between 
conversation and mundane talk when he recalls a dinner “in a very pretty company” in which 
they “had talk enough, but no conversation; there was nothing discussed” (Life iv.186). The 
conversation that Johnson prized and that Boswell opened to readers for their instruction was 
elevated above common “talk” as a thorough treatment of substantive topics by able minds. Such 
a discursive model required four attributes on the part of the participant: 
Talking of conversation . . . [Johnson] said, “There must, in the first place, be 
knowledge, there must be materials; in the second place, there must be a 
command of words; in the third place, there must be imagination, to place things 
in such views as they are not commonly seen in; and in the fourth place, there 
must be presence of mind, and a resolution that is not be overcome by failures: 
this last is an essential requisite; for want of it many people do not excel in 
conversation. (Life iv.166). 
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The attributes that Johnson assigns to the participant correlate to the attributes of Boswell’s 
readers. The biography makes readers more than spectators. They are silent participants in a 
Johnsonian conversation who must bring their own knowledge to bear on the discussions that 
Boswell portrays, who can follow the intellectual articulation and rhetorical structuring of the 
arguments, who can imagine alternatives to the argument that allow reflection, and who can 
persist in following the lines of biographically documented and personally constructed argument, 
perhaps to victorious disputation.  
Although these skills seem situational, Boswell’s representation of Johnson show them to 
fundamental to the practices of self-examination and self-awareness that, upon engaging another 
person’s selfhood, makes sympathy didactic. Readers must be able to engage the discursive 
model in the biography with the same facility they would approach the conversations in 
Johnson’s presence. For the four rules that Johnson establishes to guide conversation, 
participants must embody traits: first, conversationalists must be knowledgeable; second, they 
must be willing to adopt and consider contrary viewpoints disinterestedly; and, third, the adept 
conversationalist who engage Johnson must be civil. Speakers who learn converse at Johnson’s 
elbow teach themselves to participate in larger social discourses of the day. They not only talk 
for local, conversational victories, but especially to talk for larger social truth within a 
conversational discourse that requires personal knowledge, personal disinterest, and civility to 
address and answer the larger social questions of the day. 
 The importance of knowledge and discernment are necessary for engaging the 
conversation. And the necessity is best exemplified in Johnson’s relationship with two of the 
Literary Club’s members, Edmund Burke and Oliver Goldsmith. Johnson praises Burke who 
comes into the biographical account slightly more than Goldsmith, but much less conspicuously: 
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“[t]hat fellow calls forth all my powers. Were I to see Burke now, it would kill me,” pointing out 
that a conversationalist could “[t]ake up whatever topick . . . [and] he is ready to meet you” (Life 
iv.19-20, ii.450). Burke has the knowledge, rhetorical ability, imagination, and tenacity to 
challenge Johnson. Goldsmith, on the other hand, is man whose “misfortune . . . in conversation 
is thus: he goes on without knowing how he is to get off. His genius is great, but his knowledge 
is small” (Life ii.196). Goldsmith’s knowledge disqualifies him for success and, worse still, his 
“for ever attempting to shine in conversation: he has not temper for it, he is so much mortified 
when he fails” (Life ii.231). Boswell suggests that Goldsmith skill in talking was better suited to 
“witty contests” and “often very fortunate when he entered the lists with Johnson himself” (Life 
ii.231). Such skill does not qualify him as the sort of conversationalist Johnson had in mind. 
Adept at wordplay, but lacking in knowledge, Goldsmith is model of a speaker who cannot talk 
for victory. 
To gain conversational victory, readers were subject to the conversational locus, a site of 
contest that depends on variety and a willingness to consider and adopt different views and 
arguments. The ability to consider and adopt opposing views marks a sympathy that Johnson’s 
rhetoric of self commands from his readers and, when they inhale his thoughts, intimates into 
their practice. Boswell relates an anecdote of a time when Johnson’s bristled at Goldsmith’s wish 
“for some additional memories to the LITERARY CLUB, to give it an agreeable variety” (Life 
iv. 183). Johnson took this as a personal attack rather than a disputational attack (although 
Johnson himself was not above ad hominem arguments), but later relented, acknowledging that 
Goldsmith was right:  
[W]hen people have lived a great deal together, they know what each of them will 
say on every subject. A new understanding, therefore, is desirable; because 
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though it may only furnish the same sense upon a question which would have 
been furnished by those with we are accustomed to live, yet this sense will have a 
different colouring; and colouring is of much effect in every thing else as well as 
in painting. (Life iv.183) 
Johnson’s depiction of the conversational contest as a “painting” makes it an organic whole that 
comes together through speakers “will say on every subject.” It is a self-contained work of art 
that derives its beauty from its diversity, the “different colourings” that different speakers 
contribute. Johnson’s acknowledgement of Goldsmith is an invitation to participate that, 
recorded in the Life, is likewise an invitation for a reader to bring a different “sense” to the 
intimacy of conversation. In the contest of the conversational locus, Johnson’s argumentation 
models a means of empirically observing other perspectives in order to consider them and 
carefully draw judgments about them.
79
 In this way, readers come into Johnson’s biographical 
presence through his conversation in a didactic exchange, which teaches them to move beyond 
the record of Johnson’s lived experience and life into their own lives and experience, where they 
must enter the larger social discourse. 
The contest of conversation in Boswell’s Life requires, additionally, a degree of civility 
that perpetuates it by fostering intimacy between participants. In exercising the force and 
dexterity of this argumentative acumen, Johnson demonstrates a gruffness that complements and, 
sometimes, makes victory possible. Boswell, however, offers an anecdote which models the 
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 The variety that adds depth to the conversational locus also affords a participant or a reader the opportunity to 
consider a variety of opinions. Boswell interprets this approach in Johnson frequently, so that Johnson’s willingness 
to argue an opinion “even when he had taken the wrong side,” by adopting an opinion he did not believe, in order 
“to shew the force and dexterity of his talents” (Life iv.111). But Johnson’s participation in the contest was not 
simply to argue for the sake of argument. Boswell emphasizes an important distinction by pointing out that “[c]are . 
. . must be taken to distinguish between Johnson when he ‘talked for victory,’ and Johnson when he had no desire 
but to inform and illustrate” (Life iv.111). Johnson, like Boswell’s professional player, is able to hold himself in 
reserve to make an argument opposed to his own beliefs and opinions. Johnson’s approach illustrates a productive 
playfulness. 
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civility that can facilitate the conversation when it carries beyond the boundaries of considered, 
social inquiry. Boswell recalls a “dispute pretty late at night, in which Johnson would not give 
up, though he had the wrong side, and in short, both kept field. Next morning, when they met in 
the breakfasting-room, Dr. Johnson accosted . . . [him]: ‘Sir, I have been thinking on our dispute 
last night—You were in the right” (Life iv.192). Boswell glosses this anecdote with an additional 
recollection of Johnson’s arguing in the evening and apologizing in the morning: “Sir, I have 
found out, upon reflection, that I was both warm and wrong in my argument with you last night; 
for the first of which I beg your pardon, and for the second, I thank you for setting me right” 
(Life iv.192 n.2). While these scenes are significant as instances contrary to Johnson’s typical 
gruffness, their import is the credence they give to the pursuit of truth that victory. Truth 
becomes most obvious through conversational victory and consideration, but victory will always 
bow to truth. “Keeping the field” must be less important to listeners and readers, even if striving 
for victory requires an apology. 
The truths that Johnson and the conversationalists subject to disputation in the Life range 
from childrearing, hypochondria, luxury, slavery, literature, and beyond.
80
 In this conversational 
locus, Alvin Kernan suggests that “Johnson’s reputation as a talker supports Boswell’s claims for 
the effectiveness of this style in that semiprivate world of talk which is located between the fully 
public scene of oratory and the totally private scene of reading” (206). Talking for truth is an 
exchange from the “public scene” of ideas and social discourse, mediated through the 
“semiprivate world” of conversation by Johnson, which is, in turn, facilitated by Boswell’s 
record of Johnson where it is transmitted through the “totally private scene of reading.” In 
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 The smaller talking points that made their way into the larger discourses, Hodge the cat or Johnson’s mysterious 
chemical experiments with orange peels, cannot be left out. Their effect, too, adds variety and “colouring” to the 
overall appearance of the “painting” in which Johnson locates conversation. In their small way, they invite readers 
into a domestic intimacy, where Johnson’s rhetoric of self is stripped of disputatious trappings of talking for victory.  
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Boswell’s account, in fact, Johnson argues that “[w]ithout truth there must be a dissolution of 
society . . . Society is held together by communication and information” (Life iii.293). Kernan’s 
observation points toward intimate conversational practice, exchanging the “communication and 
information” that, Johnson’s argues, hold the macrocosm of public life together. 
Talking through victory as an inquiry into truth begins to move readers from the intimate 
microcosm of table talk into the macrocosm of social discourse. Kernan argues that 
conversational move from microcosm to macrocosm is particularly evident in the “pattern of 
Johnson’s speaking, talking, and reading [which] offers a lived-out model of the ways that 
increased reading was affecting the society and its individual members, and an insight into how 
an individual experienced the change and its psychological dynamics” (205). Reading reshaped 
society by affecting the “psychological dynamics” of it readers, moving an “individual” reading 
experience to social practice. The textual Johnson in conversation engages the psychological 
dynamic, teaching readers how to participate in the larger social questions of the late eighteenth 
century. The “psychological” and social effect of discussing truth, however, is evident in 
Johnson’s famous criteria for the best conversations: “the happiest conversation is that of which 
nothing is distinctly remembered but a general effect of pleasing impression” (Life iv.50). 
Kernan describes the “lived-out model” that moves from reading to social work by creating a 
“general effect of pleasing impression.”  
It is a description of a conversation between Johnson and Bishop Percy that might easily 
be applied to public discourse. First, they take up a topic, a book, “that cannot defend or explain 
itself”—any discussion requires the application of knowledge, rhetoric, imagination, and 
perseverance—“but here in the room emotions and tones are felt and responded to immediately. 
Submission is made and reinforced with actions when the situation becomes dangerous. And 
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humor finally establishes and maintains a draw in which both antagonists give in, yet don’t 
surrender” (209). To argue for victory is to think for oneself, but to argue for truth is an inquiry 
that benefits society, semiprivately in a personal conversational locus and publicly. The 
didacticism of Boswell’s intimate portrayal of Johnson allows the reader to move from private 
observations of Johnson’s print self, to an intimate conversation with Johnson’s observed self, to 
an autodidactic, experimental process whereby the reader comes to participate in the larger social 
and ethical issues of the moment.   
The rhetoric of self that James Boswell writes Samuel Johnson into biographically is a 
didactic selfhood that builds on earlier strengths of eighteenth-century biographical models. 
Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of print and manuscript culture to arrange the 
experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood bound in time, but freed from the 
diachronic by a synchronic continuity that makes Johnson’s selfhood seem unchanging and 
intimately engaging and available to the reader. Boswell adapts Johnson’s dependence on print 
but demonstrates a distinct drive to document Johnson more thoroughly than any biography had 
previously documented a person. Using these documents, Boswell fashions an epistolary, 
documentary, and paratextual framework for Johnson. Likewise, Boswell moves beyond Oliver 
Goldsmith’s depiction of character as a Theophrastan model based on singular character, 
preferring instead to make Johnson’s character evident for readers who can discover it with the 
matrix of ten character traits he establishes as Johnsonian. Increasingly, the structuring that 
Boswell uses invites a reader into a sympathetic exchange with Johnson’s print self.  
It is the conversations that Boswell records that most explicitly distinguish Johnson’s 
rhetoric of self from other biographical selfhoods. Through conversation, Boswell most fully 
achieves his biographical project. In exhibiting Johnson’s lived experience and his character, 
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Boswell set himself up to reveal Johnson in his conversation, through which he strove to 
“Johnsonise the land.” Reading conversation situates readers to engage through listening and 
speaking. Conversation informs social intercourse, which in turn shapes the discursive practices 
of the larger society. The reader, who comes to talk and think Johnson by meeting the man in 
print, is transformed by this conversation. As a conversational locus, Johnson’s selfhood is less a 
thing to be observed than it is a presence, a person, a more intimate biographical subject than any 
prior. As Boswell writes, “unless” a man “has the comfort of a friend who will oppose him in 
nothing, nay will not trouble him with conversation but just as he appears to wish, watching him 
with soft attention, and as much possible preserving an unison with him. In such a state, books, 
which have been called silent friends, afford a kindly relief” (Hypochondriack I.148-9). The 
comfort Boswell takes in biography is a comfort that, like biographical conversation with 
Johnson, moves from the personal to the public: “I have generally found the reading of lives do 
me most good, by withdrawing my attention of myself to others, and entertaining me in the most 
satisfactory manner with real incidents in the varied course of human existence” 
(Hypochondriack I.149).  Perhaps the greatest test of the Life of Johnson is the potential Boswell 
saw in it for himself, and perhaps this is the test of what Boswell meant for the reader. 
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Conclusion 
 
Two Bodies  
 Eighteenth-century biography emerged in the wide scope of a new science that privileged 
experimentation and observation as the primary means for understanding the world and one’s 
place in it.  The emergence of the biographical form heralded an experiment in understanding the 
self that was advanced by a repeated cycle of observation, conclusion, induction, and, most 
importantly, personal application. Eighteenth-century biographers conducted this experiment in 
print for their readers, applying a variable and adaptable set of rhetorical strategies to arrange 
lived experience into a print selfhood that readers would approach ethically, inducing the 
character of the subject and evaluating it sympathetically. “Readers are wiser” than “critics and 
biographers,” Paula Backscheider explains, because “[t]hey know there will never be a poetics of 
biography, and yet there is a there, too . . . and the importance of biography . . . is its 
presentness—it is meaningful to the present, the life is, not just was, important” (227). The 
“there” that is “there,” in the absence of a formal test for recognizing biography is its effect on 
the reader. The effect that defines biography is a print selfhood that remains new and living 
every time the book is opened, not just an assemblage of rhetorical strategies, but rather the 
“presentness” and coherence of a person a reader can observe there and understand as a living 
self that “is important.”  When the book is closed, readers come away with an understanding of a 
living self they can apply to their own self-understanding. 
Biography near the close of the eighteenth century might be seen as a genre devoted 
solely to the life of Samuel Johnson and to maintaining his presentness in the years after his 
death. More than fifteen biographies marked his life and its passing. The two most prominent 
lives, Piozzi’s and Boswell, end with the presentness of Johnson’s physical person. The two 
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bodies of Johnson they submit for one final inspection by readers marks the changes in the form 
that culminate in Boswell’s innovative rhetoric of self. “It is usual, I know not why, when a 
character is given, to begin with a description of the person,” Hester Thrale Piozzi notes, closing 
her catalog of anecdotal recollections of Samuel Johnson (Anecdotes 297). Her biographical 
account necessitates a closing description and character more than others. It is comprised of 
anecdotes from her recollections of the last twenty years of Johnson’s life, which require little 
narrative structure, but what is necessary to set up Johnson’s sayings. Piozzi gives her readers a 
body capacious enough to contain all of her anecdotes. It is a body that is almost heroic in it 
physical excesses, a striking last image of the physical person with whom she would connect her 
anecdotal Johnson.  
Piozzi’s Anecdotes require the description and character as the last section of the account 
the reader sees to recombine the fragmented collection of anecdotes into a singular, coherent 
body: Johnson’s “stature was remarkably high, and his limbs exceedingly large: his strength was 
more than common I believe, and his activity had been greater I have heard than such a form 
gave one reason to expect: his complexion had certainly been fair, a circumstance somewhat 
unusual” (297). She idealizes Johnson in the body of a hero, noting that “his sight was near, and 
otherwise imperfect; yet his eyes, though of a light-grey colour, were so wild, so piercing, and at 
times so fierce, that fear was I believe the first emotion in the hearts of all his beholders” (297). 
While she has been following a formula of eighteenth-century biography, Piozzi’s description of 
Johnson gives her recollected anecdotes the sort of presentness that Backscheider describes. The 
body that Piozzi writes for Johnson is out reach; it is heroic and marked with “wild,” “piercing,” 
“fierce” eyes that turn the reader away from a clear view of the present man. By emphasizing 
Johnson’s greatness in the body of a hero, the selfhood stands a remove as the biographical 
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account closes. Piozzi’s Johnson walks along an earlier biographical tradition: everything about 
Johnson ultimately reflects his excellence, in the syllogistic, deductive fashion that makes a 
major premise of Johnson’s superlative nature that every saying, action, writing, and behavior 
proves. Even though Piozzi does not know why, “it is usual” indeed to portray a selfhood thus, 
and it is such portrayals that Boswell turns from in his innovations of the biographical form. 
As much as Piozzi turns the reader away from the body of Johnson and a 
conceptualization of his selfhood, Boswell points his readers back to the body of Samuel 
Johnson to recognize the selfhood embodied there. His Johnson is unchanged from the earlier 
print selfhood he presented, “as I do not see any reason to give a different character of my 
illustrious friend now, from what I formerly gave, the greatest part of the sketch of him in my 
‘Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides,’ is here adopted” (Life iv.425 n.1).  The familiarity that 
Boswell evokes confers credibility on the physical self he presents and, in turn, an overarching 
credibility for the details of the Life that it collects. Yet Boswell’s depiction of Johnson is an 
unflattering, almost grotesque image of the man’s physical self: 
 his appearance was rendered strange and somewhat uncouth, by convulsive 
cramps, by the scars of that distemper which it was once imagined the royal touch 
could cure, and by a slovenly mode of dress. He had the use only of one eye; yet 
so much does mind govern and even supply the deficiency of organs, that his 
visual perceptions, as far as they extended, were uncommonly quick and accurate. 
So morbid was his temperament, that he never knew the natural joy of a free and 
vigorous use of his limbs: when he walked, it was like the struggling gait of one 
in fetters; when he rode, he had no command or direction of his horse, but was 
carried as if in a balloon. (Life iv.425)  
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The body of Boswell’s Johnson is a scarred, twitchy, unkempt thing, given to tortured and 
limited movement. This physicality is much at odds with the vigorous, heroic body Piozzi 
invents for her Johnson. Her Johnson, too, looks back at his audience of beholders, but Boswell’s 
only invites readers to stare. He does not return their gaze or inspire their fear. If anything, 
Boswell’s Johnson is an object to be pitied, marked as it is by physical deformity and a lack of 
self-control. It is a description that fronts the presentness of the physical self to put the body into 
a sympathetic view. To look at the body of Boswell’s Johnson is to recognize a superlative mind 
in a pitiable body and to understand that what made Johnson great is not, as Piozzi makes it 
seem, out of reach. This body asserts the importance and meaning of Johnson’s life beyond its 
span, the presentness that Boswell’s biography evokes. 
 Situated at the end of the biography, this physical description underscores the humanity 
of the Johnson’s living selfhood and contrasts the greatness that Boswell locates in Johnson 
through his writing, conversations, and acquaintance. His circumstances are easier to consider as 
“naturally incident to . . . [readers’] state of life” (Johnson, Rambler III.319). Just as importantly, 
this physical description of Johnson is a power reminder not only of Boswell’s purpose, but the 
project of eighteenth-century biography at large: the arrangement of a rhetoric of self that 
embodies lived experience and right social practice. Boswell reconciles the grotesquerie of a 
physical self so incongruous with the character, personality, and beliefs he arranges as Johnson: 
“[t]hat with his constitution and habits of life he should have lived seventy-five years, is a proof 
that an inherent vivida vis is a powerful preservative of the human frame” (Life iv.425). A perfect 
segue from the physical self to the character and personality that Boswell describes next, the 
question of the “human frame” suggests an important cornerstone for the emergent eighteenth-
century biographical project. Where the human frame is present, the “vivida vis” or animating 
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“lively force” is manifest in action, reason, behavior, character; when the human frame is gone, 
the lively force that distinguishes a person’s selfhood is lost. The biographical rhetoric of self is a 
human frame, a humanizing print frame for containing and conveying the vivida vis, giving it 
presentness when the physical frame is absent, even years later. Being in the presence of this 
human frame, reading a biography, is to engage an autodidactic process of self-improvement, the 
non-coercive project of reading.  
  
The Human Frame  
The emergence of a humanizing frame for representing selfhood grew out of the shift 
from a deductive to inductive scientific paradigm and a corresponding methodology that 
presumed to be more for the people at large than earlier models. The Royal Society’s inductive 
epistemology depends on cyclical observations to generate specific facts from which observers 
might induce broad scientific truths that could, in turn, be tested and observed again to hone 
those scientific truths. It is a process that purports to refine scientific theories by considering an 
ever-widening body of facts and details. The methodology values the role of the person in 
making scientific meaning: it humanizes science. This model depends on consensus among 
multiple observers to credential facts. The Royal Society’s practices depend on human 
intervention and incorporate its limitations into a scientific model that lends itself to formulating 
an understanding of selfhood, like John Locke’s model of the self and self-understanding. Locke 
theorizes a scientific epistemology for the self as a reasoning person who develops through a 
reflexive self-consciousness, becoming a spectating self-observer that, as a consequence of 
observing multiple details and facts, generates its own distinctive selfhood.  
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Within the larger, scientific paradigm, the inductive epistemology is matched by a 
rhetoric appropriate to its methodology, one which would make its ideas accessible to all 
observers. Just as the inductive epistemology requires the observer or scientist to draw 
conclusions from a surfeit of facts, the rhetoric of the inductive paradigm invites a reader to draw 
conclusions from facts as well. As a paradigm purportedly for the people, its rhetoric must make 
the facts accessible with clear, plain language that stresses the importance of the idea rather than 
its expression, which foregrounds the process of drawing conclusions inductively. In its 
emphasis on transparency, this rhetorical style attempts to make facts more observable. 
The emergence of eighteenth-century biography within this context emulates the core 
practices and values that distinguish the epistemology and rhetoric of the inductive paradigm 
from the older scientific rhetoric of deduction. Novels, too, grew out of the normative scientific 
and print standards. The advent of biography and “its status as a respectable literary and didactic 
species, providing significant, accepted reading material to a wide (and widening range) or 
readers” led to the development of a novelistic selfhood (Hunter 351). While eighteenth-century 
novels and biographies share a representational impetus, they are constructed of different 
materials: the novel depends on imagined experiences with the stamp of life; biography, on the 
lived experiences that can be credentialed as life. Biography’s aesthetic must be real in a way 
that is nominal to novelistic realism. The normative standards this scientific model provide made 
it possible for biographers to gather as wide a range of facts as possible that could be credited as 
the experiences of the person they sought to write. Such credit came from observation—facts 
from other people that put the person in observable view of many people. The biography itself 
also put the person in view. Eighteenth-century biography developed a rhetoric of self that would 
allow a reader to determine selfhood from the facts the biographer presented. This rhetorical 
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arrangement, in turn, allowed the biographer to create choices for the readers who observed the 
selfhood from a new epistemology and new foundation for representation. The context of an 
inductive science that put the onus on the reader to observe and draw conclusions engendered a 
literature in which the act of reading opened an opportunity like scientists conducting 
experiments, observing and drawing conclusions from the details they saw. But it provided a 
human frame that these reader-scientists observed; it was not just an experiment. Readers’ 
sympathetic identification with human contradictions mark an ethics of reading that cultivated 
virtue for the reader in the project of reading biography. Their role of readers was to play the 
acquaintance to the biographical selves they read, and, in the process, become part of the 
experiment of testing and proving a self.  
 The most complicated biographical human frame of the eighteenth century was the life 
Boswell arranged for Johnson. The rhetoric of self that Boswell writes Johnson into 
biographically is a didactic selfhood that builds on earlier strengths of eighteenth-century 
biographical models from Johnson himself and Goldsmith, most notably.  Boswell sought to 
further humanize the rhetoric of self he developed to represent Johnson by cultivating an ethos of 
direct friendship and camaraderie with his subject, bending extant eighteenth-century 
biographical patterns to deliver a Johnson capable of exciting the sympathetic reader to view 
Johnson’s print life ethically. Boswell draws on Johnson’s applications of print and manuscript 
culture to arrange the experiential materials of his biography into a selfhood bound in time, but 
freed from the diachronic by a synchronic continuity that makes Johnson’s selfhood seem 
unchanging and intimately engaging and available to the reader. In the end, it is the 
conversations Boswell records that most explicitly distinguish Johnson’s rhetoric of self from 
other biographical selfhoods. Through conversation, Boswell most fully achieves his 
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biographical project, to “Johnsonise the land” (Life i.13). Reading conversation situates readers 
in a conversational locus where the reader not only observes, but especially engages the rhetoric 
of self through listening and speaking, the social, human act of talking. The larger consequence 
of this intimate biography is a larger social shift in which readers talk with or like Johnson and, 
through their observations, comes to think like Johnson as well. In the conversational locus, 
Johnson’s selfhood moves from the life observed to a presence, a person, a more intimate 
biographical subject than any prior.  
 
Biography Beyond the Eighteenth Century 
 In an introduction to a journal issue of a/b: Auto/Biography Studies, Elizabeth Podnieks 
notes that the “question that obtains from discussing the status of biography today within 
scholarly and popular contexts is this: has the attention being paid to biography of late been 
enough to redeem its long and embarrassing neglect?” (9). She asserts that modern biographical 
study usually vacillates between scholarly and popular extremes, “the market and the academy,” 
and argues that, within a context of cultural, social, and representation influences, “the impact of 
electronic technologies on the representations of self and the consequent biographical project; . . 
. [and] the increasing fusion of academic and popular mandates, apparatus, and approaches to the 
life” (5, 12). The modern biographical form develops, as it always has, within the larger social 
context that situates selfhood, and while the advent of new media complicates biographical 
practice, it illustrates the importance of the contextual framework within which the form the 
emerged. The significance is not necessarily the similarities between the two—developments in 
modern electronic technologies are no more influential than developments in the earlier media, 
print, and the work of the Grub Street hacks is as pervasive in the eighteenth century as it is in 
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journalistic blurbs now—but, rather, it is the similarities’ emphasis on material and 
epistemological contexts that highlight what has been at the heart of the form’s emergence and 
development, the larger contexts for recognizing and distinguishing selfhood.  
The emergence of biography in the eighteenth century and its formulation of the 
biographical rhetoric of self, a new human frame for representing selfhood through the methods 
of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, mark a defining moment in the form. While a 
biographical impulse might be located in earlier forms of life writing, biography proper is a 
development of the eighteenth century. But it is a genre in a constant state of flux and 
development, as responsive to the epistemological shifts and available methods for 
representation today as it was in the eighteenth century. A burgeoning print culture and a 
scientific epistemology of self gave rise to the eighteenth-century rhetoric of self which 
characterized the new form, a human frame that promised the new intimacy of understanding. 
We too may be on the cusp of new forms of understanding selves that are similarly revealing, 
pedagogical, and detailed, new potential rhetorics of self for a digital age. Boswell’s enduring 
lament is that the life of Johnson was no fuller than it was, that “might have been almost entirely 
preserved” if Johnson’s acquaintance had “been as diligent and ardent” in recording the facts of 
his life as Boswell himself had been (Life i.30). The rhetoric of self Boswell creates can reveal 
the Johnson “more completely than any man who has ever lived” (Life i.30). Eighteenth-century 
biography is charged with the vivida vis that gives the subject an intimate presentness: readers 
can know biographical subjects better than they have ever been known and know ourselves 
better, even centuries later, in the process. 
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